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Group.  Oslo,  Norway. 1. Sustainable  Prosperity? 
Can  the  American  economy  achieve  su.s:sinab/e  prosperify  -  a  ::ogressive 
spreading  of  the  benefits  of  economic  growth  to  more  and  more  people  over  a 
prolonged  period  of  time?  During  the  first  half  of the  twentieth  century  -- despite  the 
debacle  of  the  Great  Depression  -- the  United  States  emerged  as  the  world’s  most 
powerful  industrial  nation.  In  the  post-World  War  II decades,  the  United  States  had 
not  only  by  far  the  world’s  highest  per  capita  income,  but  also  a  distribution  of 
income  that,  until  the  early  197Os,  showed  continuous  improvement.  Since  then, 
Japan  has  mounted  a dramatic  challenge  to  the  economic  leadership  of  the  United 
States,  while  the  U.S.  income  distribution  has  become  increasingly  unequal.’  A 
report  from  the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  shows 
that  in  the  198Os,  of  all  the  advanced  industrial  economies,  the  United  States  had 
the  widest  income  gap  between  the  rich  and  poor.’ 
It  is  not  only  those  at  the  bottom  of  the  U.S.  income  distribution  who  are 
losing  out.  A  distinctive  dimension  of growing  income  inequality  in the  United  States 
has  been  a drop  in  the  real  incomes  of those  in  the  middle  of the  income  distribution 
_- what  many  have  called  “the  vanishing  middle  class”.3  Adjusted  for  inflation,  the 
median  income  of  American  employees  in  the  mid-1990s  is  some  five  percent  !ower 
than  it was  in  the  late  1970s.  Yet  since  the  early  1970s  the  American  economy  has 
grown  at  an  average  annual  rate  of well  over  two  percent.  Why  have  such  a  small 
proportion  of  Americans  -  perhaps  only  the  top  20  or  30  percent  of  the  income 
distribution  --  been  sharing  in  this  growth? 
A  major  cause  of  the  growing  inequality  in  income  distribution  has  been  the 
mounting  disappearanc”  = of  “good  jobs”  in  the  American  economy.  These  are  jobs 
that  provide  high  standards  of  living  in  terms  of  earnings,  employment  stability,  and 
benefits  for  sickness  and  old  age.  In  the  past,  the  widespread  availability  and 
economic  viability  of  these  good  jobs  provided  the  foundations  for  sustainable 
prosperity  in  the  United  States.  The  disappearance  of  such  jobs  has  placed 
sustainable  prosperity  in considerable  jeopardy. 
Goods  jobs  have  been  under  pressure  since  the  197Os,  and  have  been 
disappearing  rapidly  since  around  1980.4  The  phenomenon  is  structural,  not 
cyclical.  Hundreds  of  thousands  of  previously  stable  and  well-paid  blue-collar  jobs that  were  lost  in  the  recession  of  1980-1982  were  never  subsequently  restored, 
Between  1979  and  1983  the  number  of  people  employed  in  the  economy  as  a 
whole  increased  by  377,000  or  0.4  percent  while  employment  in  durable  goods 
manufacturing  --  which  supplied  most  of  the  good  blue-collar  jobs  --  declined  by 
2,023,OOO or  15.9  percent5 
indeed,  the  “boom”  years  of  the  mid-1980s  saw  hundreds  of  major  plant 
closings.  Between  1983  and  1987  4.6  million  workers  lost  their  jobs,  of  which  40 
percent  were  from  the  manufacturing  sector.6  The  elimination  of  these  well-paid 
and  stable  blue-collar  jobs  is  reflected  in  the  decline  of  the  proportion  of  the 
manufacturing  labor  force  that  is  unionized  from  47.4  percent  in  1970  to  27.8 
percent  in  1983  to  18.2  percent  in  1994.’ 
Throughout  the  1980s  American  corporations  displayed  a  mounting 
predilection  toward  “downsizing”.  Not  only  blue-collar  workers  were  affected. 
Professional,  administrative,  and  technical  personnel  -  so-called  “white-collar’ 
employees  --  experienced  a  significant  share  of the  elimination  of  previously  stable 
and  remunerative  jobs.  For  example,  a Business  Week  cover  story  of August  1986, 
entitled,  “The  End  of  Corporate  Loyalty?“,  observed  that  “cutbacks  are  becoming  a 
way  of  life  even  in  healthy  companies.“’  In  the  “white-collar’  recession  of  the  early 
1990s  tens  of  thousands  of  managerial  positions  were  eliminated,  again  apparently 
on  a permanent  basis.  Even  in this  recession,  blue-collar  workers  bore  the  brunt  of 
displacement,  but  the  dismissal  of  professional,  administrative,  and  technical 
employees  became  more  prevalent.  In  1982  the  rate  of  unemployment  of 
professional,  administrative,  and  technical  employees  was  37  percent  of  the  rate  of 
unemployment  of all  employees;  in  1994  44  percent.g 
Leading  the  downsizing  of  the  1980s  and  1990s  were  many  of  America’s 
largest  corporations.  From  1990  to  1995,  the  number  of  employees  of  the  50  U.S. 
companies  with  the  greatest  sales  volume  declined  by  almost  13  percent  even 
though  the  proportion  of sales  to  U.S.  gross  national  product  accounted  for  by  these 
companies  declined  by  less  than  1.5  percent  (see  Table  1).  Seventeen  U.S. 
industrial  corporations  that  in  1990  each  employed  more  than  100,000  people,  and 
combined  employed  3.4  million  people  worldwide,  had  by  199.5  reduced  their  net 
employment  by  a total  of over  700,000,  or by  about  21  percent  from  the  1990  levels 
(see  Table  2). 
2 Table  1.  Total  Employment  and  Sales  as  a Proportion  of GNP 
Fifty  U.S.  Industrial  Corporations  with  Largest  Sales,  1954-l  995 
Year  Employees  Annual  average  Sales  as  percent 
percent  change  ofGNP  .~..~.~~~~~~...~..~................~......~.....~.~..~..~  .-.-..-.....  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ..- -.........-...  .--  .  .  .._......._-.. .  .._....___.  _  .*....._....  _  .  .  .  .  .._  _..._...______._.__.__  .___.__. 
1954  3.729.097  18.83 
1959  4,087,864  0.46  (1954-1959)  19.93 
1969  6,366,904  4.53  (1959-1969)  21.69 
1979  6,203,785  -0.25  (1969-1979)  29.81 
1990  5,821,300  -0.57  (1979-1990)  23.41 
1993  5169,128  -3.73  (1990-1993)  20.70 
1995  5079,747  -0.86  (1993-1995) 
Note:  Worldwide  employment and  sales. 
Source:  Fortune  magazine,  ‘Fortune  500’  listings,  various  issues. 
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Table  2.  Net  Employment  Change  of U.S.  Industrial  Corporations  with  over 
100,000  Employees  in  1990,1990-1995  , 
- 
Company  Employees  Employees  Employment  %  change, 
1990  1995  .  .._..................................................-  change,1990-95  1990-95  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ..~.............................................................___._.............._...............  _..._....._........_.....................................,....... 
General  Motors  761.400  709,000  -52.400  -6.9 
Ford  3701400  346,900  -231410  -6.3 
IBM  373,816  252,215  -121,601  -32.5 
Pepsico*  308,000  480.000  172,000  55.8 
General  Electric  298,000  222,000  -76,000  -25.5 
United  Technologies  192,600  170,600  -22,000  -11.4 
Philip  Morris  168,000  151,000  -17,000  -10.1 
Boeing  161,700  105,000  -56,700  -35.1 
Du Pont  143,961  105,000  -38,961  -27.1 
Eastman  Kodak  134,450  96,600  -37,850  -28.2 
Chrysler  124,000  126,000  2,000  1.6 
Digital  Equipment  124,000  61,700  -62,300  -50.2 
McDonnell Douglas  121,190  63,612  -57,578  -47.5 
Westinghouse  115,774  77,813  -37,961  -32.8 
Xerox  110,000  85,200  -24,000  -22.5 
Goodyear  Tire  107,961  87,390  -20,571  -19.1 
Sara  Lee  107,800  149,100  41,300  38.3 
Allied  Signal  105,800  88,500  -17,300  -16.4 
Motorola  105,000  142,000  37,000  35.2 
Exxon  104,000  82,000  -22,000  -21.2 
Rockwell  international  101,900  82,671  -19,229  -18.9 
Notes:  Worldwide  employment  and  downsizing.  These  figures  are  not  adjusted  for  acquisitions  and 
thus  may  considerably  understate  gross  downsizing. 
l  In  1990,  Pepsico  was  listed  as  an  industrial  company  under  the  ‘beverage”  classification;  in 
1995,  after  acquiring  a  substantial  number  of  restaurants,  the  company  was  listed  as  a  serxe 
company  under  the  ‘food  services’  classification. 
Source.  “The  Fortune  500  By  Industr;r,’  Fortune  April  22,  1991;  ‘The  Fortune  1000  Ranked  Within 
Industries,’  Fortune,  April  29,  1997’ 
A  good  indicator  of this  decline  of  stable  and  remunerative  employment  is  the 
extent  to which  employers  provide  managers  and  workers  with  sickness  and  old  age 
benefits.  In  1960 only  11 percent  of the  civilian  labor  force  had  health  benefits  paid 
by employers.  By 1970  this  proportion  had  increased  to  30  percent  and  by  1980  to 
62  percent.  Yet  by  1990  only  52  percent  of  employees  had  health  benefits  paid  by 
3 employefs.1o  A  similar  trend  can  be  seen  in  employer  contributions  to  employee 
pension  funds.  In  1960  24  percent  of  the  civilian  labor  force  had  such  benefits,  in 
1970  32  percent,  and  in  1980  45  percent.  By  1990  this  proportion  had  declined  to 
40  percent,  and  by  1993  to  39  percent.  ”  This  decline  in  benefits  occurred  for  all 
occupational  classifications.  For  example,  comparing  1982  and  1993,  coverage  by 
group  health  plans  dropped  from  72  percent  to 61  percent  for  semi-skilled  workers, 
from  76  percent  to  57  percent  for  skilled  workers  (precision  production,  craft,  and 
repair  employees),  and  from  76  percent  to  67  percent  for  managerial  and 
professional  employees.‘2 
The  first  place  to  look  for  an  explanation  of  the  disappearance  of  good  jobs 
in  the  American  economy  is  employment  trends  within  the  nation’s  major  industrial 
corporations.  In  the  decades  after  World  War  II, the  foundations  of  U.S.  economic 
development  were  the  willingness  and  ability  of  the  nation’s  major  industrial 
corporations  to  allocate  their  considerable  financial  resources  to  investment 
strategies  that  created  the  good  jobs  that  many  Americans  began  to  take  for 
granted.  In  1969  the  50  largest  U.S.  industrial  corporations  by  sales  directly 
employed  6.4  million  people,  equivalent  to  7.5  percent  of  the  civilian  labor  force.  In 
1991  these  companies  directly  employed  5.2  million  people,  equivalent  to  4.2 
percent  of  the  labor  force  (see  Table  1).  And  since  1991  the  downsizing  of  these 
companies  has  gone  forward  at  a steady,  and  even  increasing,  pace.  Yet,  prior  to 
the  198Os,  large  industrial  corporations  had  been  the  employers  that  had  provided 
the  most  stable  and  remunerative  jobs  in the  economy. 
What  underlies  the  prevalence  and  persistence  of  corporate  downsizing?  A 
typical  top-management  explanation  is  that  changes  in  competition  and  technology 
have  rendered  significant  proportions  of existing  corporate  labor  forces  redundant  in 
terms  of  both  the  quantity  of  people  who  can  generate  corporate  revenues  and  the 
quality  of  skills  needed  to  do  so.  From  this  perspective,  downsizing  is  part  and 
parcel  of  a  strategy  for  corporate  restructuring  that  will  enhance  the  ability  of 
remaining  corporate  employees  to  generate  the  revenues  that  can  sustain  their 
employment.  Should  the  corporation  try  to  maintain  existing  levels  of  employment, 
so  the  argument  goes,  the  long-term  viability  of  the  whole  enterprise  could  be  in 
jeopardy.  From  this  perspective,  the  obligation  of  the  corporation  is  to  remain 
competitive,  an  objective  that  may  well  be  in  conflict  with  maintaining  the  prior  stock 
of  good  jobs. 
The  realities  of  international  competition  and  technological  change 
undoubtedly  demand  organizational  restructuring.  If  that  process  is  to  form  a 
4 renewed  foundation  for  sustainable  prosperity,  however,  it  must  entail  innovative 
investments.  Such  investments  mean  committing  resources  to  the  development  of 
integrated  skill  bases,  and  whether  these  investment  strategies  will  require  the 
employment  of  more  or  less  people  is  an  open  question.  It  is  possible  that,  in 
implementing  their  downsizing  strategies,  top  managers  of  major  U.S.  :oroorations 
have  focused  so  much  on  job  cutting  as  the  prime  mode  of  cost  cutting  that  they 
have  ignored  the  allocation  of  corporate  resources  to  innovative  investment 
strategies. 
Although  competitive  outcomes  are  always  uncertain  when  investment 
decisions  are  made,  innovative  investment  strategies  can  result  in  higher  quality 
and/or  lower  cost  products  than  the  enterprise  had  previously  been  capable  of 
generating.  Such  investment  strategies  invariably  require  the  allocation  of 
substantial  resources  to  skill  formation  within  the  enterprise.  This  skill  formation 
builds  on  capabilities  that  the  enterprise  has  already  accumulated,  and  provides  the 
foundation  for  learning  processes  that  can  enable  the  enterprise  to  gain  sustained 
competitive  advantage. 
Changes  in  the  employment  performance  of  major  U.S.  industrial 
corporations  appear  to  be  related  to changes  in the  ways  in which  those  who  govern 
these  corporations  have  been  choosing  to  allocate  corporate  revenues.  The  fact  is 
that  corporate  managers  control  substantial  financial  and  productive  resources  that 
permit  them  to  make  strategic  choices  in  the  allocation  of  resources.  Retained 
earnings  --undistributed  profits  and  capital  consumption  allowances  --  have  always 
provided,  and  continue  to  provide,  the  financial  resources  that  are  the  foundation  of 
investments  in  productive  capabilities  that  can  make  innovation  and  industrial 
development  possible.  From  1970  to  1989,  for  example,  retained  earnings 
accounted  for  91  percent  of  the  net  sources  of  finance  for  U.S.  nonfinancial 
industrial  corporations,  while  debt  finance  accounted  for  34  percent  with  new  equity 
and  other  sources  of finance  being  negative.13 
How  major  corporations  allocate  their  vast  revenues  are  matters  of  strategic 
choice,  and  the  strategic  choices  of  corporate  decision  makers  can  have  profound 
effects  on  the  availability  and  viability  of  stable  and  remunerative  employment 
opportunities.  To  understand  what  has  been  happening  to  employment 
opportunities  in  the  United  States,  therefore,  we  have  to  understand  strategic 
decision  making  within  the  nation’s  major  industrial  corporations,  and  how  and  why  it 
has  changed  over  time.  The  rhetoric  used  to  support  downsizing  proclaims  that  the 
prime,  if not  only,  corporate  responsibility  is to  “create  value  for  shareholders”.  And 
5 indeed,  since  the  1970s  many  corporations  have  become  obsessed  with  shedding 
employees  for  the  sake  of  boosting  profits  and  distributing  revenues  to 
stockholders. 
Under  the  slogan  of  “creating  shareholder  value”,  these  distributions  have 
taken  the  forms  of  not  only  dividends  but  also  stock  repurchases.  Dividends  as  a 
proportion  of  corporate  earnings  -  the  payout  ratio  -  has  risen  from  about  45 
percent  in  the  1960s  and  1970s  to  over  60  percent  in  the  1980s  and  1990s.  Stock 
repurchases  have  risen  even  more  dramatically.  Prior  to  the  1980s  corporations 
tended  to  issue  more  equities  than  they  repurchased,  although,  as  we  shall  see, 
equity  issues  have  never  been  an  important  source  of  funds  for  investment  in 
productive  capabilities.  But  during  the  1980s  the  net  equity  issues  for  U.S. 
corporations  became  negative  in  many  years,  largely  as  a  result  of  stock 
repurchases.  In  1985,  when  total  corporate  dividends  were  $92  billion,  stock 
repurchases  were  $20  billion,  or  about  22  percent  of  dividends.  In  1989,  when 
dividends  had  risen  to  $128  billion,  stock  repurchases  had  increased  to  over  $60 
billion,  or  almost  half  the  amount  of  dividends.  In  1990  to  1993  annual  stock 
repurchases  averaged  about  333  billion,  but  in  1994  rose  to  close  to  $70  billion  -  33 
percent  of  dividends  --  and  during  the  first  nine  months  of  1995  were  already  over 
that  amount.14 
The  strategic  managers  of  the  major  U.S.  industrial  corporations  were  not 
always  so  oriented  as  they  are  at  present  toward  “creating  value  for  shareholders”. 
In the  quarter  century  after  World  War  II, when  the  trend  was  toward  greater  income 
equality  in  the  United  States,  the  strategic  orientation  of American  corporations  was 
to  allocate  corporate  revenues  to  the  organization  in  the  forms  of  incomes  and 
benefits  for  both  managers  and  workers  as  well  as  for  investments  in  plant, 
equipment,  and  skills,  especially  the  skills  of managerial  personnel. 
Why,  during  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s  did  the  major  U.S.  corporations 
turn  from  reinvesting  revenues  and  generating  growing  numbers  of  stable  and 
remunerative  jobs  to  distributing  revenues  to  shareholders  and  shedding  long-time 
employees?  The  problem  is  not  just  a  change  in  ideological  outlook  by  the  top 
managers  of  America’s  major  industrial  corporations.  To  understand  the 
transformation  of  U.S.  industrial  corporations  from  financial  commitment  to  financial 
liquidity,  and  from  value  creation  to  value  extraction,  requires  an  analysis  of  the 
social  foundations  of  U.S.  industrial  development  during  the  quarter  century  after 
World  War  II  and  the  erosion  of  these  foundations  --  which  are  both  institutional 
6 and  organizational  --  since  the  1970s.  At  work  in  the  erosion  pmcess,  we  shall 
argue,  are  industrial  competition  from  abroad  and  financial  transformazion  at home. 
2.  The  Promise  of  Sustainable  Prosperity 
The  United  States  has  always  prided  itself  on  being  the  land  of  growing  opportunity 
_- a  nation  in  which  any  individual  might  rise  or  fall  economically  but  in  which  for  the 
population  as  a whole  economic  prosperity  would  be  an  ever-increasing  reality.  The 
United  States  emerged  from  World  War  II with  by  far  the  highest  GDP  per  capita  in 
the  world  (see  Table  3).  In  the  post-World  War  II  decades,  the  United  States  not 
only  held  leading  positions  in  capital  goods  industries  such  as  steel,  machine  tools, 
and  chemicals  but  was  also  dominant  in  ccnsumer  goods  industries  such  as 
automobiles,  electronics  and  pharmaceuticals. 
Table  3. Gross  Domestic  Product  per  Capita,  1913-1989 
U.S.S  at  1985  relative  prices 
1913  1950  1973  1989 
Nation  uss  %  of  uss  % of  uss  % of  uss  % of 
US  us  us  us  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  . .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ..~-......................................................................................._......  _  .  ..__.......................................................... 
United  States  4,846  100  8,605  100  14.093  100  18,282  100 
Germany  2,506  52  3,295  38  10,124  72  13,752  75 
Japan  1,153  24  1,620  19  9,524  68  15,336  84 
France  2,746  57  4,176  49  10,351  73  13,952  76 
Britain  4,152  86  5,651  66  10,079  72  13,519  74 
Source:  Angus  Maddison,  ‘Explaining  the  Economic  Performance  of  Nations,  1820-1989,”  in  William 
J.- Baumol,  Richard  R.  Nelson,  and  Edward  N.  Wolff,  Convercence  of  Productivitv:  Cross- 
National  Studies  and  Historical  Evidence,  Oxford  University  Press,  1994:  22. 
In  the  rapidly  expanding  global  economy  that  prevailed  in  the  decades  after 
World  War  II,  U.S.  leadership  in  technoiogy  and  productivity  enabled  dominant 
American  corporations  to  offer  stable  and  remunerative  employment  to  growing 
numbers  of  managers  and  workers,  both  within  their  own  enterprises  and  in  their 
supply  and  distribution  networks.  Table  4  illustrates  the  commanding  international 
lead  the  United  States  had  in  high  technology  in the  early  1960s. 
In  the  mid-1960s  the  United  Siates  ha.1  30  percent  or  more  of  world  market 
share  in  aircraft  and  parts  (50  percent  in  1962),  guided  missiles  and  aerospace  (43 
percent),  professional  and  scientific  instruments  (36  percent),  office,  computing  and 
accounting  machinery  (36  percent),  and  engines,  turbines,  and  parts  (31  percent).15 
In  1965  the  number  of  scientists  and  engineers  engaged  in  R&D  as  a  proportion  of 
total  employment  was  2-l/2  to  3  times  higher  in  the  United  States  than  in  Japan, 
Germany,  or  France.16  Into  the  late  196Os,  in  absolute  terms,  expenditure  on  R&D 
7 in  the  United  States  was  more  than  double  that  of  the  United  Kingdom,  Germany, 
France,  and  Japan  combined,  largely  because  of  massive  U.S.  federal  government 
funds  deployed  in  combination  with  investment  and  employment  by  U.S.  industrial 
corporations.”  In the  late  1960s  the  United  States  also  had  a  26  percent  share  of 
world  machine  tool  production,  larger  even  than  that  of  Germany,  which  had  by  far 
the  largest  share  of  world  exports  (see  Table  5). 
Table  4.  National  Shares  of World  High-Technology  Markets,  1962-1980 
percent  World  Market  Share  World  Export  Share 
Nation  1962  1970  1980  1962  1970  i 980 
USA  30.3  27.6  23.9  38.4  38.6  32.9 
Japan  4.1  9.6  12.3  4.6  6.9  5.8 
Germanv  17.6  18.0  17.5  k5  13.2  16.0 
*  France  7.7  7.8  9.0  7.2  10.6  12.1 
Source:  Romesh  Diwan  and  Chandana  Chakraboriy,  Hich  Technoloav  and  International 
Comoetitiveness.  Praeger,  1991:  45. 
Table  5.  Global  Shares  of Production  and  Exports  of Machine  Tools,  1968-1986 
percent  USA  Germany  Japan 
Year  Production  Exports  Production  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  _  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ..-................  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  Exports  Production  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ......  Exports  .-  .........  _  _..._.._..._.____._............................................. 
1968  26.3  10.0  N/A.  28.9  7.5  3.6 
1976  16.3  a.5  la.3  28.5  7.9  7.2 
1980  18.2  7.3  17.9  24.8  14.5  13.2 
1986  9.7  4.1  17.8  22.9  24.2  21.4 
Note:  N/A  means  not  available 
Source:  Artemis  March,  “The  U.S.  Machine  Tool  Industry  and  its  Foreign  Competitors,’  in  MIT 
Commission  on  Industrial  Produc!ivity,  The  Workina  Pacers  of  the  MIT  Commission  on 
Industrial  Productivitv,  Volume  2,  MIT  Press,  1989:  88. 
In  the  decades  after  World  War  II,  the  advantageous  position  of  U.S. 
industry  in  the  global  economy  created  the  promise  of  sustainable  prosperity  for 
Americans.  A  more  limited  promise  of  sustainable  prosperity  had  also  appeared  in 
the  1920s  when,  particularly  in  the  consumer  durable,  chemical,  and  electrical 
manufacturing  industries,  a  number  of  corporations  consolidated  their  control  over 
large  market  shares.  Between  1919  and  1929  manufacturing  production  in  the 
United  States  grew  at  a  rate  of  8.0  percent  per  annum  and  labor  productivity  in 
manufacturing  at  a  rate  of  5.6  percent  per  annum.  In  sharing  in  this  growth, 
managers  and  stockholders  fared  much  better  than  workers.  Between  1920  and 
1929,  managerial  salaries  in  manufacturing  rose  by  22  percent  and  enterprise 
surpluses  rose  by  63  percent,  while  the  wages  of workers  in manufacturing  fell  by  6 
percent.” 
8 The  workers  who  fared  best  during  the  1920s  were  those  who  found 
employment  with  the  dominant  mass  producers.  In  the  automobile  industry,  for 
example,  which  was  dominated  by  General  Motors  and  Ford  Motor  Company, 
wages  rose  by  24  percent  during  the  192Os,  while  managerial  salaries  rose  by  :5 
percent  and  enterprise  surpluses  by  193  percent.  At  a  small  number  of 
“progressive”  corporations  such  as  General  Motors,  General  Electric,  National  Cash 
Register,  Eastman  Kodak,  and  Procter  & Gamble,  the  1920s  saw  the  introduction  of 
organizational  initiatives,  including  systematic  promotion  and  pay  policies,  grievance 
procedures,  and  employee  representation,  designed  to  provide  stable  and 
remunerative  employment  to cooperative  shop-floor  workers.lg 
Yet,  in  the  early  193Os,  the  promise  of  sustainable  prosperity  vanished. 
Despite  initial  attempts  at  worksharing,  the  deepening  depression  of  economic 
activity  put  an  end  to  the  stable  employment  that  the  dominant  corporations  had 
been  able  and  willing  to  provide  in  the  1920s.  In  1929  Detroit  automobile 
companies  employed  475,000  workers;  by  the  end  of  1931  almost  half  of  this 
number  had  been  laid  off.  In  1933  wages  and  salaries  in  U.S.  manufacturing  were 
less  than  half,  and  in  the  automobile  and  steel  industries  well  under  40  percent,  of 
their  1929  levels.*’ 
Within  the  major  industrial  corporations,  shop-floor  workers  were  particularly 
affected  by  these  massive  cutbacks.  Having  invested  in  the  skills  of  managerial 
employees,  the  corporations  sought  to  keep  their  managerial  organizations  intact. 
The  more  valuable  the  employees  as  productive  assets,  the  more  reluctant  were  the 
corporations  to  part  company  with  them.  Indeed,  during  the  193Os,  the  industrial 
corporations  continued  to  augment  their  R&D  capabilities.  The  research 
laboratories  of  U.S.  manufacturing  enterprises  employed  2,775  scientific  and 
engineering  personnel,  or  0.56  research  professionals  per  thousand  manufacturing 
employees  in  1921;  10,927  professionals  or  1.93  per  thousand  in  1933;  and  almost 
28,000  professionals  or  3.5  per  thousand  in  1940.*’ 
During  the  early  1930s  most  of  the  industrial  corporations  --  even  those  that 
had  pursued  progressive  employment  policies  in  the  1920s  -  deemed  shop-floor 
workers  to  be  dispensable  because  the  companies  had  not  invested  in  their  skills. 
From  the  nineteenth  century,  the  prevailing  managerial  ideology  in  the  United 
States  had  been  to  develop  technology  in  ways  that  could  dispense  with  the  need 
for  shop-floor  skills  in  the  utilization  of  technology.**  The  pmgressive  employment 
practices  of  the  1920s  had  been  designed  to  secure  the  cooperation  of  shop-floor 
workers  in  supplying  their  efforts  to  ensuring  high  levels  of  utilization  of  expensive 
9 high-throughput  technologies.  But  at  the  same  time,  corporate  managers  sought  to 
develop  new  technologies  that  could  take  the  exercise  of skills  off  the  shop  floor. 
When,  during  the  1930-s,  even  the  most  dominant  industrial  corporations 
failed  to  provide  shop-floor  workers  with  stable  and  remunerative  jobs,  these 
employees  turned  to  industrial  unionism  to provide  them  with  some  control  over  their 
futures.  Backed  by  New  Deal  legislation  that  protected  the  rights  of  workers  to 
organize  unions  and  engage  in  collective  bargaining,  shop-floor  employees  in 
American  manufacturing  built  powerful  mass-production  unions  that  would  become 
a  major  force  in  ensuring  them  employment  security  and  high  wages  in  the  post- 
World  War  II expansion.  In the  posivvar  decades,  these  unions  did  not  challenge  the 
principle  of  management’s  right  to  control  the  development  and  utilization  of  the 
enterprise’s  productive  capabilities.z3  In  practice,  however,  the  quid  pro  quo  for 
union  cooperation  was  that  seniority  be  a  prime  criterion  for  promotion  along  well- 
defined  job  structures,  thus  giving  older  workers  best  access  to a succession  of jobs 
paying  gradually  rising  hourly  wage  rates.  This  labor-management  accord  provided 
the  organizational  basis  on  which  the  dominant  industrial  corporations  shared  the 
gains  of the  post-World  War  II prosperity  with  shop-floor  workers. 
The  economic  basis  for  the  growth  of  secure  and  stable  employment 
opportunities  and  a  more  equal  distribution  of  income  in  the  United  States  in  the 
post-World  War  II  decades  was  the  rapid  growth  of  the  international  economy 
combined  with  the  productive  capability  of  the  major  U.S.  industrial  corporations  to 
dominate  in  global  competition.  The  basis  of  the  sustained  competitive  advantage 
of  these  corporations  was  organizational  learning.  Through  learning  that  was  both 
collective  and  cumulative,  these  enterprises  developed  product  and  process 
technologies  that  competitors  could  not  easily  replicate.  In  most  of  the  U.S. 
industrial  corporations  that  dominated  in  global  competition,  this  organizational 
learning  occurred  among  technical,  administrative,  and  professional  personnel 
within  the  managerial  organization  and  specifically  excluded  operatives  on  the  shop 
floor. 
Nevertheless,  these  corporations  still  relied  on  the  cooperative  effort  of shop- 
floor  employees  to  secure  high  degrees  of  utilization  of the  process  technologies  in 
which  they  had  invested.  Within  the  framework  of  the  new  industrial  unionism, 
therefore,  these  corporations  could  benefit  economically  by  sharing  some  of  the 
returns  from  their  sustained  competitive  advantage  with  shop-floor  workers  in  the 
forms  of  stable  employment  and  good  wages  and  benefits. 
10 In  providing  these  shop-floor  workers  with  stable  and  remunerative 
employment,  however,  the  corporations  made  little  if any  attempt  to  integrate  Shop- 
floor  workers  into  the  organizational  learning  processe:.  Ra-.‘,er,  despite  th  3 
provision  of  good  jobs  to  shop-floor  workers,  the  ideology  persis4  that  shop-floe 
workers  were  merely  “hourly  employees”,  and  hence  easily  interchangeable  an  : 
replaceable  units  of  labor.  Such  hourly  employees  stood  in  contrast  to  professiona. 
managerial,  and  technical  employees  who,  as  “salaried  personnel,”  were  deemed  to 
be  members  of  the  enterprise  in  whose  skills  the  corporation  had  to  invest  and 
whose  capabilities  that  corporation  had  to  retain.  The  result  was  a  sharp 
organizational  segmentation  between  managers  and  workers  --  between  insiders 
and  outsiders  to  the  learning  process  --  that  would  prove  to  be  the  Achilles  heel  of 
American  industrial  corporations  when  challenged  from  abroad  by  corporations  that 
integrated  shop-floor  labor  into  the  processes  of organizational  learning. 
3.  The  Challenge  to  Sustainable  Prosperity 
The  sustained  competitive  advantage  of an  enterprise,  region,  or  nation  depends  on 
its  ability  to  develop  and  utilize  productive  resources  better  than  rival  enterprises, 
regions,  or  nations.  Across  nations  and  over  time,  the  superior  development  and 
utilization  of  productive  resources  has  increasingly  required  learning  that  is 
collective  and  cumulative  -  that  is,  organizational  learning  -  rather  than  simply  the 
aggregation  of  learning  by  individuals.24  Hence,  the  importance  of  organizations, 
both  government  and  business,  to  the  process  of  economic  development,  even  in 
“market  economies”  such  as  those  of the  United  States,  Germany,  and  Japan. 
The  collective  skill  bases  that  can  be  organizationally  integrated  to  generate 
organizational  learning  vary  across  industries  characterized  by  different 
technologies  that  provide  different  opportunities  for  collective  learning.  For 
example,  organizational  learning  in  the  pharmaceuticals  industry  relies  on  the 
integration  of  a  very  different  skill  base  than  organizational  learning  in  the 
automobile  industry.  Moreover,  even  within  a  particular  industry,  the  character  of 
the  integrated  skill  base  that  can  generate  organizational  learning  vanes  over  time 
as  cumulative  learning  transforms  the  possibilities  for  a  collective  skill  base  to 
develop  and  utilize  productive  resources.  For  example,  compared  with  the  skill 
bases  within  the  managerial  structures  of  the  enterprise  that  enabled  the  U.S. 
automobile  companies  to  be  the  dominant  mass  producers  from  the  1920s  to  the 
196Os,  the  successful  challenge  of  the  Japanese  automobile  producers  has  relied 
on  broader  and  deeper  skill  bases  --  ones  that  include  both  managerial  and  shop- 
11 floor  employees  within  core  enterprises  and  organizational  integration  of  the  skills 
bases  in  core  enterprises  with  those  of suppliers. 
As  a general  rule,  within  any  given  industry  and  for any  given  technology,  the 
potential  for  organizational  learning  that  is  collective  and  cumulative  has  made 
economic  development  increasingly  dependent  on  organizational  integration 
characterized  by  broader  and  deeper  skill  bases.  These  broader  and  deeper  skill 
bases,  mobilized  for  industrial  development,  in  turn  can  provide  the  foundations  for 
the  sustainable  prosperity  of a region  or  nation.  Not  only  can  they  generate  higher 
quality,  lower  cost  products  that  bring  economic  growth,  but,  by  relying  on  the 
participation  of  more  people  with  greater  skills  to  generate  these  products,  they  can 
distribute  more  widely  among  the  working  population  the  gains  of  economic  growth. 
If,  as  we  shall  argue,  the  effective  challenges  to  sustainable  prosperity  in the 
United  States  have  come  from  foreign  enterprises  that  develop  and  utilize 
productive  resources  by  integrating  broader  and  deeper  skill  bases,  strategic 
responses  of  U.S.  enterprises  could  entail  organizational  integration  that  extends 
the  collective  learning  process  to  groups  of  producers  -  other  employees  and  other 
firms  --  whose  productive  capabilities  were  previously  excluded  from  the  collective 
learning  process.  But  such  innovative  responses  that  broaden  and  deepen  the 
productive  capabilities  engaged  in  the  collective  learning  process  may  not  be 
forthcoming  because  strategic  decision  makers  may  have  neither  the  incentive  nor 
the  ability  to  make  such  strategic  investments.  Rather  they  may  seek  to  compete  on 
the  basis  of  the  pre-existing  organizational  integration  that  had  given  their 
enterprises  competitive  advantage  in  the  past.  In  the  face  of  the  competitive 
challenges,  they  may  even  choose  to  exit  from  developing  and  utilizing  particular 
technologies  in  industries  in which  a competitive  response  demands  investments  in 
broader  and  deeper  skill  bases. 
As  a  necessary  complement  to  organizational  integration  in  the  process  of 
innovation,  financial  commitment  is  a term  we  use  to  describe  the  social  relations 
that  are  the  basis  for  the  ongoing  access  of a  business  organisation  to  the  financial 
resources  required  to  sustain  the  development  and  utilization  of  productive 
resources.25  The  level  and  duration  of  financial  commitment  required  to  generate 
innovation  varies  across  industries  characterized  by  different  learning  processes 
and  over  time  as  learning  processes  require  broader  and  deeper  skill  bases. 
In  combination,  organizational  integration  and  financial  commitment  provide 
social  foundations  for  innovative  business  enterprise.  In  terms  of  inputs  into  the 
production  process,  organizational  integration  supplies  knowledge  and  financial 
12 commitment  supplies  money.  In  contributing  to  the  innovation  process,  however, 
these  inputs  are  not  commodities.  They  reflect  the  social  relations  to  the  business 
organization  of  people  who  supply  knowledge  and  money.  These  social  conditions 
constitute  norms  according  to  which  strategic  decisions  are  made  within  enterprises 
concerning  the  allocation  of  resources  to  the  productive  transformation  in  these 
organizations  and  the  allocation  of  returns  from  it.  Without  institutions  that  support 
organizational  integration  and  financial  commitment  -  or  more  precisely,  without  the 
organizational  control  over  knowledge  and  money  that  these  conditions  support  - 
business  enterprises  cannot  generate  innovation  through  strategic  investments  in 
collective  learning  processes.  In  all  of  the  advanced  industrial  nations,  in  different 
ways  and  to  varying  degrees  at  any  one  time  as  well  as  over  time,  organizational 
integration  and  financial  commitment  have  provided  the  social  foundations  for 
innovation  and  industrial  development. 
The  Wealth  of Different  Nations 
From  the  late  nineteenth  century, 
experienced  a  transformation  in 
the  U.S.,  German,  and  Japanese  economies  all 
the  social  organization  of  their  major  business 
enterprises.  This  social  transformation  has  become  known  as  “the  managerial 
revolution”.  The  characteristic  features  of  the  managerial  revolution  were  1)  the 
employment  of  technical  and  administrative  personnel  by  business  organizations  on 
a  “permanent”  basis  so  that  these  employees  could  engage  in  organizational 
learning;  and  2)  the  governance  of  these  enterprises  by  salaried  managers  so  that 
they  could  allocate  surplus  revenues  to  investment  strategies  that  sought  to  develop 
further  and  utilize  more  completely  the  productive  capabilities  of  the  business 
organization. 
While  organizational  control  over  both  knowledge  and  money  have  been 
common  characteristics  of  successful  industrial  development  in nations  such  as  the 
United  States,  Germany,  and  Japan  during  this  century,  there  have  also  been 
significant  differences  in  organizational  integration  and  financial  commitment  within 
business  enterprises  across  advanced  economies.26  We  shall  focus  on  the 
differences  between  Japan  and  the  United  States  because  it  has  been  Japanese 
industrial  enterprises  that  over  the  past  two  decades  have  mounted  the  most 
effective  challenges  to  U.S.  industrial  dominance.  In  gaining  ascendancy  in 
international  competition,  the  peculiar  features  of the  Japanese  economy  have  been 
1)  the  extension  of  permanent  employment  to  male  shop-floor  workers  so  that  the 
enterprise  can,  as  is  the  case  with  managerial  employees,  develop  and  utilize  their 
13 skills  in  an  organizational  learning  process;  and  2)  the  evolution  and  persistence  of 
a cross-shareholding  movement  in which  major  companies  hold  each  others’  equity 
shares  for  the  purpose  of  ensuring  that  these  business  organizations  can  maintain 
control  over  the  revenues  that  they  generate. 
Japanese  permanent  employment  builds  on  the  high-quality  but 
nonvocational  primary  and  secondary  educations  that  all  the  nation’s  children 
receive.  The  level  of  education  attained  (college  or  high  school)  tracks  males  into 
managerial  or  shop-floor  employment,  while  females  are  generally  expected  to  drop 
out  of  the  paid  labor  force  once  married  and  hence  are  not  considered  permanent 
employees.  At  major  companies,  all  permanent  employees,  both  managers  and 
workers,  go  through  extensive  internal  training  in  a  wide  variety  of  activities  that 
gives  them  the  capabilities  to  work  in  teams  to  solve  problems  specific  to  the 
company’s  products  and  processes. 
Cross-shareholding,  which  began  in  the  1950s  to  keep  public  shareholders 
from  laying  claim  to  the  financial  resources  of  companies  recovering  from  the 
devastations  of  World  War  II, currently  involves  about  70  percent  of  the  outstanding 
shares  of  the  major  industrial  corporations.  Companies  hold  these  shares  of  other 
companies,  not  for  capital  gains  or dividends,  but  to  suppress  the  property  rights  of 
individuals  and  thereby  ensure  that  business  organizations,  by  controlling  their 
financial  resources,  can  govern  their  investment  strategies.  In  effect,  for  the  sake  of 
industrial  development,  the  Japanese  business  community  has  organized  itself  to 
suspend  the  traditional  rights  of  individual  shareholding  in  collective  business 
organizations.  These  companies  have  been  run  for  the  sake  of  permanent 
employees  --  that  is,  male  managers  and  workers  within  the  company.  The  practice 
of  cross-shareholding,  however,  also  means  that  across  companies  the  critical 
relations  are  not  ones  of  property  but  of  business.  Major  Japanese  companies  not 
only  commit  resources  to develop  the  productive  capabilities  of their  own  companies 
but  also  release  skills  and  m,oney  to  set  up  new  autonomous  companies  and  make 
investments  in  other  legally  distinct  enterprises  (especially  suppliers)  with  which  the 
company  is  engaged  in  a process  of organizational  learning. 
The  Japanese  Challenge  to  American  industry 
In  the  1970s  and  1980s  the  Japanese  successfully  challenged  the  Americans  in 
industries  that  mass  produced  durable  goods  such  as  passenger  cars,  televisions, 
audio  equipment,  video  equipment,  photocopiers,  and  computers  --  industries  in 
which  the  United  States  had  previously  reigned  supreme.  Japanese  competitive 
14 advantage  in  these  industries  built  on  their  advances  in  verticaily  re!<:ed  capital- 
goods  industries  such  as  steel,  machine  tools,  and  semiconduczors  tr.at  provided 
the  materials,  the  equipment,  and  ‘the  components  for  generating  high-  Auality,  low- 
cost  products.*’ 
The  Japanese  challenge  was  devastatirg  in  consumer  ?!ectronics 
__  an  industrial  sector  in  which,  in  the  decades  after  World  War  II, the  United  States 
had  been  the  unrivaled  world  leader.  Indeed,  during  the  middle  decades  of  the 
century,  a  number  of  U.S.-based  companies  -  General  Electric,  RCA,  Motorola,  and 
Zenith  among  others  -  collectively  created  the  consumer  electronics  industry. 
Critical  to  U.S.  dominance  in  these  industries  were  its  pioneering  efforts,  first  in 
vacuum  tubes,  then  transistors,  and  finally  semiconductors. 
By  the  1970s  the  market  for  electronics  products  was  vast.  Between  1977 
and  1985,  the  U.S.  consumer  electronics  market  alone  increased  by  we!l  over  300 
percent  in  real  terms,  with  video  recording  sales  increasing  from  only  2  percent  of 
the  total  in  1977  to  about  25  percent  in  1985.”  During  the  mid-1980s,  the  total 
consumer  electronics  market  in  the  United  States  was  estimated  to  be  about  $30 
billion  per  year.  Yet,  by  that  time,  it was  a market  that  had  been  lost  or  abandoned 
by  most  of  the  American  companies  that  had  previously  dominated  the  industry.  It 
was  the  Japanese  who,  in  consumer  electronics,  generated  such  formidable,  and 
often  unbeatable,  competition  to  the  Americans.  Companies  such  as  Sony,  Hitachi, 
and  Matsushita  entered  the  consumer  electronics  industries  in the  1950s  in  products 
such  as  radios  and  tape’  recorders,  and  then  developed  their  capabilities  in  audio 
equipment  and  video  equipment.  U.S.  imports  increased  from  less  than  6 percent  of 
the  U.S.  consumer  electronics  market  in  1960  to  over  50  percent  in  1979.” 
The  United  States  went  from  almost  complete  control  of  the  radio  market  in 
1955  to  virtually  no  market  share  twenty  years  later.  RCA,  the  company  that  had 
pioneered  in  radio  in  1920s  enjoyed  enormous  success  in  televisions  in  the  1950s 
and  1960s  and  complete  failure  in  video  equipment  in  the  1970s  and  1980~.~’  In 
1985  RCA  had  $2.3  billion  in  consumer  electronic  sales  (about  ten  percent  of  the 
entire  U.S.  market).  But  two  years  later,  when  RCA  was  acquired  by  General 
Electric  as  part  of  its  deal  for  NBC,  GE  closed  down  all  of  RCA’s  operations 
(including  the  company’s  David  Sarnoff  Research  Laboratory)  and  sold  the  RCA 
brand  name  to  the  French  electronics  company,  Thomson  (a  company  whose  own 
name  traces  back  to  GE’s  pioneering  scientist,  Elihu  Thomson).  Zenith,  the  lone 
U.S.  television  manufacturer  in  the  late  198Os,  ceased  producing  tele\/isions  in  the 
United  States  in  1995.“’ 
15 In  many  other  consumer  electronics  product  markets,  the  story  was  much  the 
same.  For  example,  in the  rapidly  expanding  video  recording  markets,  in which  U.S. 
companies  had  been  the  technological  pioneers,  Japanese  companies  such  as 
Sony  and  Matsushita  emerged  as  overwhelmingly  dominant  in  the  late  1970s  and 
early  1  980s.32  Indeed,  from  the  early  1970s  the  Japanese  consumer  electronics 
companies  had  been  busy  setting  up  production  facilities  in  the  United  States,  at 
first  using  some  of the  plants  that  had  been  abandoned  by  U.S.  producers.” 
So  too  in  the  automobile  industry,  the  competitive  challenge  to  a  previously 
dominant  U.S.  industry  came  from  the  Japanese.  From  the  first  decades  of  the 
twentieth  century,  the  United  States  had  taken  the  lead  in  the  mass-production  of 
automobiles.  In  1950,  with  Europe  and  Japan  still  struggling  to  recover  from  the 
industrial  damage  of  Wodd  War  II,  the  United  States  produced  over  80  percent  of 
the  world’s  automobiles  (cars,  trucks,  and  buses).34  Even  in  1960,  when  Europe 
and  Japan  had  substantially  rebuilt  their  war-torn  economies,  the  United  States 
retained  about  50  percent  of  world  production,  the  Europeans  about  35  percent, 
and  the  Japanese  only  about  two  percent.  The  Japanese  increased  production 
from  less  than  half  a  million  vehicles  in  1960  to  5.3  million  in  1970  and  11 .O million 
in  1980,  a  year  in  which  they  surpassed  the  Americans  as  the  world’s  largest 
producers  of  automobiles  with  about  29  percent  of world  production.35 
Domestic  sales  on  the  Japanese  market  were  an  important  part  of  the 
demand  for  Japanese  automobiles.  Motor  vehicle  sales  within  Japan  increased 
from  440,000  vehicles  in  1960  to well  over  5 million  in  1980.  But  it was  the  ability  of 
the  Japanese  to  build  on  this  home  market  to  compete  for  foreign  markets  that 
made  them  world  leaders  in  automobiles.  Exports  as  a  proportion  of  total 
production  increased  from  8  percent  in  1960  to  21  percent  in  1970,  and  then  to  54 
percent  in  1980.  Japanese  exports  had  been  growing  steadily  even  before  the 
OPEC-generated  oil  crisis  of  1973-1974;  in  1971  the  Japanese  were  exporting  1.8 
million  vehicles,  or  31  percent  of  total  production.  In  1977,  for  the  first  time,  the 
Japanese  exported  more  automobiles  than  they  sold  at home.36  In the  early  198Os, 
about  half  of  the  Japanese  output  was  produced  by  two  companies,  Toyota  and 
Nissan,  which  joined  General  Motors  and  Ford  as  the  world’s  leading  automobile 
companies.37 
Central  to  the  export  success  of  the  Japanese  was  their  ability  to  penetrate  the 
huge  U.S.  automobile  market.  In  1965  U.S.  imports  accounted  for just  13  percent  of 
Japanese  automobile  exports.  By  1970  this  figure  had  risen  to  38  percent,  and  it 
peaked  at  55  percent  during  the  second  oil  crisis  of  1979.  In  15  years  -- from  1964 
16 to  19T9  --  the  number  of  Japanese  automobiles  imported  into  the  United  States 
increased  from  less  than  20,000  to  over  2.5  million.  From  the  eariy  1982s  first  in 
response  to  U.S.  government  political  pressure  and  then  in  response  to  rising 
Japanese  wages  and  the  strengthening  yen,  Japanese  automcbiie  compar,ies 
began  to  build  plants  in  the  United  States  to  produce  cars  for  the  U.S.  mar!-;?!, 
bringing  their  innovative  production  practices  directly  to  the  United  States.  Between 
1982  and  1992,  the  Japanese  invested  almost  $9  billion  to set, up  9  major  assembly 
plants  in  the  United  States,  employing  more  than  30,000  workers  and  with  a 
capacity  to  produce  2.4  million  automobiles  per  year,  some  20  percent  of  total  U.S. 
production.38 
It was  not  only  in  the  automobile  industry  that  Japanese  companies  brought 
their  productive  capabilities,  developed  in  Japan  to,  produce  for  domestic  and 
foreign  marke?s,  to  compete  for  markets  by  producing  in the  United  States.  By  1989 
Japanese  industrial  companies  had  set  up  1,275  plants  in  the  United  States, 
employing  over  300,000  people  directly,  in  steel,  computers,  industrial  machinery, 
rubber,  and  plastics  as  well  automobiles  and  consumer  electronics.3g  Success  in 
these  industries  was  not  simply  the  result  of  creative  vision  and  deft  marketing  -- 
although  Japanese  companies  showed  themselves  to  be  adept  at  both.  Nor  were 
low  wage  rates  or  low  interest  rates  the  foundation  of Japanese  success.  Rather  the 
Japanese  gained  competitive  advantage  through  a  transformation  of  the  way  in 
which  products  were  developed  and  utilized  in  mass-production  industries.  This 
productive  transformation  permitted  Japanese  enterprises  to generate  products  that, 
in  particular  market  segments,  were  both  higher  quality  and  lower  cost  than  their 
competitors. 
Japanese  success  in  high-technology  consumer-durables  industries  both 
depended  on,  and  encouraged,  the  transformation  of  the  nation’s  capital-goods 
industries.  In  particular,  from  the  1960s  to  the  1980s  the  Japanese  transformed 
their  machine-tool  industry,  trading  places  with  the  United  States  in  shares  of  world 
production  and  exports  (see  Table  5).40  So  too,  during  the  1970s  and  198Os,  and 
integral  to  their  successes  in  consumer  electronics,  computers,  and 
telecommunications  equipment,  and  mechatronics,  Japanese  companies  such  as 
NEC,  Toshiba,  Hitachi,  Fujitsu,  Mitsubishi,  and  Matsushita  became  world  leaders  in 
semiconductor  production,  and  especially  in  dynamic  random  access  memories 
(DRAMs).~’  While  the.Japanese  share  of  global  semiconductor  sales  rose  from  26 
percent  to  49  percent  from  1980  to  lb90,  the  U.S.  share  fell  from  58  percent  to  37 
17 percent.  In  1990  Japanese  held  over  70  percent  of  the  world  DRAM  market,  up 
from  22  percent  a decade  eariier.42 
What  made  the  Japanese  such  formidable  competitors  was  the  extent  of 
organizational  integration  that  they  achieved  within  and  across  business  enterprises. 
All  of  the  management  practices  -  ‘JIT  manufacturing,  total  quality  control,  focused 
factories,  concurrent  engineering,  short  product  development  cycles,  and  close 
relationships  with  suppliers,  customers,  and  laboratories”,  to  quote  one 
knowledgeable  observera  -  that,  by  the  198Os,  were  being  exported  from  Japan  to 
the  rest  of  the  worid  entailed  broader  and  deeper  organizational  integration.  This 
organizational  integration  in turn  enabled  the  Japanese  to  become  the  world  leaders 
in  the  development  and  utilization  of  machine  technologies  and  advanced  materials 
that  further  transformed  the  ability  of  enterprises  to  generate  high-quality,  low-cost 
products  -  even  as  these  enterprises  paid  their  employees  higher  and  higher 
wages.  That  the  Japanese  transformed  themselves  into  a high-wage  economy  while 
paying  financial  interests  low  rates  of  returns  manifests  the  financial  commitment 
that  permitted  investments  in  organization  and  technology.  These  investments  in 
turn  generated  products  that  outcompeted  the  previous  world  leaders  in  terms  of 
both  quality  and  cost. 
Occurring  as  it did  across  a broad,  and  interrelated,  set  of industries  in which 
the  United  States  had  previously  been  world  dominant,  competition  from  Japan 
posed  a  f0rmidab.e  challenge  to  U.S.  prosperity.  On  the  shop  floor  and  within 
managerial  structures  of  major  U.S.  industrial  corporations,  the  sustainability  of  the 
stable  and  remunerative  employment  of  millions  of  American  workers  could  no 
longer  be  taken  for  granted  as  product  markets  in what  had  been  the  most  powerful 
industries  in  the  United  States  were  lost. 
If the  Japanese  challenge  had  been  based  on  low  wages,  as  many  believed 
in  the  197Os,  then  the  threat  to  the  sustainability  of  American  employment  in  mass- 
production  industries  should  have  vanished  as  Japanese  wages  climbed  at  a  rapid 
pace.  At  the  beginning  of  the  1970s  Japanese  wages  per  hour  for  production 
workers  in  manufacturing  were  only  about  one-sixth  of  U.S.  hourly  wages.  By  the 
end  of  the  decade,  however,  Japanese  wages  were  about  five-sixths  of  the  U.S. 
level,  and  during  the  1980s  the  differential  vanished.  Between  1982  and  1994 
hourly  manufacturing  compensation,  measured  in  current  U.S.  dollars,  increased  by 
55  percent  in  the  United  States,  178  percent  in  West  Germany,  and  296  percent  in 
Japan44  --  yet  Japanese  manufacturers  continued  to  exert  formidable  pressure  on 
their  American  and  German  competitors. 
18 What  needs  to  be  explained  is  the  abiiity  of  the  Japanese  to  transform  low 
wages  into  high  wages  on  a  sustained  basis.  Prote*::icn  of  the  home  market  and 
unfair  trade  practices  do  not  provide  compelling  explanations  in  view  of  the  ultimate, 
and  relatively  rapid,  success  of  the  Japanese  in  transforming  low  .vages  into  high 
wages  and  gaining  dominant  shares  nf  world  markets.  For  a  nation  en::ge.  1 
global  compe?ition,  sustained  increase? J  in  earnings  for  large  numbers  ,of peczre 
require  that  a  significant  proportion  of  its  productive  enterprises  be  able  to  develop 
and  utilize  productive  resources  so  that  they  can  gain  sus&inab/e  competitive 
advanfage.  To  understand  how  the  Japanese  outcompeted  the  United  States  in the 
1970s  and  1980s  (and  beyond)  is  to  understand  how  their  major  enterprises 
pursued  innovative  strategies  that  resulted  in  the  superior  development  and 
utilization  of  productive  resources  on  the  basis  of  superior  organizational  integration 
and  greater  financial  commitment  than  the  integration  and  commitment  that 
prevailed  in  the  United  States. 
In  an  industry  characterized  by  complex  divisions  of  labor,  the  deve!opment 
of  productive  resources  requires  organizational  learning  --  that  is,  learning  in  which 
participants  in  the  business  organization  acquire  knowledge  and  solve  problems  as 
a  collectivity  that  cumulates  it  capabilities  over  time.  As  part  of  an  innovative 
strategy  that  seeks  to  develop  productive  resources,  the  utilization  of  productive 
resources  requires  organizational  incentives  that  induce  members  of  the  business 
organization  to  apply  their  productive  capabilities  to  the  benefit  of  the  enterprise  as 
a  whole.  Put  differently,  in  industries  that  entail  complex  divisions  of  labor, 
sustained  competitive  advantage  is  the  result  of  a social  process  that  is  embedded 
in the  business  enterprise. 
For  the  innovative  enterprise,  the  technological  -  or  developmental  -- 
challenge  is  to  generate  products  that  are  higher  quality  than  those  which  are 
currently  available  on  the  market,  and  the  economic  -- or  utilization  -- challenge  is to 
generate  these  higher  quality  products  at  lower  unit  costs  than  competitors.  The 
technological  and  economic  challenges  are  inextricably  related  because  the  cost  of 
developing  productive  resources  depends  on  the  utilization  of  productive  resources 
that  enter  into  the  developmental  process,  while  the  utilization  of  productive 
resources  depends  on  the  quality  of  the  productive  resources  that  the  enterprise 
has  developed. 
For  example,  the  longer  the  product-development  cycle,  the  higher  the  fixed 
costs  inherent  in  the  product,  and  the  higher  the  level  of  productivity  required  to 
achieve  low  unit  costs.  For  many  products,  developmental  investments  are  large 
19 relative  to  the  investment  in  plant  and  equipment  required  to  produce  a  new 
product.  To  give  three  examples:  for  the  Hewlett-Packard  Deskjet  500  printer,  the 
development  cost  was  $50  million  and  the  production  investment  $25  million;  for  the 
Chrysler  Concorde  automobile,  31  billion  and  $600  million;  and  for  the  Boeing  777 
airliner,  $3  billion  and  $3  biilion.45  Given  these  developmental  costs,  the  ability  to 
achieve  high  levels  of  productivity  depends  on  the  development  of  process 
technologies  that  permit  high  levels  of throughput  and  low  levels  of  defects.  Indeed, 
a key  characteristic  of  all  of the  organizational  practices  for technology  development 
that  have  been  important  to  Japanese  success  has  been  the  integration  of  product 
and  process  development 
Organizational  integration  represents  the  way  in  which  the  innovative 
enterprise  seeks  to  meet  these  two  challenges  -- I the  technological  and  the 
economic  --  simultaneously.  Over  the  past  fifteen  years  or so  --  from  the  time  that 
many  Americans  who  were  knowledgeable  about  production  began  to  realize  that 
the  Japanese  challenge  would  not  simply  disappear  --  studies  have  accumulated 
that  recognize  the  importance  of  organizational  integration  to  Japanese  competitive 
advantage  in  the  mechanical  and  electronic  industries  that  its companies  have  come 
to  dominate.  There  is  now  a  large  and  expanding  body  of  evidence,  based  on 
enterprise-level  studies,  that  shows  that  organizational  integration  is  key  to  superior 
product  development  and  process  development,  and  that  a  prime  source  of 
competitive  advantage  of  Japanese  companies  in  global  competition  is  the 
organizational  integration  of  participants  in  the  enterprise  to  foster  collective  and 
cumulative  learning  processes.46 
The  enterprise  must  invest  substantial  resources  to finance  the  development 
of the  capabilities  of  large  numbers  of  employees  through  collective  learning.  These 
costs  include  not  only  the  commonly  measured  expenditures  on  R&D  but  also  the 
training  of  people  to  perform  a  wide  variety  of  tasks  and  the  funding  of 
experimentation  at  all  functional  and  hierarchical  levels  of  the  organization.  These 
developmental  costs  derive  from  permitting  people  to  engage  in  learning  processes 
that  eventually  can  result  in  superior  products  and  processes,  even  though  in  many 
cases  the  use  of  existing  practice  could  save  on  these  costs  and  achieve  higher 
levels  of  output  and  revenue  in  the  short  run.  Resource  commitments  must  also  be 
made  to  give  employees  the  incentives  to  devote  their  creativity  to  enterprise  goals 
and  to  make  their  acquired  experience  available  to  benefit  the  enterprise  in  the 
future. 
20 Although  standard  accounting  practices  do  not  classify  investments  in 
organization  as  enterprise  assets,  investments  in  collective  learning  processes  <‘ire 
indeed  assets,  the  acquisition  of  which  entail  substantial  fixed  costs  for  ~:e 
enterprise.  In  incurring  these  high  fixed  costs,  the  strategy  of  the  enterprise  is  to 
develop  capabilities  that  will  generate  the  high  quality,  lower  cost  products  that  at-3 
the  products  of  innovation  and  the  sources  of  competitive  advantage.  These  high 
fixed  costs  make  it critical,  however,  that  the  enterprise  actually  achieve  the  superior 
development  and  utilization  of  its  productive  resources  if it  is  to  gain  a  competitive 
advantage.  Indeed,  an  enterprise  that  incurs  the  high  fixed  costs  of  investments  in 
organizational  integration  without  achieving  a  superior  development  and  utilization 
of  productive  resources  will  place  itself  at  a  competitive  disadvantage  relative  to 
what  its  competitive  position  would  have  been  had  it  eschewed  such  an  investment 
strategy.47 
As  is  well  known,  a  characteristic  organizational  feature  of  major  Japanese 
corporations  since  the  1950s  has  been  the  permanent  employment  of  not  only 
managerial  personnel  (as  was  effectively  the  case  in  major  U.S.  corporations  until 
the  1980s)  but  also  male  shop-floor  workers.  In  addition,  major  Japanese  industrial 
corporations  maintain  long-term  relationships  with  vertically  related  enterprises, 
especially  component  suppliers.48  If  and  when  this  organizational  integration  of 
personnel,  employed  both  directly  and  through  subcontractors,  does  not  generate 
higher  quality,  lower  cost  products  on  a  sustained  basis,  the  high  fixed  costs 
inherent  in  such  an  organizational  structure  place  major  Japanese  companies  at  a 
competitive  disadvantage.  Prima  facie  evidence  that  this  employment  system 
instead  provided  a foundation  for  sustainable  competitive  advantage  from  the  1950s 
lies  in  the  fact  that  the  system  became  institutionalized  in  the  decades  that 
Japanese  incomes  rose  dramatically  while  Japanese  companies  were  able  to 
continuously  reinvest  in more  and  better  productive  capabilities. 
To  develop  and  utilize  productive  resources  on  the  basis  of  organizational 
learning  requires  financial  commitment.  Before  World  War  II,  the  zaibatsu,  the 
enterprise  groups  that  were  central  to  the  development  of  Japanese  industry, 
provided  financial  commitment,  particularly  to  the  heavy  machinery  and  shipbuilding 
industries.  The  ownership  of the  holding  companies  that  ran  powerful  zaibatsu  such 
as  Mitsui,  Mitsubishi,  and  Sumitomo  remained  largely  in  the  hands  of  the  founding 
families  but  strategic  control  over  the  allocation  of  zaibatsu  resources  passed 
increasingly  to  salaried  career  managers.4g  In  the  aftermath  of  World  War  II  the 
Allied  occupation  dissolved  the  zaibatsu  by  distributing  shares  in  the  holding 
21 companies  to  the  general  public,  thus  transferring  ownership  from  the  zaibatsu 
families  and  formally  severing  the  ownership  linkages  among  the  constituent 
zaibatsu  enterprises.  Most  of these  companies  had  their  equities  listed  on  the  Tokyo 
Stock  Exchange  when  it was  reopened  in  May  1949.  5o 
In  the  195Os,  after  the  Allies  departed,  the  Japanese  business  community, 
led  by  the  top  managers  of  the  major  industrial  companies  and  banks,  initiated  a 
cross-shareholding  movement  to  ensure  that  outside  stockholders  did  not  disrupt 
the  accumulation  of  capabilities  in  industries  such  as  consumer  electronics  and 
automobiles.  Japanese  businesses  bought  blocks  of  each  other’s  shares  with  the 
intent  of  remaining  stable  shareholders  who,  for  the  sake  of  ensuring  organizational 
control,  would  neither  sell  the  shares  on  the  open  market  nor  demand  high 
dividends.  The  concomitant  rise  and  strengthening  of  enterprise  unionism 
reinforced  the  forces  in Japanese  industry  and  society  that  supported  organizational 
control  over  enterprise  revenues  by  making  the  delivery  of  permanent  employment 
and  higher  earnings  to  male  employees  major  goals  of  the  enterprise.  After  Japan 
joined  the  OECD  in  1964,  the  Japanese  business  community  increased  the  level  of 
cross-shareholding  to  ensure  that  foreigners  did  not  use  the  market 
control  to take  over  the  increasingly  successful  Japanese  companies. 
By  the  late  1980s  cross-shareholding  accounted  for  about  68 
shares  list  on  the  Tokyo  Stock  Exchange  and  in  1995  was  about 
for  corporate 
percent  of  all 
65  percent.5’ 
Meanwhile,  as  Japanese  companies  barely  increased  dividends  per  share  from  their 
nominal  levels  in  the  1950s  yields  of  corporate  stocks  declined  to  less  than  one 
percent  in  the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s.  Even  life  insurance  companies,  which  in 
1989  owned  13  percent  of  shares  of  listed  companies  outstanding,  have  been 
stable  shareholders  -- they  do  not  normally  sell  the  shares  that  they  hold.52 
What  binds  the  Japanese  business  community  together  in  providing  financial 
commitment  is  not  the  yields  that  they  can  receive  on  each  other’s  shares,  or  even 
the  property  rights  conventionally  associated  with  these  shares,  but  the  business 
relations  they  have  with  each  other  and  the  consequent  common  interest  in  the 
sustained  growth  of  the  Japanese  economy.  Into  the  mid-1990s,  the  cross- 
shareholding  movement  has  remained  intact,  despite  the  financial  mania  of the  late 
1980s  that  created  strong  short-term  incentives  for  any  individual  cross- 
shareholding  company  to  market  the  shares  of  other  companies  on  the  vastly 
inflated  Tokyo  stock  market.  At  the  same  time,  as  they  develop  new  lines  of 
business,  successful  Japanese  industrial  enterprises  often  provide  the  knowledge 
22 and  money  to  spin  off  new  enterprises  with  distinctive  product-market  orientations 
as  distinct  u:“.its  of  strategic  control  within  the  enterprise  group.  a 
Throughout  the  twentieth  century,  the  foundation  of  Japanese  corporate 
finance  has  been  retained  earnings.  As  was  the  case  before  World  War  II,  these 
retained  earnings  have  often  been  highly  leveraged  by  lcans  from  b::rks,  K.:I  the 
main  bank  of  the  company’s  keirefsu  taking  the  lead.  Also,  as  before  the  war,  the 
main  banks  could  commit  finance  to  industrial  development  because  of  not  only 
their  deposit  base  but  also  their  access  to  funds  through  the  “overloan”  policies  of 
the  Bank  of  Japan.s4  By  the  late  198Os,  the  success  of  the  industrial  companies 
permitted  them  to  reduce,  in  many  cases  dramatically,  their  bank  debt. 
Organizational  control  over  the  allocation  of  corporate  revenues  remains 
dominant  in  Japan,  therefore,  because  the  business  community  has  cooperated  in 
ensuring  that  shareholders  cannot  extract  resources  from  industrial  enterprises, 
while  the  government,  through  the  regulation  of  the  financial  system,  has  ensured 
that  debt  financing  for  industrial  development  is  both  inexpensive  and  secure. 
Manifesting  the  dominance  of  organizational  control  is  the  remuneration  of  top 
managers  of  Japanese  industrial  corporations,  which  remains  far  below  that  of  their 
counterparts  in  the  United  States  and  Britain,  even  when  -  as  is  often  the  case  -- 
their  companies  outperform  their  U.S.  and  British  counterparts.55 
Indeed,  the  outstanding  performance  of  Japanese  companies  over  the  past 
few  decades  derives  in  part  from  the  recognition  that  top  managers  hold  their 
positions  of  authority  and  responsibility  as  members  of  an  organization  and  that  the 
capabilities  that  permit  superior  economic  performance  are  not  individual  but 
organizational.  The  foundations  of  these  organizational  capabilities  are  not  only 
within  the  managerial  structure  but  also  on  the  shop  floor  and  in  vertically  related 
enterprises.s6  Japan’s  economic  success  reflects  a  powerful  mode  of  “collective 
capitalism”  in  which  members  of  the  business  community,  acting  in  concert,  have 
suspended  the  traditional  rights  of  private  stockholding  for  the  sake  of  sustained 
economic  grow-th.57 
4. The  Erosion  of  Sustainable  Prosperity 
Financial  commitment  was  also  central  to  the  rise  of the  United  States  to  its  position 
of  industrial  leadership  during  the  first  half  of  the  twentieth  century.  In  the  United 
States,  even  more  so  than  in  Japan,  retained  earnings  formed  the  foundation  of 
enterprise  access  to  committed  finance.  In the  United  States,  as  in  Japan,  financial 
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utilized  productive  resources. 
Unlike  Japan,  however,  the  organizational  integration  characteristic  of 
American  companies  did  not  extend  to  the  shop  floor,  but  was  confined  to  the 
professional,  administrative,  and  technical  employees  who  inhabited  the  managerial 
structure.  Nevertheless,  in  its  time,  the  organizational  integration  of  managerial 
employees  in  U.S.  corporations  represented  a  powerful  mode  for  developing  and 
utilizing  technology.  The  limits  of  this  restricted  U.S.  mode  of  organizational 
integration  for  developing  and  utilizing  productive  resources  became  apparent, 
however,  with  the  coming  of  the  Japanese  challenge.  Confronted  by  business 
organizations  that  developed  and  utilized  broader  and  deeper  skill  bases,  the 
competitive  advantages  of  organizational  integration  within  U.S.  managerial 
structures  came  up  against  the  competitive  disadvantages  of  organizational 
segmentation  between  management  and  labor. 
Moreover,  in  contrast  to  Japan,  the  financial  commitment  that  could  be 
obtained  from  reinvesting  the  earnings  of already  successful  productive  investments 
did  not  give  birth  to  new  ventures  affiliated  with  enterprise  groups.  Rather  it created 
pressures  for  the  growth  of  the  corporate  enterprise,  either  through  internal 
expansion  or  external  acquisition,  so  that  strategic  control  became  increasingly 
concentrated  in  the  central  offices  of  multibusiness  enterprises.  Confronted  by 
business  organizations  that  permitted  the  decentralization  of  strategic  control  in 
units  affiliated  to  the  enterprise  group,  the  competitive  advantages  of  financial 
commitment  by  powerful  corporate  enterprises  were  offset  by  the  competitive 
disadvantages  of  organizational  segmentation  of  top  management  with  strategic 
control  from  the  learning  collectivities  within  the  managerial  organization  that 
developed  and  utilized  the  productive  resources  of the  enterprise. 
Confronted  by  competitive  challenges  that  required  organizational 
transformation  for  innovative  responses,  many  U.S.  industrial  corporations  in  the 
last  few  decades  have  instead  sought  to  compete  on  the  basis  of  adaptive 
responses.58  Rather  than  integrate  strategic  managers  with  the  learning 
collectivities,  and  rather  than  extend  organizational  integration  to  the  shop  floor, 
most  major  U.S.  industrial  enterprises  have  chosen  to  narrow  and  concentrate  the 
skill  bases  in  which  they  invest.  These  learning  collectivities  can  often  still  maintain 
world  leadership  in  industries  and  activities  in which  their  enterprises  had  been  able 
to  cumulate  productive  capabilities  in  the  past.”  But  such  enterprises  are  not 
making  investments  in  the  broader  and  deeper  collectivities  that  are  needed  to 
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providing  the  financial  commitment  required  for  develop:iental  investments,  these 
enterprises  have  become  obsessed  with  financial  liquidity  as  manifested  by  high 
levels  of  dividends,  unprecedented  stock  repurchases,  and  massive  corporate 
downsizing.  To  the  origins  and  implications  of  organizaticnal  segmentation  and 
financial  liquidity  in  U.S.  industry,  we  now  turn. 
From  Organizational  Integration  to  Organizational  Segmentation 
The  impact  of  the  Japanese  challenge  has  varied  markedly  across 
industries.  The  Japanese  challenge  has  been  least  in  industries  such  as 
pharmaceuticals  and  chemicals  in  which  it  is  possible  to  innovate  and  gain 
competitive  advantage  through  the  organizational  integration  of  relatively  small 
groups  of  scientists  and  engineers.  In  industries  such  as  automobiles  and 
consumer  electronics  in which  competitive  advantage  depends  on  the  organizational 
integration  of  not  only  managerial  (professional,  administrative,  and  technical) 
employees  but  also  shop-floor  personnel,  the  United  States  has  been  most 
susceptible  to  the  Japanese  challenge.  The  challenge  to  high  value-added  industry 
in  the  United  States  has  come  not  from  low-wage  competition  but  from  enterprises 
and  industries  that  have  gained  competitive  advantage  through  the  development 
and  utilization  of  broader  and  deeper  skill  bases  than  American  companies. 
Even  within  product  markets  in  which  U.S.  companies  remain  world  leaders, 
there  is  insufficient  broadening  and  deepening  of the  skill  base  to  retain  competitive 
advantage  for  producers  in the  United  States.  Take  for  example  the  case  of General 
Electric  Medical  Equipment,  one  of GE’s  twelve  businesses  in which,  in  line  with  the 
competitive  strategy  propounded  by  CEO  Jack  Welch  from  the  early  198Os,  the 
company  considers  itself  to  be  the  “number  one  or  number  two”  producer  in  the 
world.60  Since  1982  GE’s  capability  for  developing  and  manufacturing  medical 
equipment  has  become  increasingly  reliant  on  a  joint  venture  with  a  Japanese 
company,  Yokogawa  Elec*&c,  a  world  leader  in  manufacturing  industrial  control 
systems  and  a  prime  example  of  Japanese  manufacturing  excellence.6’  In  1982, 
GE’s  distribution  contract  with  Yokogawa  Electric,  begun  in  1976,  was  transformed 
into  a joint  venture,  Yokogawa  Medical  Systems  C/MS),  after  Yokogawa  Electric,  in 
defiance  of  GE,  had  begun  manufacturing  CT  scanners  for  the  Japanese  market. 
All  of  the  YMS’s  original  333  employees  came  from  Yokogawa  Electric,  and  the 
company’s  internal  organization  and  productive  capabilities  are  distinctly  of 
Japanese  origin.  In  1986,  it was  the  successful  development  of  these  indigenous 
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percent,  and  in  1994,  it was  the  ever-expanding  range  of  YMS’s  product  lines  and 
its  increasing  share  of  global  (including  U.S.)  markets  that  led  GE  to  change  the 
company’s  name  to  GE  Yokogawa  Medical  Systems. 
Nurturing  of  foreign  competitors  through  strategic  alliances  that  combine 
outsourcing  with  technology  transfer  is  not  new  to  U.S.  companies.  From  the 
196Os,  in  industries  such  as  consumer  electronics,  leading  U.S.  enterprises 
outsourced  manufacturing  with  attendant  transfers  of  key  technologies  abroad.62  At 
some  point,  the  subcontractors,  having  acquired  American  technology  and  having 
developed  manufacturing  capability,  then  invested  in  product  development  and 
marketing  capability,  put  their  own  brand  names  on  the  final  product,  and  became 
the  new  competition.  Unless  American  companies  reverse  the  process  by  investing 
in  broader  and  deeper  skill  bases,  the  competitive  problems  will  only  grow  as  other 
national  economies  besides  Japan  make  these  investments.  It  would  appear, 
however,  that  far  from  responding  to  foreign  competition  by  investing  in 
organizational  integration,  the  prevalent  tendencies  in  U.S.  industrial  corporations 
have  been  toward  hierarchical,  functional,  and  strategic  segmentation.63 
As  we  have  already  indicated,  the  evolution  of  the  American  employment 
system  creates  profound  biases  within  American  corporations  toward  hierarchical 
segmentation  and  against  investments  in broader  and  deeper  skill  bases.  From  the 
early  nineteenth  century,  the  mobility  of  labor  in  the  United  States  created  a  bias 
toward  developing  manufacturing  technologies  that  would  not  require  the 
complementary  application  of  skills  and  exercise  of initiative  by  shop-floor  workers.64 
To  develop  these  technologies  and  ensure  their  complete  utilization  required 
investment  in  managerial  organization.  The  attempts  in  the  late  nineteenth  century 
to  increase  the  power  of  craft  unions  through  their  organization  into  the  American 
Federation  of  Labor  only  increased  the  resolve  of  entrepreneurs  ar.3  managers  to 
develop  and  utilize  manufacturing  technologies  in  ways  that  segmented  shop-floor 
workers  from  the  learning  process. 
The  industrial  unionism  that,  during  the  1930s  replaced  craft  unionism 
helped  to  institutionalize  the  segmentation  of  shop-floor  workers  from  the 
organizational  learning  process.  Industrial  unions  focused  on  getting  their  members 
a  share  of  the  competitive  gains  made  possible  by  learning  processes  generated 
within  the  enterprises’  managerial  structures.  In  return  for  higher  wages  and 
benefits,  shop-floor  workers  cooperated  in  supplying  the  labor  effort  that  ensured 
high  levels  of  utilization  of expensive  process  technologies  on  the  shop  floor. 
26 In  those  industries  in  which  the  integration  of  shop-floor  workers  into  the 
collective  learning  process  has  become  fundamental  to  innovation,  the  American 
mode  of  utilizing,  but  not  developing,  the  productive  capabilities  of  shop-floor  labor 
can  no  longer  generate  the  revenues  to  maintain  the  employment  and  wage  levels 
of  shop-floor  workers.  Hierarchical  segmentation  between  managers  and  workers 
has  become  a  barrier  to  innovation  and  competitive  advantage  in  many  U.S. 
industries.  The  failure  of American  industrial  corporations,  and  American  society,  to 
make  the  necessary  investments  in  developing  the  productive  capability  of  shop- 
floor  workers  is  a  prime  cause  of the  decline  of  good  jobs  and  the  growth  of  income 
inequality  in  the  United  States. 
But  the  problems  of  collective  learning  in  U.S.  industrial  corporations  go 
beyond  the  hierarchical  segmentation  of  management  and  labor.  Within  the 
managerial  structure  itself,  the  learning  process  has  become  increasingly  subject  to 
functional  segmentation.  Rather  than  engage  in  “concurrent  engineering”  in  which 
managerial  personnel  in  marketing,  product  design,  and  manufacturing  work  as 
teams,  upstream  specialists  (for  example,  design  engineers)  work  in  isolation  from 
downstream  specialists  (for  example,  production  engineers),  throwing  their  work  -- 
and  the  problems  inherent  in  it  --  “over  the  wall”  to  the  next  functional  activity, 
Functional  segmentation  results  in  longer  product  development  cycles  and  inferior 
products  than  is  the  case  with  functional  integration?  In  historical  perspective, 
functional  segmentation  in  U.S.  industry  was  exacerbated  by  the  quest  by  highly 
specialized  professional,  administrative,  and  technical  employees  to  protect  their 
positions  of  authority  and  responsibility  within  the  business  enterprises  that  employ 
them  in  response  to  challenges  to  their  hierarchical  authority  and  responsibility  from 
strategic  managers  above  and  shop-floor  workers  below. 
In  addition  to  functional  and  hierarchical  segmentation,  there  has  been  a 
tendency  in  U.S.  industrial  corporations  toward  strategic  segmentation  --  the 
vesting  of  strategic  decision  making  power  within  the  corporation  in  top  managers 
who,  by  their  isolation  at  the  top  of  the  corporate  hierarchy,  possess  little  capacity 
for  understanding  and  evaluating  the  problems  and  possibilities  for  organizational 
learning  within  their  enterprises.  In the  face  of  a growing  hierarchical  and  functional 
segmentation  of  American  corporate  organizations  in  the  post-World  War  II 
decades,  top  managers  portrayed  themselves  as  “generalists”  who,  requiring  no 
specialized  knowledge,  could  manage  anything.  Indeed,  specialized  knowledge 
about  particular  products  and  processes  was  often  portrayed  as  an  impediment  to 
strategic  decision  making,  and  there  was  a  tendency  for  personnel  with_ financial 
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corporations.66 
The  segmentation  of  these  top  managers  from  the  organizational  learning 
process  within  the  enterprise  resulted  in strategic  decision  making  that  was  limited  in 
its  ability  to  assess  or build  on  the  enterprise’s  innovative  capabilities.67  As  a result, 
strategic  managers  of  U.S.  corporations  often  made  costly  investments  in  plant  and 
equipment  that  could  be  purchased  on  the  market  without  complementary 
investments  in  organizational  learning  that  could  transform  the  combination  of 
physical  and  human  resources  into  sources  of competitive  advantage.68 
To  argue  for  the  centrality  of  organizational  integration  to  innovation  and, 
hence,  economic  development  by  no  means  implies  that  we  do  not  have  much  to 
learn  about  the  social  conditions  under  which  appropriate  organizational  integration 
is  achieved  and  what  strategic  actions  can  be  taken  to  transform  these  conditions, 
To  what  extent  does  organizational  integration  or  organizational  segmentation  within 
enterprises  derive  from  the  social  institutions  that  characterize  the  economy  in which 
these  enterprises  evolve  and  compete?  To  what  extent  is  a  tendency  from 
organizational  integration  to  organizational  segmentation  the  result  of  an 
evolutionary  process  of  enterprise  growth?  To  what  extent  is  inadequate 
organizational  integration  the  result  of the  emergence  of new  competitors? 
A  research  program  to  answer  these  questions  requires  detailed  company- 
level  research  that  is  both  dynamic  over  time  and  comparative  across  social 
environments.  What  we  are  presenting  here,  based  on  research  that  has  already 
been  done,  is  a  theoretical  framework  on  the  dynamic  interactions  among 
organization,  technology,  and  competition  that  makes  it  possible  to  analyze  these 
questions  systematically.  In  particular,  at  the  enterprise  level  such  research  must 
analyze  the  dynamic  interactions  among  the  different  types  of  organizational 
segmentation  in  contributing  to  the  erosion  of  sustainable  prosperity.  For  example, 
hierarchical  segmentation  can  exacerbate  strategic  segmentation  as  a narrow  group 
of  insiders  concentrate  strategic  control  to  defend  against  the  claims  on  corporate 
resources  of  a  large  group  of  outsiders.  Or  functional  segmentation  can  lead  to 
greater  strategic  segmentation  by  creating  the  need  for  the  coordination  of  highly 
specialized  activities  by  those  who  have  no  specialist  expertise  or  identity.  Strategic 
segmentation  might  induce  functional  specialists  to  demarcate  and  codify  their 
realms  of  specialization  in  order  to  exercise  greater  control  over  their  spheres  of 
expertise,  in  the  process  making  functional  segmentation  more  pronounced. 
Strategic  segmentation  might  also  result  in  greater  hierarchical  segmentation  as 
28 strategic  managers,  unable  and  unwilling  to  invest  in  organizational  learning 
processes,  instead  treat  employees  (such  as  those  in  professional,  administrative, 
and  technical  activities)  who  were  previously  integrated  into  the  organization  like 
those  (such  as  shop-floor  employees)  who  are  already  segmented. 
Existing  research  on  organizational  integration  and  segmentation  relieals 
that  the  organizational  integration  that  generates  innovation  occurs  across,  as  well 
as  within,  enterprises.  Elements  of  hierarchical,  functional,  and  strategic  integration 
or  segmentation  exist  in  the  relation  of  subcontracting  enterprises  that  supply 
materials,  components,  and  machinery  to  dominant  enterprises.  A  large  and 
growing  body  of  evidence  on  U.S.  and  Japanese  supplier  relations  shows  the 
importance  for  innovation  and  competitive  advantage  of  the  organizational 
integration  of  dominant  enterprises  with  suppliers.6g  Organizational  segmentation  is 
not  a  problem  when  materials,  components,  and  machinery  have  become 
standardized  commodities  and  innovation  is  not  required.  Indeed,  under  these 
circumstances,  strategic,  functional,  and  hierarchical  segmentation  between  the 
buyer  and  supplier  can  be  expected  to  be  the  norms.  But  such  conditions  can  pose 
fundamental  problems  when  innovation  in  the  supply  of  capital  goods,  whether  as 
materials,  components,  or  machines,  is required  to meet  competitive  challenges. 
From  Financial  Commitment  to  Financial  Liquidity 
Organizational  integration  and  the  collective  learning  process  for  which  it  provides  a 
foundation  require  financial  commitment.  Investments  in  organizational  integration 
do  not  simply  occur.  Rather  they  are  the  results  of  strategic  decisions  by  those  who 
control  financial  resources  that  can  be  allocated  to  such  investments.  The  ability  of 
strategic  managers  to  allocate  resources  to  collective  learning  processes  depends 
on  the  degre  e  to  which  they  themselves  are  integrated  into  that  process.  Their 
incentive  to  make  such  strategic  resource  allocations  depends  on  the  extent  to 
which  they  see  their  own  goals  as  being  furthered  through  investment  in  a  learning 
process  that  is  both  collective  and  cumulative. 
Conversely,  in  the  presence  of  strategic  segmentation,  top  corporate 
managers  will  be  more  susceptible  to  pressures  from  financial  interests  to  use  their 
strategic  control  to  make  corporate  resources  a  source  of  financial  liquidity  rather 
than  financial  commitment.  In  particular,  in  the  allocation  of  corporate  revenues, 
strategic  managers  who  are  segmented  from  the  collective  learning  process  are 
more  likely  to  take  actions  such  as  issuing  higher  dividends,  repurchasing  stock, 
and  reducing  corporate  employment  that  increase  financial  liquidity.  The  result  of 
29 such  actions  is  to  boost  the  returns  on  corporate  stock  in  the  short  run  as  an 
alternative  to  committing  financial  resources  to  the  investments  in  organization  and 
technology  that  are  necessary  to  achieve  sustainable  prosperity  over  the  long  run. 
Instead  of  aligning  their  interests  with  members  of  a  collective  learning  process 
within  their  corporations,  segmented  strategic  managers  will  tend  to  align  their 
interests  with  public  stockholders,  whose  only  involvement  with  the  corporation  is 
through  the  security  purchase  that  they  have  made  on  the  public  market  and  whose 
only  interest  in  the  corporation  is financial. 
Such  corporate  managers  will  come  to  evaluate  the  performance  of  the 
corporation  from  the  perspective  of  financial  liquidity  rather  than  financial 
commitment,  and  will  contend  that  the  prime,  if  not  only,  goal  of  the  business 
corporation  is  to  “create  value  for  shareholders.”  For  their  success  in  “maximizing 
shareholder  wealth,”  these  strategic  managers  will  receive  ample,  and  even 
exorbitant,  personal  rewards,  even  as  most  other  corporate  employees  experience 
lower  earnings  and  less  employment  stability  and  security. 
This  alignment  of strategic  managers  with  public  stockholders  at the  expense 
of  investments  in  organizational  learning  is  precisely  what  happened  to  corporate 
strategy  and  corporate  investment  in  the  United  States  in  the  1980s  and  1990s. 
Encouraging  these  changes  in  business  investment  strategies  was  a transformation 
in  the  way  in  which  wealthholding  American  households  saved  for  the  future.  From 
the  1960s  to  the  1980s  fundamental  changes  occurred  in  U.S.  financial  institutions 
that  encouraged  and  abetted  American  households  to  save  for  the  future  by  living 
off  the  past.  Returns  from  investments  in  publicly  traded  common  stocks  became 
the  prime  means  by  which  wealthholding  American  households  extracted  higher 
returns  from  past  accumulation.  In  doing  so,  American  households  have 
inadvertantly  exacerbated  the  problem  of  long-term  business  investment  in  the 
United  States  by  not  only  reducing  financial  commitment  but  also  encouraging  the 
strategic  segmentation  of  top  corporate  managers  in  the  enterprises  that  these 
managers  control. 
At  a  time  when  the  technological  challenges  of  international  competition 
have  demanded  investments  in  broader  and  deeper  skill  bases,  the  dynamic 
interaction  of  organizational  segmentation  and  financial  liquidity  has  led  many  U.S. 
industrial  corporations  to  flee  from  such  investments.  Insofar  as  these  corporations 
invest  in  organizational  learning,  they  have  done  so  through  the  development  and 
utilization  of  narrower  and  more  concentrated  skill  bases,  thus  limiting  the  range  of 
productive  activities  and  technologies  in  which  U.S.  companies  can  compete.  This 
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prime  cause  of  the  erosion  of  sustainable  prosperity  in  the  United  States  in  the 
1980s  and  1990s. 
At  the  center  of  the  shift  from  financial  commitment  to  financial  liquidity  in  the 
investment  strategies  of American  industrial  corporations  is the  transformation  of  the 
.  role  of  the  stock  market  in  business  investment  and  in  household  saving  over  the 
past  few  decades.  The  understanding  of  most  Americans  of  the  role  of  the  stock 
market  in  the  development  of  the  American  economy  is  based  much  more  on  myth 
than  reality.  The  myth  is  that  business  enterprises  have  relied  on  the  stock  market 
to  fund  long-term  investment,  and  that,  therefore,  the  increased  flow  of  household 
saving  into  the  stock  market  that  is  now  occurring  is  favorable  to  long-term 
economic  growth.  The  reality  is that  in the  United  States  the  stock  market  is  not,  and 
never  has  been,  an  important  source  of  funds  for  long-term  business  investment. 
The  reality  is  that  the  use  of  publicly  traded  shares  as  a  means  of  househcld 
savings  entails  living  off  the  past  rather  than  investing  for the  future. 
Throughout  the  twentieth  century,  corporate  retentions  and  corporate  debt, 
not  equity  issues,  have  been  the  main  sources  of  funds  for  business  investment. 
For  example,  for  the  period  1982-1987,  for  the  100  largest  U.S.  manufacturing 
corporations,  new  equity  issues  were  10.1  percent  of  gross  sources  of  funds  and 
3.1  percent  of  net  sources  of funds.  The  gross  and  net  figures  for  retained  earnings 
were  51.5  percent  and  79.1  percent  and  for  new  debt  30.2  percent  and  3.2 
percent.”  Even  these  figures  do  not  tell  the  whole  story  of the  limited  role  of  equity 
issues  in  funding  investment  in  new  productive  assets.  New  corporate  equity  issues 
have  generally  been  used,  not  to  finance  investment  in  new  productive  assets,  but 
to transfer  ownership  of  existing  assets  or to  restructure  corporate  balance  sheets. 
The  owr,ership  transfer  may  be  an  initial  public  offering  (IPO),  in  which  case 
ownership  is  transferred  from  the  original  owner-entrepreneurs  and  their  venture- 
capital  partners  to  a public  stockholder.  High  levels  of  IPO  activity,  therefore,  do  not 
indicate  that  households  and  institutional  investors  are  funding  a wave  of  innovative 
investment.  Rather,  in  absorbing  the  IPOs  these  portfolio  investors  are  paying  the 
entrepreneurs  who  built  the  businesses  for  a  claim  on  the  enterprise’s  future 
earnings,  based  on  the  investments  in  productive  capabilities  that  have  already 
been  made.  Whether  any  of the  money  realized  from  an  IPO  ends  up  committed  to 
new  innovative  investment  strategies,  either  in  the  issuing  company  or  some  other 
new  venture,  is  at  the  discretion  of  the  original  owner-entrepreneurs  and  is  not 
inherent  in  the  IPO  itself. 
31 The  ownership  transfer  may  also  occur  for  the  purpose  of  one  company 
acquiring  another  company.  Typically,  the  acquiring  company  issues  new  stock  of 
its  corporation  to  exchange  for  the  existing  stock  of  the  acquired  company,  whose 
stock  is  then  retired.”  In  the  aftermath  of  the  acquisition,  the  acquiring  company 
may  make  substantial  investments  in  the  acquired  company,  but  the  equity  issue 
does  not  provide  the  source  of such  investment  financing. 
Funds  raised  through  equity  issues  may  also  be  used  to  restructure  the 
corporate  balance  sheet  by  using  the  proceeds  from  the  sale  to  retire  some 
corporate  debt  or  add  to  cash  reserves.  Such  a  practice  was  common  during  the 
Japanese  “bubble  economy”  of the  late  1980s  as  companies  realized  that  windfalls 
could  be  obtained  through  the  sale  of equities  to  the  public,  who  would  buy  stock  at 
prices  that  were  wildly  out  of  line  with  the  long-run  earning  power  of  the  underlying 
corporate  assets.  So  too,  in  the  speculative  boom  of the  late  1920s  U.S.  industrial 
corporations  sold  equity  to  pay  off  debt  or  increase  their  cash  balances.”  As  it 
turned  out,  the  strengthened  financial  conditions  of these  companies  helped  them  to 
withstand  deep  economic  downturns  that  followed  the  speculative  booms,  in  the 
U.S.  case  during  the  depression  of the  early  1930s  and  in the  Japanese  case  during 
the  recession  of the  early  1990s. 
When  companies  have  issued  stock  for  the  purpose  of  financing  investment 
in  new  productive  assets,  it  has  usually  been  in  the  form  of  preferred  shares,  often 
with  restricted  voting  rights.  In  terms  of  secure  prospects  of  future  returns,  a 
preferred  share  is  much  closer  to  a corporate  bond  than  a common  stock.  For  going 
concerns  that  have  the  option  to  finance  long-term  investment  on  the  basis  of 
stocks  or  bonds,  the  use  of  stocks  is  expensive,  less  because  of  high  transaction 
costs  involved  in  equity  financing,  than  because  equity  financing  signals  to  potential 
investors  that  corporate  management  does  not  have  the  confidence  that  the 
company  can  meet  the  debt-service  requirements  of  a bond  issue.  It  is,  therefore, 
self-defeating  for  a company  that  has  access  to  bond  financing  to  instead  choose  to 
issue  equity. 
If the  primary  role  of  the  stock  market  is  to  transfer  ownership  over  existing 
assets  or  to  restructure  the  corporate  balance  sheet,  what  about  retained  earnings, 
which  are  the  financial  foundation  of  long-term  investment?  If  stockholders  are 
viewed  as  the  principal  investors  in the  company  who,  as  residual  claimants,  bear  all 
the  risk  of  investment  in  productive  assets,  it  might  follow  that  they  finance  long- 
term  corporate  investment  by  leaving  a  portion  of  earnings  in  the  company  for  that 
purpose.  Such  a  perspective,  however,  ignores  the  fact  that  throughout  this  century 
32 corporate  governance  in  the  United  States  has  been  cnaracterized  by  the 
separation  of  stock  ownership  from  managerial  control  over  the  allocation  of 
corporate  revenues.  Public  stockholders  have  had  no  direct  Input  into  the  decisions 
to  allocate  corporate  revenues.  Nor  have  they  hired,  fired,  rewarded,  or  punished 
the  corporate  managers  who  have  made  these  decisions.  Ostensibly  the  beard  of 
directors  represents  the  interests  of  stockholders  in  these  matters.  But  it  is  well 
known  that,  historically,  the  top  managers  of  the  U.S.  corporation,  not  the 
stockholders,  choose  the  board  of  directors,  and  that  for  stockholders  to  mount  a 
proxy  contest  to  replace  top  management  can  be  very  expensive.‘3 
Conversely,  when,  as  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  institutional  investors,  who 
have  channeled  the  savings  of  households  into  the  stock  market  on  an  ever- 
increasing  scale,  have  used  the  “market  for  corp’orate  control”  to  influence 
managerial  decision  making  concerning  the  allocation  of  corporate  revenues,  their 
primary  interest  has  been  to  “disgorge  the  fre e  cash  flow”.74 Far  from  encouraging 
corporate  managers  to  commit  internal  financial  resources  to  the  development  and 
utilization  of  new  productive  capabilities,  when  public  stockholders  have  had  any 
influence  on  the  allocation  of  corporate  revenues  they  have  opted  for  financial 
liquidity,  not  financial  commitment. 
In  historical  perspective,  the  lack  of  control  of  public 
retained  earnings  of  industrial  corporations  was  not  imposed  on 
managers  or  government  regulators,  as  some  have  contended.75 
stockholders  over 
them  by  corporate 
Rather  this  lack  of 
control  was  a  feature  of  public  stockholding  that  portfolio  investors  not  only 
accepted  but  also  favored.  The  market  in  industrial  securities  evolved  in  the  United 
States  to  effect  the  separation  of  stock  ownership  from  strategic  control  because  it 
offered  American  households  liquidity  but  did  not  require  commitment.  Once  the 
market  in  industrial  securities  came  into  existence,  American  households  were 
willing  to  hold  shares  in  publicly  traded  corporations  only  because  their  “ownership” 
stakes  did  not  entail  any  commitments  of  their  time,  effort,  or  additional  funds  to 
ensure  the  success  of  the  company.  A  general  willingness  to  leave  control  over  the 
allocation  of  corporate  revenues  with  managers  stemmed  in  part  from  the  limited 
liability  protection  that  public  stockholders  enjoyed.  But,  for  any  particular  company, 
this  abdication  of  control  derived  from  the  confidence  of public  stockholders  that  the 
equities  they  held  were  liquid,  and  hence  could  be  sold  on  the  stock  market  at  any 
time. 
In  the  United  States  in  this  century,  the  liquidity  of  equities  traded  on  the 
stock  market,  and  the  consequent  possibility  for  separating  ownership  and  control, 
33 derived  from  the  fact  that  the  market  in  industrial  securities  arose  as  a  result  of the 
growth  of  dominant  enterprises  during  the  last  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
The  growth  of  these  enterprises  made  possible  the  rise  of  a  market  in  industrial 
securities,  not  vice  versa.  A  market  in  industrial  (as  distinct  from  railroad  and 
government)  securities  in  the  United  States  only  came  into  existence  in  the  late 
1890s  and  early  1900s  as  a  number  of  owner-enterpreneur  companies  that  had 
grown  to  dominant  positions  in  their  industries  in  the  decades  after  the  Civil  War 
decided  to  go  public.76  As  Thomas  Navin  and  Marian  Sears  put  it  in  their  classic 
article,  “The  Rise  of  a  Market  in  Industrial  Securities,  1897-1902”:  “the  very  term 
‘industrials,’  meaning  securities  of  industrial  companies  did  not  come  into  use  until 
the  end  of  the  [1890~].“~~ 
Launched  on  the  basis  of  “inside”  capital  provided  by  the  entrepreneur, 
family  members,  friends,  and  business  associates,  the  companies  that  became 
successful  in  the  late  nineteenth  century  did  so  by  reinvesting  earnings  to  build 
productive  organizations  -- as  is the  case  today  in the  transition  from  new  venture  to 
going  concefn.78  But  a  problem  of  the  transfer  of  ownership  of  the  company  arose 
when  the  financial  value  of the  company  and  the  managerial  organization  required 
to  run  it  had  grown  beyond  the  capacity  of  a single  person  or even  a small  group  of 
partners.  Even  the  owner-entrepreneurs  family  members  would  likely  be  ill-suited  to 
run  a  company  that  relied  on  organizational  learning  for  its  competitive  advantage. 
The  transfer  of  ownership  particularly  became  a  problem  when  the  original  owner- 
entrepreneurs  and  their  backers  were  ready  to  retire,  as  was  the  case  of  the  post- 
Civil  War  generation  of  entrepreneurs  in  the  1890s.”  The  emergence  of  a  market 
for  industrial  securities  permitted  the  original  owner-entrepreneurs  to  sell  the 
company  (often  to  retire  from  the  industrial  scene)  while  leaving  intact  the 
managerial  organization  that  had  given  the  company  its  competitive  advantage  as  a 
going  concern.  Unless  the  managers  themselves  were  to  assume  ownership  of  the 
enterprise  --  an  ownership  transfer  that  in  the  most  successful  enterprises  was 
generally  beyond  their  collective  means  -- the  continued  integration  of  strategy  and 
learning  required  that  stock  ownership  be  separated  from  strategic  control. 
The  importance  of Wall  Street  -- the  major  New  York  investment  banks  and 
the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  --  to  industrial  investment  in  the  twentieth  century 
arose  from  the  way  it  structured  the  separation  of  stock  ownership  from  strategic 
control.  It  took  Wall  Street  some  three  decades  of  marketing  and  trading  industrial 
securities  before  any  but  the  wealthiest  households  or  the  most  speculatively 
minded  individuals  viewed  industrial  stocks  as  sufficiently  liquid  to  be  worthy  of 
34 purchase.  In  the  1890s  and  early  1900s  initial  “public“  offerings  Ooated  by  Wall 
Street  investment  bankers  went  to  a  relatively  small  circle  of  wealthy  individuals 
(including  the  companies’  original  owner-entreqene-_rs  and  their  families)  and 
financial  institutions,  particularly  insurance  companies  and  the  under.,vriSng 
investment  banks  themselves.  Of  the  $6.2  billion  of industrial  commcn  and  preferred 
stock  issued  during  the  peak  of  the  merger  movement  between  1,093  and  1902, 
48.8  percent  was  privately  placed  in exchange  for  the  assets  or  securities  of  merged 
companies,  and  another  45.4  percent  was  issued  by  companies  to  their  own 
stockholders  as  dividends  or for  cash  or for  unknown  purposes,  but  only  5.8  percent 
was  sold  to  the  general  public.” 
To  ensure  themselves  an  income  from  industrial  securities  that  might  be 
difficult  to  market,  these  early  portfolio  investors  favored  preferred  shares  or  bonds 
rather  than  common  stocks.  Indeed,  in  many  initial  offerings,  common  stocks  were 
distributed  as  a bonus  to  the  purchasers  of preferred  stocks  or to  the  promoters  and 
investment  banks  for  their  services.”  As  the  market  for  industrial  securities 
developed,  these  stockholders  were  able  to  sell  off  some  of  their  portfolios  of 
preferred  and  common  stocks  to the  public. 
Over  time,  as  the  companies  listed  on  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange 
continued  to  thrive  and  as  wealthy  individuals  and  institutional  investors  sold  off 
some  of  their  portfolios,  shareholding  became  more  dispersed  and  the  threat  of 
outside  interference  by  substantial  stockholders  decreased.  From  the  late  1910s 
through  the  1920s  the  dispersion  of  stockholding  increased  rapidly.  The  sale  of 
Liberty  bonds  during  World  War  I  brought  the  savings  of  a  whole  new  tier  of 
American  households  into  the  securities  markets.  After  the  war,  Wall  Street  sought 
to  capture  these  savings  through  sales  of  preferred  stocks  that  were  marketed  as 
having  the  security  of  bonds.”  The  record  $1.5  billion  in  corporate  stock  issues 
(over  half  of  which  were  preferreds)  in  1919  was  double  the  value  issued  in  1916, 
the  previous  peak  year.a3  The  average  annual  rate  of  increase  in  the  number  of 
book  stockholders  in  U.S.  corporations  was  11.6  percent  in the  period  from  1917  to 
1920  as  compared  with  4.0  percent  from  1900  to  1917  and  5.2  percent  from  1920  to 
1  928.a4 
During  the  1920s  many  of  the  leading  industrial  companies  made  the 
availability  of  company  stock  for  purchase  by  employees  a  part  of  an  emerging 
welfare  capitalism,  and  by  1928  there  were 
stockholders.”  Companies  also  sold  shares  to 
according  to  Gardiner  Means,  was  the  addition 
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more  than  800,000  employee 
customers,  the  result  of  which, 
of  one  million  new  stockholders between  1920  and  1928.=  During  the  1920s  the  marketing  of stock  became  a highly 
developed  industry  in  itself,  with  institutional  forms  of  stockholding  such  as  the 
investment  trust  becoming  wildly  popular  among  small-scale  investors.87  Stock  splits 
also  became  common  as  a way  of  making  shares  more  accessible  to  households 
further  down  the  income  scaie.a8  The  stock  market  boom  of  the  late  1920s  brought 
crowds  of  new  people  into  the  market,  many  of  them  borrowing  to  buy  stocks  on 
margin  in  attempts  to  get  rich  quickly.  In  1927  an  unprecedented  $1.7  billion  of  new 
stocj< was  issued,  but  that  amount  doubled  the  next  year  and  again  in  1929.  In  the 
process,  common  stocks  gained  wide  acceptance.  In  1927  common  stock  issued 
was  only  65  percent  of  preferred  stock  issued;  in  1929  300  percent.” 
In  1900,  there  were  an  estimated  4.4  million  stockholders  on  the  books  of 
U.S.  corporations,  holding  an  average  of  140  $100  par  value  shares.  By  1910  the 
number  of  book  stockholders  had  increased  to  7.5  million  with  their  average 
holdings  down  to  87  shares.  In  1920  these  figures  were  12  million  and  57  shares 
respectively,  and  by  1928  18  million  and  51  shares.”  Insofar  as  in  the  later  years, 
stockholders  held  more  diversified  portfolios,  the  actual  number  of  stockholders  may 
have  increased  somewhat  less  than  fourfold  between  1900  and  1928.  But  it is  clear 
that  over  the  first  three  decades  of  this  century  the  distribution  of  stocks  became 
increasingly  dispersed. 
As  stocks  became  more  widely  held,  the  possibility  diminished  that  any 
group  of  stockholders  could  challenge  managerial  control  of  corporate  resources. 
Most  corporate  stock,  whether  preferred  or  common,  carried  voting  rights,  but  the 
very  dispersion  of  stockholding  with  voting  rights  made  it al  the  more  difficult  for  any 
small  group  of  stockholders  to  use  these  rights  to  challenge  managerial  control. 
Corporate  managers  were  more  concerned  about  diluting  the  control  of  holders  of 
preferred  shares  rather  than  holders  of  common  shares  because  preferred 
stockholders,  behaving  more  like  creditors  than  like  speculators,  tended  to  scrutinize 
managerial  actions  and  performance  more  closely  when  dividend  payments  were 
missed.  As  a  result,  there  was  a  tendency  over  the  first  decades  of  the  century  to 
dilute  the  power  of  preferred  stockholders  by  granting  common  stockholders  more 
votes  per  dollar  of  stock.  In the  1920s  U.S.  corporations  found  that  they  could  dilute 
shareholder  power  even  more  directly  through  the  issue  of non-voting  stock.g’ 
These  practices  led  to  a public  protest  against  the  disenfranchisement  of  the 
stockholder  --  fueled  almost  entirely  by  a  book  published  in  1927  by  Harvard 
professor,  William  Z.  Ripley.”  In  response,  the  Governors  of  the  New  York  Stock 
Exchange,  ever  eager  to  maintain  public  confidence  in  the  holding  of  stock, 
36 approved  a  resolution  (without  devising  a  definite  policy)  of  their  Committee  on 
Stock  List that  “in  the  future  the  committee  in  considering  applications  for  the  listing 
of  securities  will  give  careful  thought  to  the  matter  of  voting  contro1.“g3  When, 
subsequently,  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  required  that  listed  stock  can-y  voting 
rights,  the  result  was  not  to  increase  shareholder  power  but,  by  maintainir,g  public 
confidence  in  the  holding  of  stock,  to  foster  the  further  dispersion  of  stockholding, 
thus  making  it  all  the  more  difficult  for  a  small  group  of  stockholders  to  challenge 
managerial  control. 
Meanwhile,  from  the  nineteenth  century,  the  evolution  of  corporation  law  had 
strengthened  the  ability  of  managers  to  exercise  control,  not  because  managers 
represented  a  “special  interest”  group  but  as  part  of  a  general  process  by  which 
corporate  law  supported  developmental  change,  often  at  the  expense  of  existing 
individual  property  rights  that  could  stifle  such  change.g4  As  the  development  and 
utilization  of  productive  resources  became  dependent  on  the  strategic  allocation  of 
resources  to  organizational  learning,  laws  that  supported  economic  development 
weakened  the  property  rights  of  individuals  who  were  outsiders  to  the  collective 
learning  process  while  strengthening  the  rights  of  the  insiders  to  the  process  to 
control  corporate  resources.  As  decision  makers  integral  to  the  organizational 
learning  process,  strategic  managers  became  the  agents  of  developmental  change, 
and  the  transformation  of  corporate  law  from  the  late  nineteenth  century  supported 
managerial  rights  to allocate  corporate  resources  to generate  such  change.g5 
In  the  earlier  part  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  courts’  application  to 
corporations  of  the  doctrine  of  ultra  vires  --  actions  deemed  to  be  outside  the 
powers  of  the  corporation  --  meant  that  the  powers  delegated  to  the  directors  and 
officers  of the corporation  had  been  held  to strict  judicial  standards  of  accountability. 
It was  the  doctrine  of  ultra  vires  that  was  used  to  dissolve  the  trusts  of  the  1880s.  In 
1889,  however,  the  New  Jersey  Corporation  Law  rescued  these  corporate 
consolidations  by  allowing  one  corporation  to  hold  shares  in another.  In  general,  the 
incorporation  statutes  introduced  by  states  in  the  “race  to  the  bottom”  sparked  by 
the  New  Jersey  statute  gave  corporation  directors  and  managers  carfe  b/an&e  to 
do  virtually  whatever  they  wanted,  and  the  doctrine  of  ultra  vires  met  its  gradual 
demise  as  an  influence  on  corporate  activities.g6 
The  states  also  proved  willing  to  introduce  other  legal  reforms  when 
corporations  began  the  process  of  explicit  consolidation  that  snowballed  into  the 
Great  Merger  Movement,  despite  the  fact  that  some  of  these  reforms  substantially 
undermined  the  rights  exercised  by  shareholders,  the  traditional  bearers  of  private 
37 property  in  the  corporation.  Of  particular  significance  as  a  potential  obstacfe  to 
corporate  consolidation  was  the  common  law  rule,  applied  throughout  the  1880s 
that  required  the  unanimous  consent  of  the  shareholders  to  undertake  fundamental 
change  in  corporate  activities.  Following  the  lead  of  New  York  in  1890,  a number  of 
states  introduced  statutes  that  permitted  corporations  to  merge  with  majoritarian 
rather  than  unanimous  consent.”  As  Morton  Horwitz  has  observed: 
The  shift  to  majority  rule  in  fact  made  the  merger  movement  legally  possible.  It  not 
only  made  consolidations  much  easier  to  effect:  it  also  dealt  the  final  blow  to  any 
efforts  to  conceptualize  the  corporation  as  a  collection  of  contracting  individual 
shareholders.g8 
The  most  important  power  accorded  to  corporate  managers  by  statutes  and 
through  the  courts  was  the  power  to  declare  or  withhold  dividends.  The  law  was 
reluctant  to  interfere  with  managerial  discretion  in  relation  to  dividend  payments.” 
As  one  commentator  described  the  legal  situation: 
The  board  of  directors  declare  the  dividends  and  it  is  for the  directors,  and  not  the 
stockholders,  to  determine  whether  or  not  a  dividend  shall  be  declared.  When, 
therefore,  the  directors  have  exercised  this  discretion  and  refused  a dividend,  there 
will  be  no  interference  by  the  courts  with  their  decision,  unless  they  are guilty  of a 
willful  abuse  of their  discretionary  powers,  or  of  bad  faith  or  of  a  neglect  of  duty.  It 
requires  a  very  strong  case  to  induce  a  court  of  equity  to  order  the  directors  to 
declare  a dividend,  inasmuch  as  equity  has  no jurisdiction,  unless  fraud  or  breach  of 
trust  is  involved.“’ 
For  companies  listed  on  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  --  which  quickly 
became  the  exchange  of  preference  for  all  of the  leading  U.S.  industrial  enterprises 
__  stockholders’  expectations  concerning  liquidity  reflected  the  stages  of 
development  and  the  financial  condition  of  the  types  of  companies  in  which  they 
acquired  shares.  These  companies  were  going  concerns  that  before  going  public 
had  established  themselves  as  dominant  enterprises  in their  particular  industries.  By 
developing  and  utilizing  productive  resources  under  owner-entrepreneurs,  these 
companies  had  already  acquired  the  capacity  to  generate  high  levels  of  profit  on  a 
regular  basis.  Once  public,  these  high  levels  of  profits  made  possible  continuous 
dividend  payments,  which  further  convinced  stockholders  of  the  liquidity  of  their 
stock.  By  refusing  to  cut  dividends  except  under  the  most  dire  circumstances, 
corporate  managers  ensured  that  stockholders  would  not  challenge  their  control 
over  the  allocation  of  corporate  revenues.“’ 
Wall  Street  helped  to  create  confidence  in  the  liquidity  of  corporate  stock  by 
identifying,  and  actively  promoting,  companies  that  had  already  acquired  the 
38 productive  base  to  generate  a  COrdtent  stream  of  profits.  Ever  more  stringent 
requirements  for  listing  on  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  built  public  confidence  in 
the  stock  market,  which,  in  bringing  in  new  buyers  of  stocks,  added  further  to  the 
liquidity  of  the  market.‘02  from  the  second  decade  of the  century,  public  cc;,fidence 
was  further  bolstered  by  the  securities  ratings  services  of  Moody’s  and  Standard 
and  Poor-s,  whose  own  businesses  were  based  on  their  reputations  for  impartiality 
and  credibility.‘03 
Most  important,  however,  in  laying  the  foundation  for  a highly  liquid  market  in 
industrial  stocks  in  the  first  decades  of  the  twentieth  century  was  the  emergence 
from  the  last  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century  of  a  large  number  of  dynamic 
industrial  enterprises  that,  through  the  superior  development  and  utilization  of 
productive  resources,  had  gained  distinct  competitive  advantage  in  an  era  before  a 
market  in  industrial  securities  even  existed.  These  companies  --  many  of  which  still 
maintain  dominant  market  shares  --  had  by  the  1920s  made  the  United  States  the 
most  powetiul  industrial  nation  in  the  world.  Wall  Street  did  not  create  these 
companies  but  built  its  business  on  the  basis  of their  enduring  success. 
What  was  the  business  of  Wall  Street  in  this  era  of  industrial  expansion? 
The  foremost  activity  of  Wail  Street  during  this  era  was  investment  banking,  even 
though  during  the  stock-market  boom  of  the  late  1920s  many  of  the  private 
investment  firms  (in  Vincent  Carosso’s  words)  “easily  succumbed  to  the  speculative 
fever  of  the  times  and  the  opportunities  for  quick,  easy  profits  which  it  promised.‘*“’ 
The  key  actors  on  Wall  Street  in  the  first  three  decades  of  this  century  were  a  few 
prominent  investment  banks,  including  J.  P Morgan  & Co.,  Kuhn,  Loeb  &  Co.,  and 
Kidder,  Peabody  &  Co.‘05  Sesides  floating  bond  issues  for  local,  state,  and  national 
governments  in  the  United  States  and  abroad,  the  business  of  these  investment 
banks  was  to  support  industrial  enterprises  in  making  investments  in  productive 
assets.  The  participation  of the  investment  banks  in  the  creation  of  liquid  markets  in 
industrial  securities  was  a  means  of  furthering  this  investment  business.  The 
investment  banks  underwrote  the  initial  public  offerings  that  permitted  the 
separation  of  stock  ownership  from  strategic  control. 
That  separation  left  the  allocation  of  corporate  revenues  in  the  hands  of 
managers,  most  of  whom  in  this  era  had  the  ability  and  incentive  to  make 
investments  in  productive  capabilities  relevant  to  their  enterprises.  lo6 This  strategic 
control  over  corporate  revenues  gave  corporations  the  foundation  on  which  to  incur 
long-term  debt,  the  floating  of  which  was  one  of  the  two  prime  activities  that 
investment  bankers  performed  for  their  corporate  clients  on  an  ongoing  basis  For 
39 example,  between  January  1919  to  May  1933,  the  House  of Morgan  was  involved  in 
the  offer  of  $6  billion  in  securities  to  the  public,  of which  over  $2  billion  were  foreign, 
almost  S2  billion  were  railroad  bonds,  over  $1  billion  were  public  utility  bonds,  and 
nearly  $600  million  were  industrial  preferreds  and  bonds.  Over  this  period,  the  issue 
of  common  stocks  represented  only  3.5  percent  of  J.  P.  Morgan  &  Co.‘s  securities’ 
offerings.lo7 
The  other  key  service  that  investment  banks  provided  to  industrial 
corporations  was  the  financing  of  mergers  and  acquisitions.  During  the  1890s  and 
early  1900s  J.  P.  Morgan  &  Co.  was  at  the  center  of  the  Great  Merger  Movement. 
The  main  purpose  of  the  Great  Merger  Movement,  in which  about  2700  companies 
disappeared,  was  to  permit,  through  horizontal  integration,  the  forrmation  of 
industrial  enterprises  that  could  control  large  market  shares.“*  To  buy  out  the 
owner-entrepreneurs  of  the  merged  companies,  the  investment  banks  underwrote 
securities  issues.  The  sheer  size  of  the  Great  Merger  Movement  and  the  centrality 
to  it  of  a  reputable  inves’ment  bank  such  as  J.  P.  Morgan  were  key  factors  in  the 
concomitant  rise  of  the  market  for  industrial  securities  that  we  have  already 
discussed. 
In the  1920s  U.S.  industrial  corporations  undertook  a wave  of acquisitions  for 
purposes  of  both  vertical  integration  and  diversification.  During  the  first  half  of  the 
1920s  the  number  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  averaged  447  per  year;  during  the 
second  half  of the  1920s  917  per  year.log  Unlike  the  merger  movement  of ?he turn  of 
the  century  which  contributed  to  the  rise  of  a  market  in  industrial  securities,  the 
acquisition  movement  of  the  1920s  was  able  to  make  use  of  what  was  by  then  a 
highly  liquid  market  in  corporate  stocks.  The  acquisitions  were  not  financed  by funds 
from  the  stock  market,  but  the  existence  of  the  liquid  stock  market  made  the 
stockholders  of  the  acquired  firms  willing  to  accept  the  stock  of  the  acquiring 
corporations  as  payment  for their  equity  holdings. 
During  the  1920s  Wall  Street  also  issued  large  amounts  of  corporate  stock, 
much  of  which,  especially  in  the  late  1920s  was  used  to  pay  off  debt  or  build  cash 
reserves.  Table  6  shows  the  relative  amounts  of their  own  securities  that  a sample 
of  84  large  manufacturing  corporations  issued  and  retired,  as  well  as  the  amount  of 
affiliates’  and  subsidiaries’  securities  that  these  companies  purchased  from  1921 
through  1939.  For  these  same  84  manufacturing  companies,  the  total  amount  of 
funds  that  they  retained  over  the  period  1921-1929  just  equaled  their  total  fixed 
capital  expenditures.“’  The  data  strongly  suggest  that  throughout  the  1920s 
companies  were  issuing  securities  to  retire  securities  and  purchase  other 
40 companies.  Of  the  $1.26 billion  of  securities  sold  in  1929,  for  example,  5.S.  S!eel 
sold  $150  million  of  common  stock  to  partiai!y  fund  the  retirement  cf  $394  million  in 
debt.“’ 




millions  of  dollars  percent 
own  own  A&S’  Retired  Purchased  Retired  + 
securities  securities  securities  as  %  of  as  %  of 
sold  retired  purchased  sold  sold 
purchased 
as  %  of  sold 
415  142  192  34  46  81 
1922  222  170  69  77  31  108 
1923  407  109  290  27  71  98 
1924  146  130  61  89  42  131 
1925  392  274  189  70  48  118 
1926  446  163  192  ‘37  43  80 
1927  474  306  113  65  24  88 
1928  273  185  224  68  82  150 
1929  1256  680  586  54  47  101 
1930  375  159  291  42  78  120 
1931  234  169  183  72  78  150 
1932  140  255  54  182  39  221 
1933  46  188  98  409  213  622 
1934  127  179  53  141  42  183 
1935  114  278  39  244  34  278 
1936  245  307  36  125  15  140 
1937  601  180  47  30  8  36 
1938  424  76  50  18  12  30 
1939  143  105  95  73  66  140 
Note:  ‘A&S  means  affiliates  and  subsidiaries 
Source:  Albert  Ralph  Koch.  The  Financina  of  Larae  Coroorations,  1920-1939,  National  Bureau  of 
Economic  Research,  1943,97. 
By  the  late  1920s  many  large  U.S.  corporations  took  advantage  of  the  stock 
market  boom  not  only  to  sell  their  own  shares  at  inflated  prices  but  also  to  make 
their  surplus  cash  available  to  speculators  in  the  form  of  brokers’  loans  on  the  New 
York  call  market,  at  interest  rates  that  reached  12 percent.  As  the  volume  of  brokers’ 
loans  outstanding  almost  tripled  from  the  end  of  1924  to  the  end  of  1928,  the 
proportion  of  the  loans  made  by  non-bank  lenders  increased  from  25  percent  to  60 
percent.  As  the  stock  market  began  its  decline  and  margins  could  not  be  met,  the 
same  industrial  corporations  were  the  first  to  call  their  loans,  thereby  forcing  the 
market  down  further.  The  non-bank  lenders  decreased  their  loans  outstanding  from 
$3.9  billion  at  the  end  of  1928  to  $2.5  billion  at  the  end  of  1929  to  only  $610  million 
at  the  end  of  1930,  whereas  the  brokers’  loans  of the  New  York  City  banks  declined 
from  $1.6  billion  at  the  end  of  1928  to  $1.2  billion  at  the  end  of  1929,  and  actually 
rose  by  $80  million  over  the  following  year.‘12 
41 The  very  real  productive  success  of  these  large  manufacturing  corporations 
had  set  off  the  stock  market  boom  in  the  first  half  of  the  1920s  and  it  was  the 
provision  and  withdrawal  of  liquidity  by  these  enterprises  to  the  stock-market 
speculators  that  helped  send  stock  prices  up  further  and  bring  them  down  faster  at 
the  end  of  the  decade.  But  besides  the  financial  instability  that  the  stock  market 
imparted  to  the  American  economy,  its  emergence  in  the  first  decades  of  this 
century  also  had  a  profound  effect  on  the  development  of  the  industrial  enterprise. 
By  separating  the  stock  ownership  from  strategic  control  over  internally  generated 
corporate  revenues,  and  by  making  it  possible  for  enterprises  to  finance  mergers 
and  acquisitions  by  an  exchange  of  corporate  shares,  the  stock  market  encouraged 
the  continuous  growth  of  the  enterprise,  not  only  through  the  expansion  of  its 
existing  productive  activities  but  also  through  extension  into  new  vertically  related 
activities  and  diversification  into  new  product  markets. 
The  existence  of  a  highly  liquid  stock  market  therefore  facilitated  the  growth 
of  the  U.S.  industrial  corporation.  It  did  so,  however,  not  because  households  as 
public  stockholders  provided  companies  with  new  sources  of  funds,  but  because  it 
gave  strategic  managers  control  over  financial  resources  internal  to  the  enterprise 
that  could  be  used  for  purposes  of  market  expansion,  vertical  integration,  and 
product  diversification.  When  the  growth  was  internal,  retained  earnings,  leveraged 
if  necessary  with  bonds,  provided  the  financial  resources  for  growth.  When  the 
growth  was  external  -- that  is, through  merger  and  acquisition  -- the  replacement  of 
the  acquired  firm’s  equity  with  the  stock  of  the  acquiring  corporation  provided  the 
financial  resources  for  growth. 
To  be  sure,  the  Great  Depression  resulted  in  massive  declines  in  corporate 
sales,  capacity  utilization,  and  employment,  especially  for  the  large  manufacturing 
enterprises  that  sold  in  the  durables  markets  and  that,  free  from  debt,  could  cut 
back  production  without  fear  of  bankruptcy.“’  But,  given  the  sound  financial 
condition  of  the  major  industral  corporations  coming  out  of  the  1920s  they  were 
able  in  the  1930s  to  keep  their  managerial  organizations  and  innovative  capabilities 
not  only  intact  but  also  active.  The  continuity  in  organizational  learning  that  these 
industrial  corporations  maintained  during  the  1930s  positioned  them  to  contribute 
their  productive  capabilities  to  the  Allies  during  World  War  II  -  for  which  these 
companies  received  huge  subsidies  from  the  U.S.  government  that  by  no  means 
disappeared  with  the  end  of  the  war.  These  corporations  were  then  able  to 
dominate  in  international  competition  in the  immediate  postwar  era. 
42 As  these  corporations  grew  through  expansion,  extension,  and 
diversification,  they  often  reaped  the  cumulation  advantages  of  b>lrlding  on  existing 
capabilities  to  develop  and  utilize  productive  resources.“4  But  their  growth  also 
opened  up  possibilities  for  the  onset  of  cumulation  disad,.  zntage  ;  of  or-aniza:‘onal 
segmentation.  Such  disadvantages  are  not  inherent  in,  bL : are  Tr”Jre likely  to  occur 
with,  rapid  and  large-scale  enterprise  growth.  The  prime  danger  was  that  the  very 
growth  of  the  corporate  enterprise,  within  markets,  across  vertical  activities,  and  into 
new  markets,  would  lead  to  strategic  segmentation. 
By  the  1950s  strategic  segmentation  was  beginning  to  show  itself  in  some  of 
the  largest,  and  previously  most  successful,  U.S.  corporations.  General  Electric  is  a 
case  in  point.  Its  expansion  into  consumer  appliances  in  the  interwar  period  had,  by 
the  1940s  and  1950s  brought  to  positions  of  strategiccontrol  managers  who  had 
aquired  no  understanding  of  the  electrical  engineering  businesses,  or  of  related 
technologies  generated  by  GE  Research  Laboratories,  that  had  been  the 
foundations  of  the  company’s  sustained  competitive  successes.  Although  in  the 
1950s  under  CEO  Ralph  Cordiner,  GE’s  top  managers  claimed  to  be 
decentralizating  authority  within  the  company,  what  they  actually  decentralized  was 
responsibility  for  divisional  or  departmental  performance  while  keeping  strategic 
authority  and  control  in the  head  office.  Managing  by  the  numbers,  Cordiner  and  the 
men  around  him  propounded  the  ideology  that,  equipped  with  the  proper 
informational  tools,  a  well-trained  general  manager  could  manage  anything  --  an 
ideology  that  by  the  1960s  had  become  conventional  wisdom  in  the  nation’s 
business  schools.“5 
In  his  1962  book,  Strateov  and  Structure,  Alfred  D.  Chandler,  Jr.  . 
documented  the  emergence  and  diffusion  of  the  multidivisional  structure  within  the 
American  corporation  from  the  1920s  through  the  1950s.  By  means  of 
administrative  decentralization,  the  multidivisional  structure  was  supposed  to  permit 
the  enterprise  to  diversify  into  many  new  businesses  without  succumbing  to 
strategic  segmentation.‘16  But  Chandler’s  conceptualization  of  the  corporate  head 
office  as  the  realm  of  strategic  decision  making  and  the  corporate  divisions  as  the 
realms  of  operational  control  already  contemplated  the  segmentation  between 
strategy  and  learning  that  in  the  1940s  and  1950s  had  begun  to  afflict  companies 
like  General  Electric.“’  Writing  in  1962,  Chandler  thought  that  the  organizational 
changes  that  had  taken  place  at  GE  under  Cordiner  demonstrated  “future  trends  in 
the  organization  of  the  most  technologically  advanced  type  of  American 
entefprise.““8  Yet  problems  that  GE  faced  in  the  1960s  and  1970s  manifested  by 
43 its  failure  in  a  number  of  new  businesses  including  semiconductors,  computers,  and 
factory  automation,  reflected  an  organization  that  could  no  longer  integrate  strategy 
and  learning.“’ 
What  happened  to  GE  in  the  post-Worid  War  II decades  happened  as  well 
to  many  other  U.S.  industrial  enterprises  that  expanded,  not  only  through  internal 
growth,  but  also  through  merger  and  acquisition.  As  in  the  1920s  so  too  in  the 
1950s  a  booming  economy  provided  many  companies  with  internal  resources  for 
growth,  while  the  booming  stock  market  made  acquisition  of other  companies  cheap 
and  easy.  What  has  subsequently  come  to  be  known  as  the  conglomerate 
movement  saw  the  number  of  announcements  to  merge  with  or  acquire  another 
company  grow  from  an  annual  average  of  1951  in  1963-67  to  3736  in  1968-1972, 
reaching  a record  peak  of 5306  in  1969  (see  Table  7).  ’ 
Table  7.  Merger  and  Acquisition  Announcements  and  Divestitures,  1963-l  994 
Annual  averages  1963-  1968-  1973-  1978-  1983-  1988-  1993  1994 
1967  1972  1977  1982  1987  1992 
Mergers  & Acquisitions  1951  3736  1474  1384  1666  1277  1529  1863 
Divestitures  207  1290  1266  789  1023  953  1134  1134 
Divestitures  as  %  of  10.6%  34.5%  85.9%  57.0%  61.4%  74.6%  74.2%  60.9% 
M&A 
Note:  In the  1960s  and  1970s.  about  10%  of  all  M&A  and  divestiture  announcements  were 
canceled:  in  the  1980s  about  7%;  and  in the  1990s  about  4%. 
Source:  Merrill  Lynch  Advisory  Services,  Meroerstat@  Review  1994:  2, 80,  120,  121. 
Table  8.  Distribution  of  Assets  Acquired  in  Acquisitions  of  Large* 
Manufacturing  and  Mining  Companies  by  FTC  Merger  Type 
Classification,  1948-l  979 
Percent 
Type  of  merger  1948-j  955  1956-l  963  1964-l  971  1972-1979  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ......................................  _ ......._...._.__...................................................,..... 
Horizontal  39.0  18.7  12.0  14.9 
Vertical  12.7  20.0  6.6  8.3 
Product  extension  36.1  36.9  38.9  28.2 
Market  extension  2.1  6.7  7.7  3.0 
Pure  10.1  17.7  34.8  45.5 
conglomerate 
Note:  * Premerger  assets  of  acquired  companies  were  %I0  million  or  more 
Source:  F.  M.  Scherer  and  David  ROSS,  industrial  Market  Structure  and  Economic  Performance.  third 
edition,  Houghton  Mifflin,  1990:  157. 
According  to  Federal  Trade  Commission  data  and  classifications,  increasingly 
over  the  course  of  the  post-World  War  II period,  industrial  mergers  and  acquisitions 
entailed  not  only  diversification  into  new  lines  of  business  but  conglomeration  of 
lines  of  business  that  had  no  technological  or  market  relations  to  one  another.  As 
44 can  be  seen  in  Table  8,  in  19481955  only  10.1  percent  of  acquired  assets  were  in 
the  “pure  conglomerate”  category,  whereas  in  the  period  1964-1971  this  figure  was 
34.8  percent  and  in  1972-1979  45.5  percent.  By  1972-1979  horizontal  or  vertical 
acquisitions  in  the  same  line  of  business  had  fallen  to  23.2  percent  of  all  assets 
acquired,  down  from  48.8  percent  in  1948-1955. 
Using  the  Federal  Trade  Commission  Line  of  Business  data,  David 
Ravenscraft  and  F.  M.  Scherer  have  shown  that  for  the  top  200  U.S.  manufacturing 
companies  ranked  by  sales,  the  mean  number  of  lines  of  business  rose  from  4.76  in 
1950  to  10.89  in  1975.  Of  the  148  companies  of  the  200  largest  in  1950  that 
survived  until  1975,  the  mean  number  of  lines  of  business  was  5.22  in  1950  and 
9.74  in  1975.  Among  the  most  well-known  conglomerates  that  emerged  over  this 
period  were  Beatrice  Foods  (290  acquisitions  between  1950  and  1978),  W.  R. 
Grace  (186),  International  Telephone  and  Telegraph  (163),  Gulf  and  Western 
industries  (155),  Textron  (115),  Litton  Industries  (99),  and  LTV  (58).12’ 
During  the  1960s  when  the  conglomerate  merger  movement  was  in  full 
swing,  the  conglomerate  promoters  (and  their  academic  admirers)  touted  the 
“synergies”  that  were  supposed  to  come  from  piling  business  upon  business.  “Two 
plus  two  equals  five”  was  a popular  refrain  of the  conglomerateurs.  According  to  one 
explanation  that  accurately  reflects  the  ideology  of  the  conglomerate  era,  after 
World  War  II a new  generation  of managers 
were  generally  better  educated  and  more  familiar  with  the  new  scientific  tools 
available  to  management  such  as  computerized  information  systems,  scientific 
decision  making,  and  decentralized  profit-center  concepts.  They  put  to  the  test  the 
theory  of  the  universality  of  financial  management,  that  many  businesses,  no  matter 
how  diverse,  can  be  successfully  managed  by  relatively  few  executives  contributing 
financial  and  planning  expertise.  More  innovative  than  the  predecessor  generation  of 
managers,  they  acted  upon  a  new  concept  that  under  current  economic  conditions 
there  was  no  problem  in  getting  capital  but  that  the  real  problem  was  putting  the 
capital  to  work  to satisfy  the  growth  demands  of their  stockholders.‘2’ 
By  relying  on  the  prevailing  business  ideology  that  a  well-trained  general 
manager  could  manage  anything,  the  conglomerate  movement  glorified  strategic 
segmentation.  In  acquiring  companies  and  consolidating  financial  decision-making 
in  the  head  office,  the  conglomerate  stripped  those  who  had  been  the  strategic 
managers  of  the  acquired  businesses  of  strategic  control.  Initially  at  least  the 
45 conglomerates  often  retained  these  fonner  top  managers  as  divisional  heads,  but 
failure  to  meet  financial.  performance  targets  could  lead  to  their  replacement  by 
someone  at  the  head  office  who,  like  the  head  office  in  general,  had  no  idea  of  the 
processes  of  organizational  learning  or  the  strategies  to  shape  them  that  the 
divisional  businesses  required  to  succeed.‘22 
In  their  statistical  study  of  the  results  of  this  merger  and  acquisition  activity, 
Ravenscraft  and  Scherer  concluded  that  “on  average,  profitability  declines  and 
efficiency  losses  resulted  from  mergers  of  the  1960s  and  early  197Os,”  while  their 
case  studies  revealed  “that  synergies  anticipated  from  acquisition  frequently  did  not 
materialize.“‘23  “Much  more  important  than  their  failure  to  achieve  hoped-for 
synergies,”  they  argued, 
was the  failure  to manage  acquired  companies  as well  as they were  managed  before 
acquisition.  We  have  no  reason  to  believe  this  was  either  intentional  or  fully 
anticipated.  To  the  contrary,  merger-makers  of the  1960s  and  1970s  suffered  from 
massive  hubris.  Successful  in  their  mainline  operations  and  perhaps  in  early 
diversification  mergers,  they  overestimated  their  ability  to manage  a sizable  portfolio 
of acquisitions,  large  and small,  related  and unrelated.  By the time  they  learned  that 
they  had  erred, they  had  already  overextended  themselves  and were  unable  to cope 
with  the  problems  emerging  from  accumulated  acquisitions.  Or  alternatively,  they 
recognized  their  limitations  but pursued  a damage-limiting  strategy,  continuing  (like 
Beatrice  Foods)  to make  mergers  but ruthlessly  selling  off  acquisitions  that  showed 
signs  of persistent  difficulty.‘24 
If, writing  in  1962,  Alfred  Chandler  had  been  optimistic  about  “future  trends  in 
the  organization  of the  most  technologically  advanced  type  of American  enterprise”, 
in  his  1990  book,  Scale  and  Scope:  The  Dynamics  of Industrial  Enterorise,  he 
emphasized  “an  overtoad  for  the  decision-makers  in top  management”  that  arose 
during  the  1960s.  Citing  the  Ravenscraft  and  Scherer  study,  Chandler  argued  that 
such  unprecedented  diversification 
often  led  to  a  separation,  that  is,  a  breakdown  of  communications,  between  top 
management  at the  corporate  office  -- the  executives  responsible  for  coordinating, 
managing,  and planning  and allocating  resources  for the enterprise  as a whole  -- and 
the  middle  managers  who  were  responsible  for  maintaining  the  competitive 
capabilities  of the operating  divisions  in the  battle  for market  share  and  profits.  .  . . 
These  top  managers  in the  corporate  office  no longer  had, unlike  their  predecessors, 
the  time  to  make  and  maintain  personal  contacts  with  the  heads  of  the  operating 
divisions.  Nor  did  the  senior  executives  have  the  product-specific  experience 
needed  to  evaluate  the  proposals  and to  monitor  the  performance  of the  operating 
managers.  Instead,  in carrying  out these  critical  tasks they had to rely on impersonal 
46 statistical  data  that  had  become  far  less  relevant  than  the  information  systems 
devised  and  used in the  1920s  and  1930s by corporate  officers  of diversified  firms  to 
carry  out  comparable  functions.  The  overload  resulted,  not  from  any  lack  of 
information  but  from  its  lack  of quality  and  from the  senior  decision-ma\  :rs’  lar,.  Jf 
ability  to  evaluate  it.  Top  managers  were  beginning  to  lose  the  capabil;.  ‘s  nee,:?d 
to maintain  a unified  enterprise  whose whole was more than the sum  of its parts.“’ 
Besides  absorbing  companies  that  they  could  not  manage  --  many  of  which 
were  sold  off  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  (see  Table  7)  -  the  conglomerate  movement 
of  the  1960s  contributed  to  a  process  that,  in  the  197Os,  encouraged  Wall  Street  to 
shift  its  focus  from  investment  banking  to  securities  trading.‘26  The  shift  would  take 
time  to  unfold  and  was  not  readily  apparent  to  close  observers  even  in  the  merger 
mania  of  the  late  1960s.  For  example,  in  1970,  when  Vincent  Carosso  published 
Investment  Bankina  in  America:  A  History_, he  was  still  able  to  see  Wall  Street  in  its 
traditional  investment  banker  role.  In the  preface  to the  book,  he  argued: 
the  overall  thesis  of  the  study  is  that  despite  the  many  profound  economic  and 
political  changes  of the  last  sixty  years,  the  basic  function  of the  investment  banker 
has  remained  essentially  unchanged.  Today,  as it was at the turn  of the  century,  the 
investment  bankers  most  important  role  is  to  channel  savings  into  long-term 
investments.  The  services  and  merchandising  functions  involved  in  planning  and 
distributing  new  security  issues,  with  the  possible  exception  of  those  sold  at 
competitive  bids,  have  remained  largely  what  they  were  in the  days  of the  elder  J. 
Pierpoint  Morgan,  when  many  of the  industry’s  present-day  practices  and  traditions 
became  firmly  established.lz7 
The  conglomerate  movement  of  the  196Os,  and  the  large-scale  divestiture 
of  businesses  to  which  -  in  large  part  because  of  its  failure  at  organizational 
integration  --  it  gave  rise  in  the  197O.q  challenged  the  practices  and  traditions  of 
Wail  Street  investment  banking.  For  the  first  time,  as  Chandler  has  put  it,  “the 
buying  and  selling  of  corporations  was  an  established  business,  and  a  most 
lucrative  one  at  that.“‘28  As  Chandler  continued: 
Before  the  1960s it was  fare  for financial  institutions,  including  investment  banks,  to 
have  specialized  merger  and  acquisitions  departments.  The  primary  function  of 
investment  bankers  in the  United  States  and abroad was to provide  their  clients  with 
long-established  services.  The  most  important  of  these  was  the  underwriting  of 
securities  used  to  supplement  retained  earnings  in  funding  long-term  growth.  The 
new and highly  profitable  business  that began with  the financing  of acquisitions  in the 
late  1960s  and the continuing  flow  of divestitures  in the 1970s warranted  the  creation 
of  the  specialized  departments.  Soon,  too,  specialists  in  “deconglomeration” 
appeared.‘2g 
47 As  Wall  Street  turned  M&A  activity  into  an  end  in  itself,  companies  with  low 
price-earnings  (p-e)  ratios  became  targets  for  takeover.  The  conglomerateurs  found 
that,  through  a  “pooling  of  interests”  (the  consolidation  of  the  financial  accounts  of 
the  acquired  company  into  those  of the  conglomerate),  the  acquisition  of  companies 
with  low  p-e  produced  a  one-shot  increase  in  the  earnings  per  share  of  the 
conglomerate.  These  increases  in  earnings  not  only  profited  the  holders  of  stocks 
but  also  provided  the  conglomerate  with  more  financial  resources,  in  the  form  of  its 
own  higher-priced  stocks,  to  make  more  acquisitions.  In  1965  pooling  of  interests 
accounted  for  30  percent  of  all  mergers;  in  1968  for  more  than  60  percent.“’ 
In  early  1969,  the  editors  of  Fortune  magazine  wrote  that  “practically  every 
sizable  U.S.  corporation,  whether  it realizes  it or not,  is under  scrutiny  by  some  other 
corporation  as  a  prospective  acquisition.“13’  To  avoid’takeover,  target  companies 
had  a  number  of  alternatives,  none  of  which  had  anything  to  do  with  a 
developmental  investment  strategy.  They  could  raise  dividends  to  try  to  convince 
the  stock  market  to  place  higher  values  on  their  equities.  Or  they  could  take  on 
fixed-interest  obligations  to  reduce  their  cash  reserves  and  lower  earnings.13’  In  its 
successful  defense  against  being  taken  over  by  Northwest  Industries  in  1969,  B.F. 
Goodrich,  which  had  sales  of  $1 .l  billion  in  the  previous  year,  increased  its  line  of 
credit  with  21  banks  to  $250  million  with  an  agreement  that  this  loan  would  be  in 
default  if  a  takeover  of  the  company  should  occur.  An  antitrust  judge  characterized 
this  amendment  as  a  “Herman  Goering  cyanide  pill”  because  B.  F.  Goodrich 
“threatened  to  commit  financial  suicide  in  the  event  that  this  transaction  is 
consummated.“‘33  As  an  alternative  to  taking  on  debt,  the  Fortune  editors 
counselled  that  one  way  for  a frightened  target  to  get  a quick  boost  to  its  stock  price 
was  itself  to  become  an  acquirer  of low  p-e  companies.134 
By  the  late  1960s  the  financing  of  the  conglomerate  movement  had 
graduated  from  cash  to  stock  to  debt.  As  a  result,  the  debt-equity  ratio  in  U.S. 
manufacturing  rose  from  0.40  in  1960  to 0.48  in  1965  to 0.72  in  1970.‘35  In  February 
1969,  as  the  conglomerate  movement  was  reaching  its peak,  the  editors  of  Fortune 
debated  the  pros  and  cons  of  the  increasing  proportions  of  debt  in  corporate 
capitalizations.  They  pointed  to  the  tax  advantages  of debt  financing,  the  security  of 
debt  in  an  economy  committed  to  full  employment,  and  the  cheapness  of  debt 
financing  in  an  inflationary  age.  They  recognized,  however,  that  debt  has  its 
hazards  “particularly  for  a  conglomerate  whose  year-to-year  increases  in  reported 
earnings  are  in  part  dependent  on  the  chain-letter  effed  of  new  acquisitions.”  They 
went  on: 
48 Times  might  not  have  to  get  very  tough  or  competitive  for  such  a  company  to  find 
itself  looking  desperately  for  hard  cash  or  the  equivalent  thereof  to  satisfy  its 
bondholders  and  keep  its  creditors  at  bay.  Hard-pressed  conglomerates  might,  for 
example,  be  forced  to  spin  off  some  of  their  divisions.  Given  plenty  of  competition, 
the  great  conglomeration  movement  of  the  1960s  might  conceivably  be  ?he  great 
deconglomeration  movement  of  the  1  970s.‘36 
The  prediction  was  prescient.  Looking  at  what  subsequently  transpired  in  the 
“deconglomeration  movement”  of  the  1970s  and  early  198Os,  Ravenscraft  and 
Scherer  estimated  that  roughly  one-third  of  the  acquisitions  made  in  the  1960s  and 
early  1970s  were  sold  off,  typically  under  conditions  of  financial  duress.‘j7  In  1975 
and  1976,  the  divestitures  in  the  United  States  were  actually  greater  than 
announced  mergers  and  acquisitions.‘38 
For  Wall  Street,  as  well  as  for  many  corporate  managers,  therefore,  the 
conglomerate  movement  transformed  the  corporate  decision  to  merge  with  or 
acquire  a  business  activity  from  an  investment  in  productive  resources  to  an 
investment  in  financial  assets.  The  financial  business  of  merger  and  acquisition 
entailed  not  only  putting  industrial  enterprises  together  but  also  pulling  them  apart. 
From  the  perspective  of  productive  performance,  the  divestitures  that  followed 
conglomeration  had  the  potential  for  rectifying  the  problems  of  strategic 
segmentation  that  the  conglomerate  movement  had  exacerbated.  But  the  failure  of 
the  conglomerate  movement  also  lay  the  foundations  for  the  rise  of  a  new  financial 
market  --  the  high-yield,  or junk,  bond  market  --  that  during  the  1970s  created  both 
the  incentive  and  ability  for  Wall  Street  to  treat  productive  enterprises  like  financial 
assets.  Far  more  than  even  the  debt-financed  conglomeration  of the  late  1960s  the 
use  of  junk  bonds  for  buyouts  and  takeovers  enforced  financial  liquidity  on  U.S. 
industrial  corporations. 
A  significant  proportion  of  the  debt  taken  on  in  the  conglomerate  movement 
of  the  196Os,  either  to  acquire  other  companies  or  to  fend  off  acquisition,  en- zged 
in  the  early  1970s  as  “fallen  angels”:  bonds  that  had  been  investment  grade  when 
issued  but  whose  ratings  had  been  subsequently  lowered  to  below  investment 
grade.13’  In  1973,  when  the  value  of  these  low-grade  bonds  of  U.S.  corporations 
stood  at  $8.2  billion,  Michael  Milken,  an  employee  of  the  Wall  Street  firm  of  Drexel 
Burnham,  began  to  convince  institutional  investors  that  they  should  hold  these 
higher  risk  securities  to  get  higher  yields.  Over  the  next  few  years  he  convinced 
enough  of them  to  do  so  that  he  created  a liquid  market  in junk  bonds.14’ 
49 In  the  recession  of  1974,  the  value  of junk  bonds  outstanding  jumped  to  $7.5 
billion.  By  1980  this  figure  had  reached  $15.1  billion,  up  from  $9.4  billion  in  each  of 
the  previous  two  years.  In  1983  the  value  of  junk  bonds  outstanding  was  $28.2 
billion  and  in  1985  $59.1  billion.‘41  In  1977,  junk  bonds  represented  only  2.5  percent 
of  corporate  bonds  outstanding,  and  in  1982  3.8  percent.  But  by  1985  9.0  percent 
of  all  corporate  bonds  were  junk.‘42 
Underlying  the  increase  in junk  bonds  from  the  late  1970s  were  new  issues, 
a  practice  that  only  began  in  1977  (Lehman  Brothers  did  the  first  new  junk  bond 
issue).  It  was  a  business  that  Milken’s  Los  Angeles  office  of  Drexel  Burnham 
Lambert  quickly  turned  into  his  own.143 Newly  issued  junk  bonds  totaled  $8  billion  for 
the  six  years,  1977-1982,  with  issues  in  the  last  year  at $2.7  billion.  The  next  year, 
in  1983,  the  value  of junk  bond  issues  leaped  to  $8  billion,  and  then  climbed  to  a 
peak  of  $34.3  billion  in  1986.  For  the  six  years,  1983-1988,  newly  issued  junk 
bonds  equaled  $120.3  bilIion.‘44  On  the  basis  of  this  business,  in  1986  alone 
Milken’s  high-yield  department  of  Drexel  Burnham  Lambert  reaped  $700  million  in 
bonuses,  of  which  he  handed  over  $150  million  to  his  departmental  associates  and 
kept  $550  million  for  himself.‘45 
The  newly  issued  junk  bonds  financed  divisional  managers  of  a 
conglomerate  enterprise  to  separate  their  division  from  the  conglomerate  structure. 
In  1980  there  were  47  divisional  buyouts  at  a  real  average  value  (in  1988  US 
dollars)  of  $34.5  million;  in  1983  139  for  $58.2  million,  and  in  1986  144  (the  peak 
annual  number  for  the  1980s)  for  $180.7  million.‘46  By  placing  in  positions  of 
strategic  control  “middle  managers”  who  understood  their  lines  of  business  far 
better  than  the  top  conglomerate  executives,  these  divisional  buyouts  created  the 
possibility  for  the  reintegration  of  strategy  and  learning  -  a  type  of  organizational 
integration  that  conglomeration  had  typically  destroyed. 
How  much  irreparable  damage  had  been  done  to  these  divisional 
businesses  while  they  were  under  the  strategic  control  of  the  conglomerates  is  an 
area  that  requires  detailed  case  study  research.14’  But,  in  a  period  of  intense  global 
competition  based  on  organizational  integration  and  financial  commitment,  the 
disruptions  to  the  processes  of  organizational  learning  that  conglomeration  typically 
entailed  must  have  severely  diminished  the  innovative  potential  of  the  divisional 
buyouts  notwithstanding  their  new-found  strategic  independence.  Moreover,  the 
financial  liquidity  that  was  imposed  on  these  divested  enterprises  limited  their  ability 
to  invest  in  new  learning  processes  and  catch  up  to the  competition. 
50 There  is  evidence  that  the  debt-service  requirements  of  these  divisional 
buyouts  resulted  in  significant  cosf-cutting.‘48  In  trimming  the  fat  of  day-to-day 
operations,  however,  many  companies  that  had  been  taken  private  found  that  they 
also  had  to  cut  out  the  bone  of  developmental  investment.  The  debt  that  financed 
the  buyouts  did  not  fund  investment  in  new  productive  assets  but  only  transferred 
claims  over  the  returns  to  existing  assets,  with  the  difference  that  the  junk-bond- 
financed  buyout  made  it  imperative  for  the  enterprise  to  pay  out  earnings  rather 
than  retain  them  for  new  productive  investment. 
Cost-cutting,  therefore,  might  pennit  an  enterprise  to  stay  ahead  of  its  high- 
yield  obligations  to  its  creditors,  but  might  be  antithetical  to  the  financial  commitment 
needed  for  innovative  investment  strategies.  From  the  perspective  of  the  innovative 
enterprise,  moreover,  the  issue  of  the  relevant  investment  strategies  goes  beyond 
the  impacts  of  pressures  for  financial  liquidity  on  corporate  R&D,  which  has  been 
the  usual  focus  of  empirical  study.14’  In  many  industries,  R&D  activities  are  critical 
learning  processes  -- and  generally  the  easiest  to  identify  statistically  --  but  they  are 
not  the  only  learning  processes  in  which  the  innovative  enterprise  must  invest. 
Indeed,  if learning  derived  from  R&D  activities  is  not  integrated  with  learning  derived 
from  production  and  marketing  activities,  investments  in  R&D  are  typically 
investments  that  do  not  pay  off. 
During  the  1980s  those  who  ran  the  Wall  Street  firms  that  made  money  from 
financing  buyouts  were  well  aware  of  the  advantages  of  debt  service  in  enforcing 
liquidity  on  corporate  management,  and  were  also  eager  to  portray  the  imposition  of 
financial  discipline  on  corporate  managers  as  the  solution  to  the  poor  performance 
of  American  industry.  Frederick  Joseph,  the  CEO  of  Drexel  Bumham  Lambert 
during  the  Milken  era,  summed  up  the  view  from  the  Street: 
Increased  debt  has important  consequences  for management.  It reduces  discretion  in 
spending  free  cash flow.  Instead  of pouring  free cash flow into  perks  or unproductive 
investments,  management  is  forced  to  direct  cash  flow to  debt  service,  effectively 
returning  it to the investing  public.  “Debt creation  without  retention  of the  proceeds  of 
the  issue  enables  managers  to  effectively  bond their  promise to  pay our  (sic)  future 
cash  flows,”  notes  Harvard  economist  Michael  C.  Jensen.  “Thus  debt  can  be  an 
effective  substitute  for dividends.“‘“’ 
By  1990,  when  these  words  were  published,  the  use  of junk  bonds  had  long 
since  been  transformed  from  financing  divisional  buyouts  to  financing  hostile 
takeovers  of  entire  corporations.  In the  typical  hostile  takeover  of  a multibillion-dollar 
company  in  the  late  198Os,  corporate  raiders,  often  hand-picked  by  Michael  Milker, 
to  launch  a  takeover,  relied  on  Milken’s  network  of  institutional  investors  (including 
51 savings  and  loan  companies)  to  make  commitments  to  buy  the  junk  bonds  that  the 
acquired  company  would  issue  when  it was  taken  over  as  the  means  to  buy  up  the 
stock  that  allowed  it  be  taken  over!  In  1986  there  were  76  public  company  buyouts  - 
-  20  percent  of  all  public  takeovers  -  at  a  real  average  value  (in  1988  dollars)  of 
$303.3  million.  In  that  year,  the  ratio  of  the  average  value  of  company  to  division 
buyouts  was  1.7: 1 --  its  lowest  such  ratio  in  the  decade.  The  average  real  value  for 
47  company  buyouts  in  1987  and  125  in  1988  was  around  $480  million,  about  three 
times  the  average  value  of the  divisional  buyouts  in those  years.“’ 
The  purpose  a  high-value  public-company  leveraged  buyout,  such  as  the 
much-publicized  KKR  takeover  of  RJR  Nabisco,  was,  to  use  Jensen’s  phrase,  “to 
disgorge  the  free  cash  flow”  from  companies  that  had  allegedly  “matured”.‘52  The 
often  explicit  goal  of  transforming  committed  finance  into  liquid  finance  by  means  of 
the  takeover  sent  stock  prices  up  when  the  target  was  “put  in  play,”  as  did  the 
speculative  bidding  that  occurred  as  the  possibility  of takeover  loomed  near.  To  pay 
for  the  high  cost  of  the  takeover,  including  the  high  rates  of  interest  that  had  to  paid 
on  the  junk  bonds  that  been  exchanged  for  stock,  divisions  were  sold  off  and  the 
cash  flow  of  the  company  was  made  as  “free”  as  possible  from  other  claims  -- such 
as  those  of  long-time  employees,  suppliers,  or customers.‘53 
For  the  most  part,  the  hostile  takeovers  of  the  1980s  were  directed  at 
corporations  that  operated  in  industries,  such  as  processed  foods,  oil  and  timber 
products,  and  airlines,  that  possessed  productive  assets,  such  as  brand-name 
recognition  or  natural  resources,  that  required  large  investments  over  sustained 
periods  of time  to  put  in  place,  but  which,  under  prevailing  conditions  of  competition, 
did  not  require  continuous  investment  in  organizational  learning  to  maintain  the 
market  value  of  the  products  that  these  assets  generate.  These  industries  were  ripe 
for  hostile  takeover  by  value  extractors  if  only  they  could  mobilize  the  financial 
resources  to  make  these  productive  assets  their  own.‘%  In  contrast,  in  industries  in 
which  productive  assets  not  only  are  expensive  to  develop  and  utilize,  but  also 
require  continuous  investments  in  organizational  learning  to  maintain  their  value  on 
competitive  markets,  takeovers  for  the  purpose  of  extracting  value  will  very  quickly 
lead  to  the  disappearance  of  the  expected  rents  as,  for  example,  key  teams  of 
scientists  and  engineers  head  for  the  door. 
In the  1980s  and  beyond,  proponents  of the  market  for  corporate  control  like 
Joseph  and  Jensen  used  the  problems  of  top  management  “perks”  and 
“unproductive  investment”  decisions  to  justify  the  daims  of  industrial  securities’ 
holders  to  “disgorge  the  free  cash  flow”  from  corporations.‘55  These  problems  of 
52 managerial  abuse  and  ill-informed  allocations  of  resources  we-e,  and  remain,  real 
within  American  industrial  corporations.  As  is well  known,  the  tc 3 executives  of  U.S. 
corporations  are  grossly  overpaid  relative  to  other  employees  :n  their  organizations 
and  to  their  top  management  counterparts  in  other  advanced  economies.“6  With 
top  management’s  pay  tied  to  stock  options,  a  rise  in  share  rice  means  :  rise  in 
pay.  In  1995,  the  average  compensation  of  CEOs  of large  U.S.  corporations  went 
up  23  percent,  to  $4.37  million.  For  a sample  of  CEOs  surveyed,  base  salaries  rose 
only  4  percent,  but  stock-based,  or  “performance”,  compensation,  which  made  up 
77  percent  of  total  pay,  shot  up  45  percent.ls7  And  over  the  past  few  decades, 
under  a  system  in  which  strategic  decision  making  has  increasingly  been 
concentrated  at  the  top  of  large  enterprises,  American  corporations  have,  in  many 
industries  in which  they  used  to  be  world  leaders,  lost  substantial  market  shares. 
Viewing  financial  liquidity  rather  than  financial  commitment  as  the  means  for 
the  allocation  of  resources  “to  their  best  alternative  uses,”  from  the  perspective  of 
the  innovative  enterprise  that  we  have  put  forward  what  the  proponents  of  the 
market  for  corporate  control  regard  as  a  solution  to  the  dissipation  of  resources  by 
management  we  see  as  part  of  the  problem.  They  define  the  problem  as  “agency 
costs”  that,  in  the  corporate  enterprise  in  which  stock  ownership  is  separated  from 
managerial  control,  derive  from  the  exercise  of  “managerial  discretion”.  They  then 
assume  that  managerial  discretion  can  only  take  the  forms  of  managerial  perks  and 
unproductive  investments  -  uses  to  which  managers  allocate  resources  instead  of 
“creating  value  for  shareholders”  by  “disgorging  the  free  cash  flow.”  The  ‘alleged 
solution  is  the  “market  for  corporate  control”  that  pressures  incumbent  managers  to 
“create  value  for  shareholders”  or  else  lose  their  positions  of allocative  control. 
Strategic  managers  of  industrial  corporations,  however,  need  to  have 
discretion  if  investments  in  developing  and  utilizing  productive  resources  are  to  be 
made  that  result  in  sustained  competitive  advantage  for  their  enterprises  and 
sustainable  prosperity  for  the  economy.  But  who  these  decision  makers  are,  what 
types  of  investment  decisions  they  make,  and  whom  they  seek  to  benefit  can  have 
profound  impacts  on  whether  these  companies  invest  for  the  future  or  live  off  the 
past.  The  real  problem  for innovation  and industrial  development  is not that  strategic 
managers  have  discretion,  but  that  they  have  become  too  segmented  from  the 
organizations  that  need  to  develop  and  utilize  productive  resources  if  these 
investments  are  to  generate  returns.  And  a  big  part  of  the  problem  of  generating 
returns  from  productive  investments  is  that  the  market  for  corporate  control  does 
not  demand  that  such  integration  of  strategy  and  learning  take  place.  In  the 
53 presence  of  a  powerful  market  for  corporate  control,  the  use  of  stock-based  rewards 
aligns  the  interests  of  top  managers  with  stockholders,  thus  encouraging  top 
managers  to  become  even  more  segmented  from  the  productive  organization, 
thereby  making  it  all  the  more  certain  that  the  integration  of  strategy  and  teaming 
will  not  occur. 
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Under  these  conditions,  from  the  perspective  of  the  innovative  enterprise, 
existing  corporate  managers  should  not  be  in  positions  of  strategic  control  over 
enterprise  resources.  But  the  proponents  of  the  market  for  corporate  control  accept 
such  strategic  segmentation  as  long  as  top  managers  “create  value  for  shareholders 
by  disgorging  the  free  cash  flow.”  Only  by  ignoring  the  process  of  innovation,  and  its 
need  for  organizational  integration  and  financial  commitment  can  the  proponents  of 
the  market  for  corporate  control  argue  that  the  good  manager  is  one  who  ensures 
financial  liquidity. 
Hence,  in  support  of  the  hostile  takeovers  of  the  1980s  Michael  Jensen 
argued  that  “for  a company  to  operate  efficiently  and  maximize  value,  free  cash  flow 
must  be  distributed  to shareholders  rather  than  retained.”  As  a “vivid  example”  of the 
failure  of  a  company  to  distribute  free  cash  flow  to  stockholders,  Jensen,  in  1989, 
targeted 
the  senior  management  of  Ford  Motor  Company,  which  sits  on  nearly  $15 billion  in 
cash  and  marketable  securities  in  an  industry  with  excess  capacity.  Ford’s 
management  has  been  deliberating  about  acquiring  financial  service  companies, 
aerospace  companies,  or making  some other multibillion-dollar  diversification  move - 
-  rather  than  deliberating  about  effectively  distributing  Ford’s  excess  cash  to  its 
owners  so they  can decide  how to reinvest  it.15’ 
Jensen  was  tight  to  caution  against  such  diversification.  One  would  not  like 
to  have  seen  Ford  Motor  Company  repeat  the  mistakes  of  the  conglomeration 
movement  of  the  1960s.  But  Jensen  failed  to  recognize  how  the  market  for 
corporate  control,  on  which  he  would  rely  to  determine  corporate  investment 
strategies,  itself  emerged  out  of  the  failures  of  diversification  in  the  196Os,  and  how, 
by  the  late  1980s  the  very  threat  of  stockholder  power  exercised  through  the 
market  for  corporate  control  may  well  have  pressured  Ford’s  strategic  managers  into 
undertaking  imprudent  diversification  rather  than  commit  financial  resources  to 
doing  what  the  company  can  do  best  -  make  and  sell  cars. 
What  Michael  Jensen  argued  in  theory  in  1989,  Kirk  Kerkorian  sought  to 
accomplish  in  practice  in  April  1995,  with  Chrysler,  rather  than  Ford,  as  his  target. 
On  April  1,  1995,  Kerkorian,  the  largest  stockholder  of the  Chrysler  Corporation  with 
54 some  15  percent  of  Chrysler’s  outstanding  stock,  announced  that,  with  the  support 
of  ex-Chrysler  chairman  Lee  lacocca,  he  was  seeking  financing  to  take  over  the 
company.  For  several  months  prior  to  the  announcement,  Kerkorian  had  been 
complaining  to  Chrysler  top  management  that  not  enough  was  being  done  to  raise 
the  price  of  his  stock.  Not  even  increases  in  dividends  on  the  order  of  175  percent 
since  the  end  of  1993  had  made  him  happy.  After  losing  half  a  billion  dollars  in 
1991,  Chrysler  had  greatly  improved  its  products  and  processes  -  so  much  so  that 
now  Kerkorian  wanted  more  of  the  $4  billion  in  net  earnings  that  the  company  had 
recorded  in  1994.  By  the  end  of the  year  Chrysler  was  holding  a cash  balance  of  $8 
billion,  a good  part  of which,  as  far  as  Kerkorian  was  concerned,  belonged  to  him  by 
virtue  of  his  ownership  of  a large  block  of  Chrysler  stock.  Chrysler,  meanwhile,  was 
one  of  the  few  very  large  U.  S.  industrial  corporations  with  100,000  or  more 
employees  in  1990  that  actually  increased  its  employment  -  from  124,000  to 
126,000  people  -  between  1990  and  1995  (see  Table  2). 
While  trying  to  appease  the  company’s  largest  stockholder  through  dividend 
payments  and  stock  repurchases,  Chrysler’s  top  management,  headed  by  CEO 
Robert  J.  Eaton,  was  not  eager  to  undermine  the  company’s  ability  to  produce  and 
sell  cars.  The  $8  billion,  Eaton  argued,  would  be  needed  in  the  next  cyclical 
downturn  of  the  automobile  industry,  and  once  the  company  had  let  go  of  its  cash 
hoard  it would  not  easily  get  it  back.  After  all,  in  the  late  1970s  Chrysler  had  been 
compelled  to  appeal  to  the  U.S.  government  for  loan  guarantees  that  saved  the 
company  from  bankruptcy. 
Ironically,  the  very  man  who  in  1979  had  been  brought  from  Ford  to  Chrysler 
to  lead  it  back  from  the  brink  of  bankruptcy,  was  now,  in  1995,  supporting 
Kerkorian’s  attempt  to  disgorge  the  company’s  cash  flow.  While  seeking  loan 
guarantees  from  the  U.S.  Congress  back  in  1979,  lacocca,  as  Chrysler’s  CEO,  had 
told  the  Senate  Banking  Committee:  “My  problems  are  the  problems  of  the 
country.“‘60  Now,  in  the  mid-1990s  his  problems  were  the  problems  of  the  individual 
stockholder.  Over  the  intervening  period,  in  the  face  of intense  industrial  competition 
and  free-wheeling  financial  deregulation,  Americans  apparently  had  become 
decidedly  less  sympathetic  to  the  view  that  what  is good  for  Chrysler  is  good  for  the 
United  States.  instead  the  belief  had  spread  and  flourished  that  the  prime,  and 
perhaps  only  purpose  of  the  business  enterprise  is  “to  create  value  for 
shareholders,”  of  which  lacocca,  like  his  friend  Kerkorian,  was  one.  To  the 
proponents  of  “shareholder  value,”  to  sit  on  a  hoard  of  cash,  as  Chrysler’s  top 
55 management  was  trying  to  do,  was  yet  another  case  of  entrenched  management 
serving  its  own  interests  rather  than  the  interests  of stockholders. 
It  should  be  noted  that,  in  seeking  to  fend  off  the  raid  on  the  corporate 
treasury,  Eaton  claimed  only  that  the  company  needed  the  cash  to  make  it through 
the  next  cyclical  downturn;  the  need  to  invest  in  the  next  round  of  innovation  was 
absent  from  Eaton’s  rhetoric.  Meanwhile,  Chrysler  raised  its  dividend  another  25 
percent  to  try  to  placate  Kerkorian.  He was  not  mollified.  By  October  1995  Kerkorian 
was  still  threatening  a takeover  of  Chrysler.  But  he  failed  to  secure  the  financing.  In 
the  end,  in  February  1996,  Chrysler  cut  a  deal  with  Kerkorian.  He  got  a 
representative  on  the  Chrysler  board,  and  Chrysler  said  that  it  would  try  to  double 
the  size  of  its  stock  repurchase  in  1996  to  $2  billion,  and  would  repurchase  another 
billion  dollars  in  1997.  A  New  York  mutual  fund  manager  with  a holding  of  more  than 
3  million  shares  of  Chrysler  stock  remarked  that  he  was  “elated”.  In  return  for  the 
disgorged  cash  flow,  Kerkorian  agreed  not  to  increase  his  stake  in  Chrysler  in  the 
next  five  years.  The  current  Chrysler  managers  kept  their  jobs  -  and  saw  the  value 
of  their  stock-related  “incentive”  pay  increase  once  again.16’ 
The  case  of  Chrysler  illustrates  the  mounting  pressure  for  financial  liquidity  in 
the  U.S.  economy  in  the  mid-1990s  and  the  extent  to  which  major  industrial 
corporations  can  be  sources  of  such  liquidity.  The  trends  to  higher  dividends,  stock 
repurchases  and  downsizing  are  not  new  to  the  1990s.  From  the  data  we  have 
presented,  it  is  clear  that  around  the  beginning  of  the  1980s  the  pressures  of 
international  competition  combined  with  the  incentives  of  the  financial  revolution  to 
change,  perhaps  fundamentally,  the  way  in which  corporate  managers  conceived  of 
strategy.  When,  in  February  1996,  Patrick  Buchanan  got  the  attention  of  the  press 
by  lashing  out  at  corporate  America,  he  certainly  had  not  discovered  something 
new.  So  why  has  there  been  such  meager  popular  response  to  these  changes? 
Why  do  the  American  people  seem  to  favor  financial  liquidity  over  financial 
commitment. 
In  part  the  answer  is  ideology.  Even  those  Americans  who  are  losing  out  by 
the  erosion  of  sustainable  prosperity  believe  that  the  governance  of  “private 
enterprise”  is  none  of  their  business.  But  ideology  is  not  the  whole  answer.  The  fact 
is  that  a  substantial  proportion  of  Americans  -  including  the  45  percent  of 
Americans  who  have  pension  coverage’62  and  even  many  employees  whose  jobs 
are  becoming  more  insecure  --  are  sharing  in  a  process  that  “creates  value  for 
shareholders”,  even  if  it  does  not  create  sustainable  prosperity  for  society  as  a 
whole.  They  share  in  the  process  of  extracting  value  from  the  economy  through  a 
56 system  of  household  finance  that  has  come  to  rely  increasingly  on  the  prices  and 
yields  of  corporate  stock.  By  relying  increasingly  on  the  stock  market  to  augment 
their  incomes  and  savings,  these  relatively  privileged  Americans  have  developed  a 
major  stake  in  maintaining  high  returns  on  corporate  stock. 
Unlike  the  days  when  stockholding  in  any  one  company  was  fragmented 
among  hundreds  of  thousands  of  household  investors,  the  collective  power  of 
institutional  investing  now  permits  wealthholding  households  to  reap  these  high 
returns.  Over  the  past  three  decades  institutional  investors  have  become 
increasingly  central  to  the  American  saving  system,  and,  with  ever-increasing 
holdings  of  corporate  stocks,  constitute  the  backbone  of  the  market  for  corporate 
control.  As  Table  9  shows,  the  importance  of  institutional  investors  as  holders  of 
corporate  stock  has  grown  dramatically  since  the  1950s.  Households  held  90 
percent  of  all  corporate  equity  in  1952  but  only  48  percent  in  1994.  In  the  first  half 
of  1996  record  amounts  of  household  savings  --  $50  billion  dollars  in  January  and 
February  of  this  year  aIone16’  --  flowed  into  mutual  funds  to  reap  the  returns  of  the 
current  stock  market  boom.  In  place  of  direct  stockholding  by  households,  corporate 
stocks  have  increasingly  been  held  by  pension  funds  (a  25  percent  increase  from 
1952  to  1994)  and  mutual  funds  (10  percent  increase  from  1952 to  1994). 
Table  9.  U. S.  Corporate  Stock  Held  by  Households  and  Institutions,  1952-l  994 
percent,  except  for  total  value  (billions  of  dollars) 
Year  Total  House-  Foreign  Insurers  Private  Public  Mutual  Allfin- 
1952 
value  hold  pension  pension  funds  ancials* 
170.1  89.7  2.2  3.4  1.1  0.1  1.9  8.2 
1955  294.2  88.6  2.2  3.2  2.1  0.1  2.6  9.2 
1960  424.9  85.8  2.2  3.0  3.9  0.1  3.5  12.3 
1965  734.9  83.8  2.0  2.9  5.6  0.3  4.2  14.2 
1970  841.4  68.0  3.2  3.3  8.0  1.2  4.7  28.7 
1975  800.2  56.7  4.2  5.2  13.5  3.0  4.2  39.2 
1980  1534.7  60.9  4.2  5.1  14.6  2.9  2.8  34.9 
1985  2360.0  51.3  5.3  5.6  19.7  5.1  4.8  43.4 
1990  3520.2  48.6  6.3  5.0  13.5  8.4  6.6  45.1 
1991  4863.6  50.8  5.6  4.4  18.3  8.0  7.2  43.7 
1992  5462.9  51.4  5.5  4.0  17.6  8.2  8.3  43.1 
1993  6186.5  50.0  5.5  3.9  17.5  8.2  10.8  44.5 
1994  5877.7  47.9  5.8  3.3  17.5  8.4  11.9  46.2 
Source:  Board  of  Governors,  Federal  Reserve,  Flow  of  Funds  Accounts,  Flows  and  Outstandings, 
various  years. 
Using  the  collective  power  of  institutional  savings,  households  have  been 
able  to  extract  higher  yields  on  stock  out  of  the  corporate  economy.  Table  10 shows 
dividend/profit  payout  ratios  of  U.S.  nonfinancial  corporations,  as  well  U.S 
corporate  stock  and  corporate  bond  yields  from  1950  to  1995.  During  the  1950s 
57 1960s  and  1970s  payout  ratios  -  the  ratio  of  dividends  to  after-tax  adjusted 
corporate  profits  -  varied  from  a  low  of  39.7  percent  in  1966  (when  increases  in 
dividends  lagged  increased  profits)  to  a  high  of  58.6  percent  in  1974  (when  profits 
fell  by  21  percent  by  dividends  went  up  by  8  percent).  But  averaged  over  any  five- 
year  period  during  these  three  decades,  the  payout  ratio  stayed  remarkably  stable, 
never  going  above  49.6  percent  (I 970-1974)  and  never  falling  below  44.1  percent 
(1960-1964).  The  stability  is  even  greater  over  ten-year  periods  --  47.9  percent  for 
the  1950s  45.8  percent  for  the  1960s  and  46.9  percent  for  the  1970s.  These 
payout  ratios  were  high  by  international  standards,  manifesting  the  extent  to  which 
U.S.  corporations  returned  value  to  stockholders  even  before  the  rise  of  the 
institutional  investor. 
But  a marked  shift  in  payout  ratios  occurred  in the  1980  and  1990s.  In  I980, 
when  profits  when  down  by  22  percent  (the  largest  profits  decline  since  the  193Os), 
dividends  rose  by  I3  percent,  and  the  payout  ratio  shot  up  to  72  percent. 
Thereafter,  from  1980  through  1995,  the  payout  ratio  only  descended  to  the  pre- 
1980s  levels  in  1984,  when  it  declined  to  47.8  percent  from  59.8  percent  in  1983, 
not  because  dividends  fell  but  because  profits  went  up  by  29  percent.  There  was  no 
five-year  period  from  198C  to  1995  over  which  the  payout  ratio  did  not  average  at 
least  55  percent,  and  over  the  16  years  it averaged  over  62  percent.  In  1989,  when 
profits  fell  by  2.3  percent  dividends  went  up  a  near  record  18.9  percent  (the 
previous  post-war  high  had  been  19.3  percent  in  1974  when  inflation  was  running  at 
twice  the  rate  of  1989).  Since  1989,  the  payout  ratio  has  never  fallen  below  62.3 
percent  in  any  one  year. 
This  marked  change  in  payout  ratios  combined  with  corporate  stock 
repurchases  and  the  corporate  shift  from  employment  expansion  through  the  1970s 
to  employment  contraction  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  all  supported  the  high  yields  on 
corporate  stock.  In  addition,  with  inflation  defeated  --  largely  because  of  the  much 
diminished  power  of  the  American  labor  movement  as  well  as  the  persistent 
pressures  of  foreign  competition  -  real  bond  yields  became  markedly  higher  in  the 
1980s  and  1990s  than  they  had  been  in  previous  decades.  Also  pushing  up  bond 
yields  were  the  deregulation  of  financial  markets  that  occurred  from  the  late  1970s 
as  well  as  the  integration  of  the  bond  and  stock  markets  through  the  investment 
portfolio  strategies  of the  institutional  investors,  especially the  pension  funds that will 
readily  change  the  mix of  their  holdings  of  bonds  and  stocks  in  search  of  higher 
yields. 
58 Table  10.  U.S.  Corporate  Payout  Ratios,  Stock  Yields,  and  Bond  Yieids, 
1950-l  995 
Percent,  annual  averages 
-.- 
1950-l  959  1960-1969  1970-l 979  1980-I’  ‘~~2  GrjO_19  . j  1980-1995  ,.___._..__........................................  _  _._.._.............................................................................................................  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Payout  ratio  47.9  45.8  46.9  61..  63.5  62.1 
Total  stock  yield  19.7  10.7  5.4  17.2  12.1  15.3 
Stock  price  yield  14.8  7.5  1.4  12.9  9.1  11.5 
Dividend  yield  4.9  3.2  4.1  4.3  3.0  3.8 
Bond yield  1.29  2.65  1.14  5.79  4.67  5.37 
Notes:  Payout  ratio  is  corporate  dividends  as  a  percentage  of  corporate  profits  after  tax  with  inventor-y 
valuation  and  capital  consumption  adjustments.  Total stock yield is stock price yield plus 
dividend  yield.  Stock  price  yield  is the  annual  percent  increase  in  Standard  8  Poor’s  composite 
index  of  500  stocks.  Dividend  yield  is  the  dividend-price  ratio  for  the  500  stocks  in  the 
Standard  8  Poor’s  composite  index,  based  on  annual  averages  of  monthly  data. 
Sources:  Economic  Reoort  of  the  President,  1992,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Oftke,  1992:  368,  378, 
397,  403;  Economic  Reoort  of  the  President,  1996,  U.S., Government  Printing  Office,  1996: 
343.  360,  379,  384. 
The  search  for  higher  yields  is the  raison  d’efre  of  U.S.  institutional  investors. 
As  we  have  seen,  contrary  to  the  folklore  of  the  stock  market,  business  enterprises 
have  never  relied  to  any  significant  extent  on  public  stockholders  to  invest  in  the 
development  and  utilization  of  productive  resources.  Despite  the  “ownership”  rights 
attached  to  stockholding,  since  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century,  when  the 
market  in  industrial  securities  emerged,  public  stockholders  have  bought  equities 
precisely  because,  in  the  presence  of  liquid  stock  markets,  they  do  not  have  to 
commit  their  time,  energy,  or,  with  limited  liability,  additional  money  to  the  business 
enterprise  in,  which  they  hold  a  security.  Liquid  stock  markets  enable  public 
stockholders  to  avail  themselves  of  the  “Wall  Street  Rule”  --  if  they  do  not  want  to 
hold  equities  in  any  particular  company,  they  should  not  try  to  exercise  their 
“ownership”  rights,  but  should  simply  call  their  broker,  or  click  the  mouse  on  their 
computer,  and  be  rid  of their  “ownership”  stake.164 
What  the  shift  of  stockholding  to  institutional  investors  has  done  for 
American  households  is  to  give  them  an  alternative  to  the  “Wall  Street  Rule”. 
Through  the  collective  power  of  institutional  investing,  American  households  can 
now  put  pressure  on  companies  to  get  their  stock  prices  up.  As  we  have  seen,  the 
top  managers  of  American  companies  have  been  increasingly  open  to  these 
demands.  During  the  1960s  the  mutual  funds,  which  had  about  85  percent  of  their 
assets  in  stocks,  increased  their  control  over  outstanding  shares  to  more  than  four 
percent,  and  played  an  important  “arbitrage”  role  in  the  conglomeration  movement 
by  buying  up  large  blocks  of  stock  that  were  rumored  to  be  in  play  and  selling  them 
to  the  corporate  raiders  at  higher  prices.‘65  In  1975  the  institutional  investors,  now 
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commissions  on  trading,  setting  the  stage  for  a  major  increase  in  the  volume  of 
trading  through  the  churning  of  investment  portfolios.‘66  The  participation  of  a 
network  of  institutional  investors  made  it  possible  for  Michael  Milken  to  create  the 
junk-bond  market  in  the  1970s  and  to  use  it  to  launch  hostile  takeovers  in  the 
1980s. 
By  the  mid-1980s  institutional  investors  could  have  a  direct  effect  on 
corporations.  In  the  aftermath  of  the  October  1987  stock  market  crash,  major 
institutional  investors,  led  by  California  State  Public  Employees  Retirement  System 
and  its  head,  John  Hanson,  began  to  engage  in  ‘relational  investing”  to  get 
companies  to  take  actions  that  would  increase  the  value  of  their  stockholdings.’ 
As  a result,  the  S&P  index  only  declined  by  7 percent  in 1988,  and  bounced  back  by 
well  over  21  percent  in  1989. 
In  1976  Peter  Drucker,  a  prominent  management  guru,  wrote  a  book  The 
Unseen  Revolution  in  which  he  proclaimed  the  unnoticed  arrival  of  “pension  fund 
socialism”.168  Drucker  missed  the  mark.  During  the  1970s  another,  much  more 
profound,  “unseen  revolution”  was  taking  place  --  a revolution  in  the  organization  of 
production.  This  productive  revolution  was  invisible  to Americans  largely  because  it 
was  taking  place  abroad,  especially  in  Japan,  and  not  in the  United  States.  At  the 
same  time,  in  the  United  States,  a  much  more  visible  financial  revolution  was 
occurring  that,  in  seeking  to  extract  high  returns  from  existing  investments,  would 
exploit  the  vulnerability  of  American  industrial  enterprises  as  they  faced  new 
competitive  challenges.  By  the  1980s  these  transformations  of  production  and 
finance  would  create  a  sharp  division  among  American  workers  between  those  who 
could  save  for  the  future  by  living  off  the  past  and  those  who  had  to  face  the  future 
with  little  on  which  to  build.  What  has  occurred  has  not  simply  been  a  redistribution 
of  income.  Rather,  the  revolutions  in  production  and  finance  that  were  taking  place 
in  the  1970s  have  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  drastically 
conditions  for  sustainable  prosperity  in the  United  States. 
5.  Restoring  Sustainable  Prosperity? 
undermined  the  social 
In  the  late  1990s  sustainable  prosperity  in  the  United  States  requires  that  U.S. 
industrial  corporations  invest  in  broader  and  deeper  skill  bases  those  in  which  they 
have  invested  historically.  Investment  in  such  skill  bases  can  generate  the  higher 
quality,  lower  cost  products  that  can  give  U.S.  ,industrial  enterprises  sustained 
advantage  in  international  competition.  Such  investments  require  strategic  decision 
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financial  resources  to  learning  processes  that  are  collective  and  cumulative.  These 
abilities  and  incentives  derive  from  the  integration  of  strategic  managers  into  the 
processes  of  organizational  learning  in which  they  invest. 
Yet  over  the  past  few  decades,  as  we  have  documented,  with  the 
overextension  of  the  U.S.  industrial  corporation  and  the  rise  of  innovative  industrial 
competitors,  strategic  managers  of  U.S.  industrial  corporations  have  become 
increasingly  segmented  from  the  organizations  over  which  they  exercise  control. 
The  increased  power  of  financial  interests  over  the  past  two  decades  has 
exacerbated  strategic  segmentation  within  U.S.  industrial  corporations  by  creating 
powerful  incentives  for  top  corporate  managers  to  cooperate  in  securing  high  yields 
on  corporate  securities  on  the  basis  of  productive  capabilities  accumulated  in  the 
past  rather  than  invest  in  organizational  learning  that  can  form  the  foundations  for 
sustainable  prosperity  in  the  future. 
To  reestablish  the  organizational  foundations  for  sustainable  prosperity 
requires  a  transformation  of  the  institutions  of  corporate  governance  that  influence 
the  investment  process  in  most  American  industrial  corporations.  In  shaping 
economic  performance,  corporate  governance  is  a  social  process  that  affects  how 
the  resources  and  returns  of  industrial  corporations  are  allocated.  One’s  perspective 
on  the  adequacy  of  the  prevailing  corporate  governance  system  for  influencing 
economic  performance  will  be  reflected  in  one’s  answers  to  the  following  three 
questions: 
1)  Who  should  confrol  strategic  invesfmenf  decisions  in  fhe  cofpofafion? 
2)  What  types  of invesfmenfs  should  they  make? 
3)  How  should  the  returns  on  fhese  investments  be  disfribufed?‘6g 
To  reform  the  system  of  corporate  governance  to  achieve  sustainable  prosperity, 
one  must  compare  the  prevailing  locus  and  exercise  of  strategic  control  with  that 
which  should  be  put  in  place.  The  debate  over  corporate  governance  and  economic 
performance  is  therefore  a  debate  over  who  should  exercise  strategic  control  and 
toward  what  ends. 
Stockholder  Control 
Thus  far,  in  the  United  States,  the  debate  over  corporate  governance  has 
been  dominated  by  proponents  of  stockholder  control.‘70  They  view  stockholders  as 
the  “principals”  in  whose  interest  the  corporation  should  be  run.  They  recognize, 
however,  that  in  the  actual  running  oc the  corporation,.  stockholders  must  rely  on 
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these  functions  are  and  hence  why  stockholders  need  to  employ  managers).  In  a 
well-governed  enterprise,  managers  should  function  as  the  agents  of  the 
stockholders  in  allocating  corporate  resources  and  returns.  For  the  proponents  of 
stockholder  control,  the  problem  of  corporate  governance  is  to  ensure  that  the 
actions  of  managers  as  agents  are  aligned  with  the  interests  of  stockholders  as 
principals. 
The  proponents  of  stockholder  control  have  argued,  often  with  justification, 
that  strategic  managers  of  industrial  corporations  are  ill-informed  and  self-serving  in 
the  ways  in  which  they  allocate  corporate  resources  and  returns.  As  a  result,  such 
managers  do  not  adequately  “create  value  for  shareholders”.  To  increase  the 
returns  to  stockholders,  the  proponents  of  stockholder  control  advocate,  first, 
realigning  managerial  inc&ntives  through  the  use  of  stock-based  rewards;  second, 
using  the  market  for  corporate  control  to  enable  stockholders  to  take  over 
companies  and  replace  managers  who  misallocate  corporate  resources;  and,  third, 
distributing  more  returns  to  stockholders  so  that  they  can  directly  reallocate 
resources  in  ways  that  “maximize  shareholder  value”. 
But  why  are  stockholders  the  “principals”  in  whose  interests  the  corporation 
should  be  run?  The  proponents  of  stockholder  control  assert  that,  as  equity 
investors,  stockholders  are  the  only  participants  in  the  corporation  who  make 
investments  in  the  corporation  without  any  contractual  guarantee  of  a return.  Insofar 
as  they  secure  a  return  on  their  investments,  it is as  “residual  claimants”,  and  hence 
they  alone  have  an  interest  in  the  size  of  the  corporation’s  profit  or  loss.  The 
corporation  has  a  contractual  obligation  to  pay  fixed-income  claimants  a  specified 
remuneration  (the  market  price  of  their  factor  input)  irrespective  of  the  performance 
of  the  enterprise  as  a whole.  In  contrast  to fixed-income  claimants,  stockholders  as 
“residual  claimants”  to  corporate  returns  have  an  interest  in  allocating  corporate 
resources  to  their  “best  alternative  uses”  to  make  the  residual  as  large  as  possible. 
Since  all  other  “stakeholders”  in  the  corporation  will  be  receiving  the  returns  for 
which  they  have  contracted,  the  “maximization  of  shareholder  value”  will  result  in 
superior  economic  performance  for  not  only  the  particular  corporation  but  also  the 
economy  as  a whole. 
In  response  to  the  three  corporate  governance  questions,  therefore,  the 
proponents  of  stockholder  control  would  reply  that,  for  superior  economic 
performance,  1)  stockholders  should  have  strategic  control,  that  2)  permits  them 
(directly  or  through  their  managers  acting  as  agents)  to  allocate  their  corporate 
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highest  expected  rates  of  return  and  that,  3)  as  an  integral  element  in  that  allocation 
process,  enables  stockholders  to  determine  the  proportion  of  corporate  returns  that 
should  be  reinvested  in  the  particular  corporation  and  the  proportion  that  should  be 
distributed  to  them  for  reallocation  elsewhere  in the  economy. 
The  stockholder-control  perspective  reflects  deep-seated  beliefs  in  the 
centrality  of  private  property  rights  and  market  relations  to  the  corporate  economy. 
Yet,  since  the  1920s  if not  before,  the  very  existence  of  the  corporation  as  a central 
and  enduring  entity  in  the  U.S.  economy  has  prompted  a  number  of  American 
economists  to  question  the  relevance  of  these  beliefs.“’  As  they  should,  for  the 
realities  of  successful  industrial  development  in  the  United  States  as  well  as  abroad 
during  this  century  flatly  contradict  the  basic  assumptions  of  the  stockholder-control 
perspective. 
Let  us  consider  the  problems  with  the  stockholder-control  perspective  in 
terms  of  each  of the  three  critical  corporate  governance  questions. 
+  Who should  control  strategic  investment  decisions in the corporation? 
Stockholders  have  not  exercised  strategic  control  in  the  U.S.  industrial 
corporation  during  this  century.  The  very  evolution  of  the  corporate  form  in  the 
United  States  entailed  the  separation  of stock  ownership  from  strategic  control.  Yet, 
for  reasons  that  we  have  outlined,  it was  in  the  presence  of  the  separation  of  stock 
ownership  from  strategic  control  that  U.S.  industrial  corporations  made  the 
investments  in  organization  and  technology  that;  by  the  middle  decades  of  this 
century,  enabled  the  United  States  to dominate  the  world  economy. 
If,  as  the  proponents  of  stockholder  control  argue,  the  problem  of  corporate 
governance  is  that  managers  have  acquired  too  much  independent  power  over  the 
allocation  of  corporate  resources  and  returns,  the  advocates  of  stockholder  control 
do  not  explain  how  and  why  corporate  managers,  as  so-called  agents,  who 
presumably  could  be  hired,  rewarded,  and  fired  by  stockholders,  acquired  such 
power.  We  have  shown  that,  historically,  U.S.  corporate  managers  acquired  power 
because  they  were  the  strategic  decision  makers  who  allocated  corporate  resources 
to  organizational  learning  processes  that  enabled  these  corporations  to  generate 
innovation  and  attain  sustained  competitive  advantage  in  the  industries  in  which 
they  competed.  We  have  also  argued  that,  in  general,  the  separation  of  stock 
ownership  from  strategic  control  was  a  precondition  for  placing  such  strategic 
decision  making  power  in  the  hands  of  managers  who  were  integrated  into  the 
collective  and  cumulative  learning  processes  that  made  their  enterprises  innovative. 
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from  strategic  control,  the  investments  in  securities  that  public  stockholders  made 
were  not  used  to  finance  investments  in  new  productive  capabilities  but  to  transfer 
ownership  rights  to  revenues  that  might  be  forthcoming  from  productive  capabilities 
that  had  already  been  put  in  place.  Hence,  even  with  the  rise  of  the  publicly  held 
corporation  at  the  turn  of  the  century,  the  new  public  stockholders  did  not  make 
strategic  decisions  concerning  investments  in productive  resources. 
On  the  contrary,  American  households  and  some  financial  institutions  were 
enticed  to  hold  stock  because  of  the  demonstrated  revenue-generating  capabilities 
of  the  going  concerns  for  which  the  stock  was  issued.  As  the  revenue-generating 
capabilities  of  these  industrial  corporations  were  sustained  over  the  first  three 
decades  of  this  century,  a  highly  liquid  market  in  industrial  stocks  emerged,  thus 
making  stockholders  all  the  more  willing  to  make  financial  investments  in  corporate 
stock  without  having  any  knowledge  of,  or  interest  in,  the  strategic  decision  making 
processes  that  were  determining  corporate  investments  in  productive  resources. 
That  is,  the  investment  decisions  of public  stockholders  have  always  been  based  on 
financial  considerations,  not  productive  considerations. 
To  recognize  that,  at  some  point  in  the  evolution  of  a  particular  industrial 
corporation,  the  corporate  managers  who  occupy  positions  of  strategic  decision 
making  may  become  iii-suited  to  allocate  resources  to  innovative  investment 
strategies  in  no  way  implies  that  stockholders,  who  have  not  been  the  strategic 
decision  makers  in  U.S.  industrial  corporations  during  this  century,  have  either  the 
incentives  or  abilities  to  perform  that  function.  Rather  the  problem  for  corporate 
governance  is  to  understand  why  the  corporate  managers  who  currently  occupy 
positions  of  strategic  control  in  major  U.S.  industrial  corporations  lack  the  incentives 
and  abilities  to  allocate  resources  to innovative  investment  strategies. 
+  What  fypes  of invesfmenfs  should  they  make? 
The  proponents  of  stockholder  control  argue  that  stockholders  allocate  their 
financial  resources  to  those  alternative  investment  opportunities  that  offer  the 
highest  expected  rates  of  return.  In  doing  so,  they  assume  that  stockholders  take 
the  alternative  opportunities  in  which  they  can  invest  as  given.  There  is  no 
expectation  that  stockholders  are  engaged  in  making  innovative  investments  that 
create  new  opportunities  for  generating  returns,  either  directly  in  selecting  their 
investment  portfolios  or  indirectly  through  the  activities  of  managers  who  are 
supposed  to  seme  as  their  agents.  Such  a  constrained  view  of  the  corporate 
investment  process  is  not  problematic  for  the  proponents  of  stockholder  control 
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arguments,  the  stockholder-control  perspective  ignores  the  process  of  innovation  as 
a  central  phenomenon  in  determining  the  performance  ci  the  industrial  enterprise  or 
the  economy  in which  it operates.  “’ 
How  far  the  stockholder-control  perspective  is from  recognizing  the  centrality 
of  innovative  investment  to  the  performance  of  the  eccnomy  s  demonstrated  in  a 
recent  presidential  address  to  the  American  Finance  Association  by  the 
perspective’s  foremost  proponent,  Michael  Jensen.  In  his  address,  entitled  “The 
Modern  industrial  Revolution,  Exit,  and  the  Failure  of  Internal  Control  Systems,” 
Jensen  highlights  Joseph  Schumpeter’s  concept  of  creative  destruction  as  a 
seminal  insight  into  the  importance  of  “efficient  exit”  from  an  industry.‘73  Yet,  of  all 
the  economists  of  the  twentieth  century,  Schumpeter  demonstrated  the  centrality  of 
innovative  investments  to  the  process  of  economic  development.  When,  in 
Capitalism.  Socialism,  and  Democracy,  Schumpeter  argued  (in  a  famous  passage 
that  Jensen  quotes),  “the  problem  that  is  usually  being  visualized  [by  the  economist] 
is  how  capitalism  administers  existing  structures,  whereas  the  relevant  problem  is 
how  it  creates  and  destroys  them,”  his  concern  was  with  the  role  of  corporate 
enterprises  in  generating  the  innovation  process,  not  with  how  (as  Jensen  would, 
quite  incredibly,  have  his  followers  believe)  corporate  managers  withdraw  resources 
from  the  corporate  enterprise.‘74  Schumpeter  would  have  included  “efficient  exit”  as 
a  way  in  “capitalism  administers  existing  structures.”  In  fact,  public  stockholders 
have  nothing  to  do  with  strategic  allocation  of  resources  to  innovation,  so  it  is  not 
surprising  that  the  proponents  of  stockholder  control  have  nothing  to  say  about 
Schumpeter’s  “relevant  problem”:  how,  through  innovation,  the  economy  engages  in 
“creative  destruction.” 
+  How  should  file  returns  on these  investments  be distributed? 
Indeed,  in  his  subsequent  writings,  Schumpeter  went  on  to  stress  the  critical 
distinction  between  innovation  that  generates  economic  development  and 
adaptation  that  simply  takes  existing  investment  opportunities  as  given.175  With  its 
focus  on  extracting  resources  from  corporations  through  “efficient  exit”  -  of  which 
“disgorging  the  free  cash  flow”  (as  Jensen  has  so  evocatively  put  it)  is  the 
mechanism  that  particularly  enhances  stockholder  control  -  the  stockholder  control 
perspective  is  concerned  only  with  adaptation,  The  perspective  has  no  conception, 
let  alone  a theory,  of  innovation. 
Yet  the  proponents  of  stockholder  control  favor  distributing  returns  to 
stockholders  so  that  they  can  reallocate  them  to  their  best  alternative  uses.  The 
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is that  they  have  placed  their  assets  at risk in the  enterprise  on  the  understanding 
that  they  can  lay claim to the  residual  -what  we shall call “the gains of innovation”  -- 
that  the  enterprise  generates.  Deny  the  residual  to stockholders,  so the  proponents 
of stockholder  control  argue,  and  finance  for industrial  investment  will disappear. 
But  the  notion  that  public  stockholders  invest  in  productive  assets  has  no 
basis  in the  history  of successful  industrial  development  in the  United  States.  Public 
stockholders  have  never,  as  a  general  rule,  put  their  financial  assets  at  risk  by 
investing  in  the  productive  assets  of  the  industrial  enterprise.  Rather  they  have 
invested  their  money  in the  securities  issued  by successful  enterprises  on the  basis 
of investments  in productive  assets  that  have  already  been  made.  They  have  been 
willing  to  place  their  money  in  these  securities,  not  because  they  are  “residual 
claimants”  to  the  gains  from  innovative  enterprise  but  because  of  the  liquidity  of 
these  securities  on financial  markets. 
By the  same  token,  in the  decades  prior to the  197Os, when  U.S.  industrial 
corporations  were  most  successful  in international  competition,  the  dividend  policy 
of  industrial  corporations  was  to  maintain  the  money  level  of  dividends  but  not  to 
share  the gains  of innovation  with  stockholders.‘76  Successful  enterprises  tended  to 
use  the  gains  of innovation  for  reinvestment  in productive  assets,  including  human 
resources,  and  to  increase  the  earnings  of  employees.  Moreover,  industrial 
enterprises  rarely sought  to boost  stock prices by repurchasing  stock. Yet during this 
period  there  was  no  shortage  of  capital  for  investment  in  productive  resources, 
either  in going  concerns  or  new  ventures.  Since  the  1980s  however,  as we  have 
seen,  through  the transformation  of Wall Street  combined with the financial  power of 
institutional  investors,  stockholders  have been  able to lay claim to a larger  share  of 
the  returns  of U.S. industrial  enterprises,  even as these enterprises  have  lost market 
share  in the  product  markets  in which they have competed  internationally. 
The  stockholder-control  perspective  has  nothing  to  say  about  the  rise of the 
United  States  to a position  of international  industrial leadership  during the first six  or 
seven  decades  of the  twentieth  century.  If it has anything  to  say  about  the  role of 
stockholder  control  in  the  U.S.  industrial  corporation  over  the  last  two  or  three 
decades,  it  is  about  how  the  enhanced  power  of  stockholders  to  lay  claim  to 
corporate  returns  has  exploited  the  vulnerability  and  contributed  to  the  relative 
decline  of  American  industrial  enterprises  in  international  competition.  The 
stockholder-control  perspective  provides  a  rationale  for  Americans  who  hold 
corp_orate stock  to  live  off  the  accumulations  of  the  past;  it  does  not  provide  a 
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reestablish  the  social  conditions  for  innovative  enterprise  and  sustainable  prosperity 
in  the  future.  It is about  destruction,  not  creation. 
Managerial  Control 
What,  then,  is  the  alternative  to  the  stockholder-control  perspective?  One 
alternative  that  has  been  put  forth  recently  in  proposals  to  improve  the  competitive 
capabilities  of  American  industry  can  be  termed  the  “managerial  control” 
perspective.“’  On  each  of  the  three  questions  of  corporate  governance,  the 
managerial  control  perspective  differs  significantly  from  the  stockholder-control 
perspective.  But  even  then,  as  we  shall  see,  the  managerial  control  perspective 
falls  short  of  providing  an  adequate  framework  for  reforming  corporate  governance 
to  generate  sustainable  prosperity. 
+  Who  should  confrol  strategic  investmenf  decisions  in  fhe  corpo&ion? 
Unlike  the  proponents  of  stockholder  control,  the  proponents  of  managerial 
control  recognize  that  the  competitive  success  of  the  industrial  corporation  depends 
on  investments  in  innovation  that  entail  specialized  in-house  knowledge  and  that 
require  time,  and  hence  financial  commitment,  to  achieve  their  developmental 
potential.  The  importance  of  innovative  investment  strategies  for  the  success  of  the 
corporation  and  the  economy  creates  a  central  role  for  corporate  managers  in 
determining  the  allocation  of corporate  resources  and  returns. 
The  fundamental  difference  between  the  stockholder-control  and 
managerial-control  perspectives  is  captured  by  two  quotes  that  appeared,  one  after 
the  other,  in  a  Business  Week  report  on  Kerkorian’s  takeover  attempt  of  Chrysler. 
Michael  Jensen,  a  leading  proponent  of  stockholder  control,  stated:  “What  is  the 
purpose  of  [Chrysler’s]  cash?  It’s  to  allow  them  [Chrysler’s  managers]  to  stay  fat  and 
lazy.”  Michael  Porter,  a  leading  proponent  of  managerial  control,  asked,  “Who’s 
going  to  make  the  investments,  if the  presumption  is that  any  management  team  will 
waste  resources?““’ 
The  proponents  of  managerial  control  argue  that,  with  appropriate  advice 
from  business  academics  and  management  consultants  on  such  matters  as 
“competitive  strategy”  and  “core  competence,”  current  managers  should  be  allowed 
to  allocate  corporate  resources.  The  proponents  of  managerial  control  provide  no 
response  to  arguments  that  the  current  top  managers  of  U.S.  industrial  corporations 
have  grown  “fat  and  lazy”,  or that  they  have  lost  the  incentive  to  invest  for  the  future. 
Besides  appropriate  advice  from  consultants,  all  current  managers  need  is  “patient 
67 capital”  that  will  enable  them  to  see  their  investments  in  productive  resources 
through  to  competitive  success. 
+  Whaf  types  of investments  should  they  make? 
The  managerial-control  perspective  is  full of  words  such  as  “capabilities,” 
“knowledge,”  “skills”,  “learning,”  “factor  creation”,  and  “innovation”  as  sources  of 
“sustained  competitive  advantage”  for  the  enterprise.  This  orientation  alone  sets  it 
apart  from  the  stockholder-control  perspective,  and  brings  the  proponents  of 
managerial  control  in  much  closer  contact  with  the  real  world  of  industrial 
development.  In  expressing  a  need  for  “patient  capital”,  moreover,  they  recognize 
(however  implicitly)  that  the  value-creating  capabilities  of  productive  assets, 
including  human  assets,  result  from  a  developmental  process  in  which  the 
enterprise  must  invest. 
But,  focused  as  it is  on what  existing  managers  think  and  do  rather  than  how 
they  are  integrated  into,  or  segmented  from,  the  productive  organizations  in  which 
they  invest,  the  managerial-control  perspective  provides  no  analysis  of  the  social 
foundations  of  innovation  and  industrial  development.  From  the  perspective  of 
managerial  control,  what  determines  whether  or  not  an  enterprise  invests  in 
innovation  is  the  “mind  set”  of  the  strategic  manager.  But  the  managerial-control 
perspective  does  not  see  the  strategic  manager  as  an  actor  in  a  social  environment 
that  includes  organizations  and  institutions.  What  determines  the  mind  set  of  the 
manager  is  rarely  addressed. 
In  particular,  little,  if  any  attention,  is  paid  to  the  relation  of  the  strategic 
manager  to  the  organization  that  he  is  supposed  to  be  managing.  For  example,  in 
his  influential  management  book,  Competitive  Strateov,  published  in  1980,  Michael 
Porter  devoted  only  seven  out  of  some  400  pages  to  what  he  calls  “organization”, 
and  these  seven  pages  are  bereft  of  any  discussion  that  pertains  to  the  social 
interaction  of  people  within  or  across  business  enterprises.‘7g  In  a  subsequent,  and 
similarly  influential,  management  book,  Competitive  Advantaqe,  Porter  included  a 
chapter  entitled,  “Achieving  Interrelationships.”  But  he  narrowly  confined  the 
discussion  to  strategic  relationships  between  business  unit  managers,  and  even 
then  felt  compelled  to  explain,  by way  of a footnote,  why  “this  book  on  strategy  must 
contain  an  unexpected  chapter  on  organization.“180  The  reason  that  Porter  gave  is 
that  “organizational  impediments”  can  sometimes  get  in  the  way  of  good  strategy, 
and  therefore  warrant  study. 
68 +  How  should  the  returns  on  these  investments  be  distributed? 
While  the  managerial-control  perspective  ignores  the  relationships  of 
strategic  managers  to  other  participants  in  the  process  of  industrial  in_;ovation,  it 
focuses  on  the  relation  of  the  strategic  managers  to  the  firm’s  stockholde-s.  Like  :he 
proponents  of  stockholder  control,  the  advocates  of  managerial  ccntrol  view 
strategic  managers  as  agents  of  stockholders.  But  the  managerial-control 
perspective  recognizes  the  need  for  strategic  managers  to  make  developmental 
investments  if  the  enterprise  is  to  achieve  sustained  competitive  advantage.  The 
managerial-control  perspective  argues,  therefore,  for  managerial  autonomy  in 
setting  and  implementing  investment  strategy,  and  looks  to  large  stockholders  such 
as  wealthy  individuals  and  pension  funds  to  become  “patient  capitalists”  -  that  is,  to 
provide  managers  with  the  control  over  financial  resources  that  innovative 
investment  strategies  require.  Hence  the  managerial-control  perspective  would 
profoundly  disagree  with  the  penchant  of  the  proponents  of  stockholder  control  for 
“disgorging  the  free  cash  flow”,  mainly  because  the  proponents  of  managerial 
control  understand  the  importance  of what  we  have  called  financial  commitment  for 
innovative  investment  strategies. 
In  looking  to  public  stockholders  to  provide  financial  commitment  to  U.S. 
industrial  corporations,  however,  the  proponents  of  managerial  control  are  looking  to 
a  group  of  people  who  have  claims  on  corporations  but  who  have  never  had  the 
abilities  or  incentives  to  support  innovative  investment  strategies.  Public 
stockholders  are,  and  have  always  been,  financial  investors,  not  industrial 
capitalists.  In  the  history  of  successful  U.S.  industrial  development,  some  wealthy 
individuals  have  performed  the  role  of  “patient  capitalists”,  but  they  have  done  so 
as  venture  capitalists  with  a view  to  reaping  returns  by  taking  the  new  venture  public 
once  the  enterprise  has  become  a  going  concern.“’  The  most  successful  venture 
capitalists,  moreover,  have  had  a  deep  knowledge  of  the  technologies  being 
developed  and  close  relationships  with  the  key  developmental  personnel.  Once, 
through  an  initial  public  offering,  a  company  that  has  made  the  transition  from  new 
venture  to  going  concern  has  become  publicly  held,  the  key  to  continued  financial 
commitment  has  been,  as  we  have  shown,  the  dispersion  of  stockholder  power  so 
that,  in  the  quest  for  financial  liquidity,  these  outsiders  to  the  innovation  process 
cannot  reduce  the  corporate  retentions  that  have  been  the  financial  basis  for 
innovative  investment. 
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separated  from  strategic  control  and  when  the  promise  of  sustainable  prosperity 
prevailed,  institutional  investors  such  as  pension  funds  and  insurance  companies 
did  provide  a degree  of  financial  commitment  to  industrial  corporations  by  absorbing 
long-term  corporate  bond  issues  at  interest  rates  that  financial  regulation  kept  low. 
This  bonded  debt  was  in  addition  to,  rather  than  a  substitute  for,  retained  earnings. 
But  as  pension  funds  became  increasingly  important  to  the  savings  strategies  of 
American  households,  they  were  influential  in  overthrowing  financial  regulation  that 
constrained  their  ability  to  extract  higher  yields  on  their  investment  portfolios  (the 
most  important  piece  of  legislation  being  the  Employee  Retirement  Income  Security 
Act  of  1974),  and  they  shifted  their  portfolios  from  bonds  to  stocks  in  their  quest  for 
higher  yields.  More  recently,  pension-fund  managers  have  been  under  even  more 
pressure  to  secure  higher  yields  on  their  portfolios  as  American  households  have 
increasingly  turned  to  mutual  funds  to manage  their  retirement  savings. 
But  even  if U.S.  institutional  investors  were  inclined  to  be  “patient  capitalists”, 
the  funds  that  they  would  supply  to  U.S.  industrial  corporations  would  not  generate 
sustainable  prosperity  without  a  dramatic  transformation  of  the  ways  in  which 
investments  in  corporate  assets  are  made.  To  invest  in  innovation  on  a  scale  that 
can  generate  sustainable  prosperity,  strategic  decision  makers  in  industrial 
corporations  must  invest  in  broader,  deeper,  organizationally  integrated,  skill  bases. 
To  have  the  incentives  and  abilities  to  make  such  investments,  these  strategic 
decision  makers  must  themselves  be  integrated  into  the  organizational  learning 
processes  for  which  the  broad  and  deep  skill  bases  form  foundations.  In  the 
absence  of  such  investments,  even  those  corporate  employees  who  could 
potentially  benefit  from  investments  in  organizational  learning  are  apt,  through  their 
pension  funds,  to  demand  high  returns  today  rather  than  support  financial 
commitment.  In  the  absence  of  investments  in  organizational  integration  that  can 
enable  business  enterprises  to  gain  sustained  competitive  advantage,  employees 
do  not,  with  good  reason,  have  any  reason  to  believe  that  they  will  share  in  the 
gains  of  innovation  in the  future. 
Organizational  Control 
Notwithstanding  all  the  rhetoric  about  stockholders  as  “residual  claimants”, 
once  one  recognizes  the  importance  of  organizational  learning  to  the  development 
and  utilization  of  productive  resources,  one  cannot  avoid  the  fact  that,  in  generating 
innovation  and  industrial  development,  the  most  important  investments  that  an 
70 enterprise  makes  are  in  human  resources,  not  physical  resources.  In  line  with  the 
conventional  concept  of  property,  corporate  accounting  r..vlCiptCs  cc;;nt  ZS 
expenses  both  the  invesfments  in  human  resources  that  rake  the  fcrms  of 
knowledge  and  skills  and  the  returns  to  human  resources  that  take  the  icrms  of 
higher  incomes,  better  benefits,  and  more  stable  employ!.*+nt.  Althczgh,  in 
common  parlance,  business  executives  will  say  that  their  human  assets  are  their 
companies’  most  valuable  assets,  in  corporate  law  and  in  accounting  practice 
human  capabilities  are  not  treated  as  corporate  assets  because  people  cannot  be 
owned.  The  conventional  concept  of  property  on  which  this  law  and  practice  is 
based,  however,  ignores  the  collective  assets  and  collective  returns  that  are  the 
essential  realities  of  the  innovative  enterprise.  From  our  perspective  -  which  one 
might  call  the  “organizational-control”  perspective  -  sustainable  prosperity,  be  it  in 
the  United  States  or  elsewhere,  requires  not  only  that  these  investments  in 
collective  assets  be  made  but  also  that  those  whose  know!edge,  skills,  and  learning 
are  central  to  the  development  and  utilization  of  these  collective  assets  have  the 
expectation  of  sharing  in  the  so-called  “residual”  -  that  is,  the  gains  of  innovation. 
With  the  increased  power  of  stockholders  to  extract  returns  from 
corporations,  a small  but  growing  number  of economists  and  politicians  have  argued 
that  there  are  other  corporate  “stakeholders”,  besides  stockholders,  who  have  a 
claim  to  corporate  retums.18’  The  stakeholder  perspective  does  not  challenge  the 
claims  of  the  stockholder-control  perspective  that  stockholders  are  “principals”;  it 
accepts  that  stockholders  have  “residual  claimant”  status  because  they  invest  in  the 
productive  assets  of  the  enterprise.  Rather  the  stakeholder  perspective  argues  that 
the  physical  assets  in  which  stockholders  allegedly  invest  are  not  the  only  assets 
that  create  value  in the  corporation.  Human  assets  create  value  as  well.  Individuals 
invest  in  their  own  human  assets,  and  to  some  extent  these  human  assets  in  which 
they  invest  are  “firm-specific”.  Hence  employees  make  value-creating  investments  in 
a  particular  firm,  and  therefore,  alongside  stockholders,  should  be  accorded 
“residual  claimant”  status.  In  allocating  corporate  returns,  the  governance  of  U.S. 
corporations  should  recognize  the  central  importance  of  these  investments  in 
human  assets  to the  success  of the  enterprise  and  the  prosperity  of the  economy. 
In  its  critique  of  the  proponents  of  stockholder  control  and  in  its  emphasis  on 
investment  in  “firm-specific”  human  assets  for  the  success  of  the  economy,  the 
stakeholder  perspective  has  a  political  affinity  to  the  organizational-control 
perspective  on  corporate  governance  that  we  emerges  from  our  own  analysis  of  the 
social  foundations  of  industrial  development.  Political  affinity  should  not,  however, 
71 be  confused  with  analytical  similarity.  Like  the  stockholder-control  perspective,  the 
stakeholder  perspective  clings  to  the  neoclassical  theory  of  the  market  economy  as 
its  analytical  framework,  and  makes  ad  hoc  assumptions  within  this  framework  to 
stress  the  importance  of  firm-specific  human  assets  to  the  economy.  Specifically, 
the  stakeholder  perspective  fails  to  analyze  the  process  of  innovation,  and  as  a 
result  fails  to  address  the  organizational  and  institutional  foundations  of  sustainable 
prosperity.  In  response  to  each  of  the  three  critical  corporate  governance  questions 
concerning  strategic  control,  types  of  investments,  and  distribution  of  returns,  let  US 
summarize  the  main  propositions  of  the  organizational-control  perspective,  and 
indicate  how  the  stakeholder  perspective  on  corporate  governance  falls  short  of 
understanding  the  foundations  of  sustainable  prosperity. 
+  Who  should  control  strategic  investment  decisions  in  the  corporation? 
The  organizational-control  perspective  argues  that  strategic  investment 
decisions  should  be  made  by  participants  in  the  corporation  who  are  integrated  into 
the  organizational  learning  processes  that  can  generate  products  that  are  higher 
quality  and  lower  cost  products  than  those  previously  produced.  Such  strategic 
integration  provides  the  only  basis  for  making  investment  decisions  in  the  face  of 
inherent  uncertainty  with  any  prospect,  other  than  pure  luck,  of  success.  Whatever 
the  hierarchical  structure  of  authority  and  responsibility  within  the  corporation  for 
committing  financial  resources  to  innovative  investment  strategies,  those  who  wield 
this  authority  and  responsibility  must  be  integrated  into  the  relevant  learning 
collectivities  if  they  are  to  have  the  abilities  and  incentives  to  transform  inherent 
uncertainty  into  sustained  competitive  advantage. 
The  stakeholder  perspective  has  no  conception  of  strategic  control  (hence 
we  have  deliberately  refrained  from  using  the  term  “stakeholder-control”  in  referring 
to  this  perspective),  primarily  because  it  has  no  theory  of  the  firm  other  than  as  a 
combination  of  physical  and  human  assets  that  for  some  reason  -  labeled  “firm- 
specificity”  --  happen  to  be  gathered  together  in  a  particular  company.  As  in 
neoclassical  economic  theory,  actual  investment  decisions  are  made  by  individual 
actors.  The  role  of  corporate  governance  is  to  get  factor  returns  “right”,  so  that 
these  individual  actors  are  induced  to  make  the  “firm-specific”  investments  that  the 
enterprise  requires.  Such  a perspective  focuses  only  on the  relation  between  types 
of  investment  (physical  or  human,  general  or  specific)  and  returns,  and  hence 
cannot  address  how  strategic  control  over  the  allocation  of  resources  may  or  may 
not  result  in  innovative  investments. 
72 +  What  types  of investments  should  they  make? 
For  the  enterprise  to  remain  innovative,  investments  must  be  made  in 
organizational  learning  processes  that  can  generate  higher  quality,  lower  cost 
products  than  currently  exist.  It  is  inherent  in  the  innovation  process  that  the 
breadth  and  depth  of  the  skills  that  must  be  integrated  to  produce  a  particular 
product  will  change  over  time  as  technology  develops.  The  most  dramatic  changes 
in  the  breadth  and  depth  of  organizational  learning  processes  occur  when,  as  has 
been  the  case  of  the  Japanese  challenge  to  American  industry,  business 
enterprises  make  productive  investments  in  social  environments  that  favor 
investments  in  broader  and  deeper  skills  bases.  To  make  innovative  responses  to 
such  challenges  the  business  enterprise  must  transform  its  social  organization.  To 
promote  sustainable  prosperity,  corporate  governance  must  be  concerned  with 
investments  in  social  organization  that  can  generate  innovation  and  competitive 
advantage. 
The  stakeholder  perspective  refers  to  “firm-specific”  assets  but  makes  no 
attempt  to  understand  the  investments  in  organizational  learning  that  make  assets 
specific  to  a  particular  collectivity.  In  Ownership  and  Control:  Rethinkinq  Corporate 
Governance  for  the  Twentv-First  Centun(,  Margaret  Blair  recognizes  the  need  for  an 
analysis  of  what  she  calls  “wealth  creation”‘83  in  order  to  make  the  case  for  a 
corporate  governance  process  that  allocates  returns  to  “firm-specific”  human  assets. 
But  she  provides  no  analysis  of the  process  that  generates  higher  quality,  lower  cost 
products.  She  merely  asserts  that  investment  in  “firm-specific”  assets  can  generate 
“quasi-rents”  for  the  investor,  but  does  not  specify  under  what  conditions 
(technological,  organizational,  and  competitive)  such  increased  returns  are 
generated,  or why  they  should  be  specific  to  a particular  company. 
+  How  should  the returns  on these investments  be distributed? 
The  organizational-control  perspective  argues  that,  to  promote  sustainable 
prosperity,  returns  must  be  reinvested  in  learning  collectivities  that  can  generate 
sustained  competitive  advantage.  Investments  in  human  assets  take  the  form  of 
remuneration  for  those  engaged  in  the  organizational  learning  processes.  The  need 
for  financial  commitment  means  that  returns  under  the  control  of  the  organization 
are  foundations  for  ensuring  investment  in  learning  processes  that  are  collective 
and  cumulative.  But  the  changing  character  of  the  organizational  learning 
processes  that  can  generate  competitive  advantage  means  that  cumulation 
disadvantages  will  eventually  arise  if  the  units  of  strategic  control  do  not  change 
accordingly.  To  promote  sustainable  prosperity,  corporate  governance  must  be 
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are  engaged  in  cumulative  learning  but  also  with  ensuring  that,  in  the  form  of 
committed  finance,  control  over  returns  devolves  to  strategic  decision  makers  who 
are  and  remain  integrated  into  the  processes  of  organizational  learning.  At  the 
same  time,  to  promote  sustainable  prosperity,  corporate  governance  must  be 
concerned  with  limiting  the  allocation  of  returns  to  those  interests  -  such  as  public 
stockholders  -  who  can  exercise  claims  on  corporate  returns  but  who  make  no 
contribution  to  the  processes  of collective  and  cumulative  teaming. 
Lacking  a  concept  of  strategic  decision  making  and  an  analysis  of  the 
innovation  process,  the  stakeholder  perspective  sees  returns  as  attaching  to 
specific  human  and  physical  assets,  and  views  the  claims  to  these  assets  as  being 
based  on  the  investments  that  individual  stockholders  <and employees  make.  The 
assumptions  that  both  investment  in  and  returns  from  productive  investments  attach 
to  individuals,  even  when  these  factors  of  production  are  combined  in  firms, 
preclude  an  analysis  of  the  collective  character  of  corporate  investment  and 
corporate  returns.  Hence  the  stakeholder  perspective  has  no  analytical  basis  for 
understanding  a  system  of  corporate  governance  that  can  allocate  returns  from 
existing  productive  investments  to  new  productive  investments  that  are  collective. 
To  promote  sustainable  prosperity,  a system  of  corporate  governance  must  facilitate 
collective  decision  making  concerning  the  allocation  of  resources  and  returns. 
Moreover,  the  stakeholder  perspective  has  no  theoretical  basis  for  explaining 
the  historical  fact  that  public  stockholders  are  not  and  have  not  been  participants  in 
this  process  of  collective  investment.  Unlike  those  who  receive  returns  for  engaging 
in  the  learning  processes  that,  with  appropriate  organizational  integration  and 
adequate  financial  commitment,  can  generate  new  sources  of  value,  stockholders 
collect  rents  on  past  accumulation.  Moreover,  the  size  of these  rents  -  the  yields  on 
their  stocks  -  is  not  dependent  on  the  scarcity  value  of  the  financial  resources  that 
they  control  but  on  their  political  power  to  lay  claim  to  corporate  returns.  The 
stakeholder  perspective  does  not  address  the  changes  in  governance  of  U.S. 
corporations,  and  the  governance  of  the  U.S.  economy  more  generally,  that  have 
enabled  stockholders  to  increase  their  political  power  to  extract  higher  returns.  Nor 
does  the  stakeholder  perspective  address  the  implications  of  this  historic  change  for 
the  prospects  for  sustainable  prosperity  in the  U.S.  economy. 
The  problem  of  corporate  governance  and  industrial  development  is  not 
resolved  by  simply  advocating  that  industrial  corporations  be  run  for  other 
“stakeholders”  -  especially  employees  -  besides  stockholders.  The  danger  is  that 
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increasingly  been  the  case  with  stockholders,  extract  corporate  revenues  whether  or 
not  their  contributions  to  the  generation  of  these  revenues  make  these  returns 
possible  on  a sustainable  basis.  The  result  of the  creation  of  a  “stakeholder  society” 
might  be  to  increase  the  propensity  for  major  industrial  enterprises  and  the  economy 
in  which  they  operate  to  live  off  the  past  rather  than  invest  for  the  future. 
If  sustainable  prosperity  is  the  objective,  proposals  to  reform  the  corporate 
governance  system  must  be  based  on  a theory  of  the  innovative  enterprise.  Without 
such  a  theory,  stakeholder  arguments  run  the  risk  of  encouraging  other  groups, 
besides  stockholders,  to  become  claimants  to  a given,  and  even  diminishing  pool  of 
returns.  To  avoid  such  a  political  and  economic  stalemate  requires  a  conception  of 
how  investments  in  people  working  together  in  organizations  can  generate  the 
returns  in  international  competition  that  make  sustainable  prosperity  possible.  To 
make  constructive  contributions  to  the  corporate  governance  debate,  economists 
must  shed  the  shackles  -  both  methodological  and  ideological  --  of  an  economic 
theory  that  was  never  designed  to  understand  how  an  economy  develops,  and  build 
their  own  capabilities  for  analyzing  the  processes  of  industrial  innovation, 
international  competition,  and  the  social  foundations  of  sustainable  prosperity.‘84 
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